The government of Lebanon is currently committed to submitting by August 31 a plan for the disarming of the Lebanese Hezbollah organization. The United States expects that the plan will be implemented by the end of the year. According to a statement by US envoy Tom Barrack on Tuesday, “The Lebanese army and the government are not talking about going to war. They are talking about how to convince Hezbollah to give up those arms.”
Sheikh Naim Qassem, the veteran ideologue and current leader of Hezbollah, has said that “no life” will be possible if the Lebanese state moves to disarm Hezbollah.
The ceasefire agreement of November, 2024, which was agreed after the severe pumelling which Hezbollah received at the hands of the IDF in the preceding months, includes the provision that the government of Lebanon disarm Hezbollah and dismantle its infrastructure throughout the country.
The Lebanese Cabinet approved in early August a road map presented by Barrack in June, for the implementation of the disarmament of the Shia Islamist movement, and the withdrawal of Israel from positions held in Lebanon. The 11 objectives listed in the US proposal include “The gradual elimination of the armed presence of all non-state actors, including Hezbollah, across all of Lebanon — both south and north of the Litani River — with adequate support to the Lebanese army and Internal Security Forces (ISF).”
Ministers affiliated with Hezbollah and with its allied Amal movement left the meeting before the vote was taken. Hezbollah, for its part, has been adamant throughout that it has no intention of giving up its weapons capacity. More than 400 of Hezbollah’s positions south of the Litani River have been taken over by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). But the organization retains its capacities further north and east. Sheikh Naim Qassem, the veteran ideologue and current leader of Hezbollah, has said that “no life” will be possible if the Lebanese state moves to disarm Hezbollah. Elsewhere, he has made clear that his movement has no interest in discussing a joint ‘national defense strategy’ with the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for as long as Israeli forces remain present on Lebanese soil and Israeli operations in Lebanon continue.
So where are things headed? Is a real attempt to end the existence of armed groups outside of state control in Lebanon about to finally get under way, 35 years after the end of the Lebanese civil war? The answer is, unfortunately, that all the indicators suggest that no such attempt appears imminent. Rather, the Lebanese government appears to want to commence a negotiating process with Hezbollah, seeking to convince it to give up its arms voluntarily. Presumably, the economic benefits which will accrue to Lebanon as a result of the movement’s agreeing to this will be held out as an incentive. This is not a completely absurd idea. Hezbollah is a political player in Lebanon with a Shia constituency whose interests it cannot totally ignore. There are no indications, however, that it will be willing to essentially cede its raison d’etre in order to provide short term economic gains to its supporters.
There is an additional problematic element: the Salam government is likely to propose to Hezbollah that it be integrated as a unit into the Lebanese Armed Forces.
There is an additional problematic element: the Salam government is likely to propose to Hezbollah that it be integrated as a unit into the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such a move, if implemented, would be likely to have the opposite effect from the one intended. Rather than ending the holding of arms outside of the framework of the state, such a move would serve to remove with one stroke the possibility that the state might at some time endeavor to impose its will on Hezbollah, by undermining the integrity of the armed forces.
Even in its current state, indeed, it is doubtful that the LAF would be able to act against Hezbollah. Probably around half of the LAF’s soldiers are Shia Lebanese. Around a third of the officer corps also belong to this sect. Any effort to use the state as an instrument of coercion against Hezbollah would likely result in a split in the LAF.
There is also much evidence to suggest that significant elements of the LAF are engaged in collaboration with Hezbollah. In the latest indication of this, evidence emerged this week showing that Suheil Gharb, commander of LAF Military Intelligence in south Lebanon, provided information to Hezbollah enabling it to disrupt an investigation into the killing of an Irish UNIFIL soldier, Private Sean Rooney in 2022. There are multiple similar occurrences. Many LAF members are linked to Hezbollah, or prominent individuals within it, through family and clan ties.
What this means is that even should it wish to use coercive force against Hezbollah to force its disarmament, it is doubtful that the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam possesses an instrument capable of carrying this out.
There is in Lebanon, among all elements of the society other than that gathered around Hezbollah, a deep and palpable fear of a return to civil war. This is likely to further militate against any serious effort to terminate Hezbollah’s independent military capacity.
This means that as of now, the most likely direction of events is that the Lebanese government will try to persuade Hezbollah to give up its arms, Hezbollah will decline to do so, and there the matter will rest.
It is presumably the expectation of the Lebanese government that at a certain point the US Administration and its envoy will realize that there is nothing to be gained from further effort at mediation, and will look elsewhere.
Both Hezbollah’s armed capacity and Israel’s campaign to prevent the organization’s efforts to replenish it are unlikely to change any time soon.
An Iranian, Hezbollah ‘deep state’ has been inserted within the structures of the official Lebanese state – in its political, economic, and security iterations. Hezbollah was defeated, hard, in combat with Israel in the last quarter of 2024. But this deep state was not destroyed in its entirety, and it remains in many ways as strong, or stronger, than the organs of the official state. That is, Hezbollah may have turned out to be much weaker than its propaganda suggested, and much weaker than Israel, but it is not weaker than its potential opponents in Lebanon, who as a consequence do not appear to wish to take it on.
From an Israeli point of view, the likely failure of the stated effort to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon is not necessarily disastrous. As of now, Israel has imposed a modus operandi in Lebanon by which it is on a daily basis acting to frustrate Hezbollah’s efforts to rebuild its strength. It holds five positions on Lebanese soil, and a de facto buffer zone along the border. It has freedom of action, and uses it, across Lebanese skies. For as long as Hezbollah remains the dominant actor within Lebanon, Israel is likely to wish to maintain this situation. Plans, roadmaps and cabinet votes notwithstanding, both Hezbollah’s armed capacity and Israel’s campaign to prevent the organization’s efforts to replenish it are unlikely to change any time soon.
Published originally on August 30, 2025. Text differs slightly from original.
