After the Ayatollah

The Death of Ali Khamenei and the End of Political Islam’s Century-Long Experiment in Power

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was eighty-six years old. He had been the supreme leader since June 4, 1989, elected by a special committee called the Assembly of Experts within hours of the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, to a position for which he was, by the theological standards of Shiite jurisprudence, never fully qualified.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was eighty-six years old. He had been the supreme leader since June 4, 1989, elected by a special committee called the Assembly of Experts within hours of the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, to a position for which he was, by the theological standards of Shiite jurisprudence, never fully qualified.

Shutterstock

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is dead. The man who ruled the Islamic Republic of Iran for 36 years, outlasted six American presidents, built and sustained the most consequential sponsor of terrorism in the modern Middle East, forged an empire that extended from Iran to the Mediterranean shores in the north and to the entry of the Red Sea in the south, whose proxies dragged Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen into decades of war and chaos, whose Revolutionary Guard propped up Bashar al-Assad as he gassed and barrel-bombed his own population into the largest refugee crisis since the Second World War, whose Houthis brought famine to Yemen, whose funding and direction made October 7 possible, and whose missiles rained on Israel as Hamas executed the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, who oversaw the weekly chants of “Death to America” and “Death to Israel” as liturgical rituals of his power—that man is gone, killed on a Saturday morning by the joint force of the two nations he swore to destroy.

He was eighty-six years old. He had been the supreme leader since June 4, 1989, elected by a special committee called the Assembly of Experts within hours of the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, to a position for which he was, by the theological standards of Shiite jurisprudence, never fully qualified. Khamenei was a hojatoleslam, a mid-ranking title of respect for Shiite clerics, meaning “proof of Islam” or “authority on Islam.” Unlike his predecessor, he was not a grand ayatollah. His authority, therefore, was political rather than scholarly. He compensated for this deficit with ruthlessness, patience, and an unshaking commitment to the revolutionary project that consumed his entire adult life. He was nineteen when he first began studying under Khomeini. He was a revolutionary before he was anything else, imprisoned under the shah, wounded by an assassination attempt in 1981 that cost him the use of his right arm, and installed as president at forty-two in the chaotic aftermath of the Islamic Revolution. He served two terms, was elevated to supreme leader, and proceeded to outlast every rival, every reformist, every protest movement, and every American attempt at negotiation, containment, and coercion—until Saturday.

Read the rest of this article at Mosaic.

Hussein Aboubakr Mansour is an Egyptian-American analyst who focuses on such topics as Muslim antisemitism, Islamist ideology, and American universities. He grew up in his native Cairo, Egypt, where he was attracted to Salafist mosques at an early age and fascinated by antisemitic conspiracy theories in Egyptian popular culture. After a transformative educational journey, he pushed back against antisemitism, which got him into trouble with the Egyptian authorities. Mansour has been published in Commentary, Tablet, The Hill, Mosaic, and elsewhere, and has published an autobiography, Minority of One: The Unchaining of an Arab Mind. Today he writes often at his Substack, The Abrahamic Critique and Digest. He received political asylum in the United States in 2012 and worked as an assistant professor of Hebrew language at the Defense Language Institute. He holds an MA in International Affairs from George Washington University.
See more from this Author
Iran Intended Its Strikes to Pressure the U.S.-Israeli Operation to Stop. For Now, That Narrative Has Collapsed
Another Massive Post-Liberal Adjustment in Which the U.S. Is Sidelining Systems That No Longer Function as They Should
See more on this Topic
The Administration’s Proposed Agreement Would Curtail Tehran’s Ability to Develop a Nuclear Weapon, But Would Not Touch the Real Drivers of Iran’s Power
Islamic State Reframes Gaza Anger to Justify Its Own Cause
The U.S.-Israeli Campaign Against Iran Reached Its Five-Week Mark on Saturday, with No Clear Mechanism to End the Conflict in Sight