Washington’s foreign policy scars run deep. U.S. experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya associate regime change with chaos, violence, and state failure. The Trump administration has therefore pivoted toward other strategies for dealing with rogue regimes. The Venezuela model, a targeted decapitation followed by pragmatic bargaining, is one option. The extraction of Nicolás Maduro shattered his grip and opened the door to deal-making with the remnants of his regime. In exchange for sanctions relief, access to frozen assets, and oil investment, these holdovers agreed to a managed transition under interim oversight.
President Donald Trump’s decision on Venezuela was rooted in realism; it was co-opting the devil to prevent a vacuum. Within the White House, the Venezuela blueprint has become one option for Iran. Especially since the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not only about repression; it also oversees an economic empire.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not only about repression; it also oversees an economic empire.
With reports that former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has deployed a team to work a deal in Washington, the old advocates of a “grand bargain with Tehran” appear to be selling the idea that the United States can work with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps if that group seeks to preserve its multibillion-dollar fiefdom. Trump’s confirmation that Tehran has asked for a meeting paints a picture of pragmatic Revolutionary Guard commanders facing personal ruin, bartering via Zarif for amnesty, asset protections, and a slice of post-theocracy power, much like the Venezuelan elites who traded loyalty for survival.
Iran’s web of proxies and nuclear brinkmanship adds complexity, but grand bargain proponents eye a path where targeted pressures—sanctions, precision strikes, street revolt, and economic collapse—will force concessions by Tehran, sparing the world another failed state.
Yet, this moment in history, which may record the final days of the Islamic Republic, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ predicament is poetic irony. Their Zarif mission—born of self-preservation—might even splinter the regime from within.
As protests now rage into their third week, building on six uprisings since 2009, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ economic colossus teeters toward implosion. Demonstrators burn posters of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, invoke the Pahlavi legacy, demand democracy, and reject the totality of a theocracy that is rotted to its core.
Recent purges betray heated debates over escalation, while savvy protesters pierce the armor: “Your paychecks are as worthless as ours—why turn your guns on kin?” Viral footage of retreating forces and whispers of assassinated commanders lay bare the dilemma: Unleash brutality and court desertions and international fury, including Trump’s wrath, or hold back and watch the flames consume the regime.
As inflation soars past 50 percent, youth unemployment hits 30 percent, and the rial craters, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders luxuriate in ill-gotten wealth.
On the economic front, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ empire—spanning construction giants like Khatam al-Anbiya, energy monopolies, and smuggling rings—has not built prosperity; it has devoured it. As inflation soars past 50 percent, youth unemployment hits 30 percent, and the rial craters, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders luxuriate in ill-gotten wealth, turning sanctions into personal windfalls. Their grip has choked innovation, fanned crises they must then quell by force, and alienated bazaar merchants. The billions of dollars poured into regional proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis accelerated this bleed, precipitated by damaging U.S. and Israeli attacks. The Revolutionary Guard today reaps hatred.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ dithering could doom the republic. What those in Washington advocating for a deal do not understand is that it may be too late already. To strike a bargain with a collapsing regime will only guarantee distrust that will hamper U.S. interests in a post-Islamic Republic future.
