More than two decades ago, the Gulf Railway network was conceived to promote economic integration among the six Gulf Arab states through trade and tourism. The ongoing regional conflict has highlighted the urgency of such a network to establish connectivity resilience. When airspace closes, ports get attacked, and maritime routes become vulnerable, the six states no longer can rely exclusively on shipping to move people, food, medical supplies, industrial goods, construction materials and other essential commodities.
While road transport provides an existing alternative, it has limitations. Cross-border trucking remains dependent on border procedures, customs clearance, road capacity and driver availability, and long-distance road freight is more exposed to traffic congestion, accidents, extreme heat, and disruptions at border crossings. A rail network could complement road transport by providing a higher-capacity and more predictable overland corridor for both freight and passengers.
A rail network could complement road transport by providing a higher-capacity and more predictable overland corridor for both freight and passengers.
In the early 2000s, the Gulf Cooperation Council proposed a railway network that would cover about 1,315 miles, from Kuwait through Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates to Oman. The project targets full operational status by December 2030. However, while the Gulf Railways Authority reported in May 2026 that the overall project had reached 50 percent completion, that figure does not reveal national differences in project development.
The United Arab Emirates has completed its 560-mile Etihad Rail network, linking the seven emirates. Freight operations have run since 2023, and national passenger services began in June 2026. The United Arab Emirates thus provides an operational foundation for the regional network. The 150-mile Hafeet Rail link, connecting the United Arab Emirates network with Sohar, Oman, was approaching 40 percent completion in April 2026. In Kuwait, however, the project remains on the drawing board and no major construction has started on its 69-mile component. In May 2026, Kuwait approved a 52-mile corridor for a separate Kuwait-Saudi high-speed connection.
Saudi Arabia already operates one of the region’s largest railway systems. It has just tendered its 417-mile Gulf Cooperation Council Railway section from Al-Khafji near Kuwait to Al-Batha on the United Arab Emirates border. Thus, Saudi Arabia has substantial railway capacity, but the specific infrastructure needed to close the Gulf railway network is still in the design and procurement phase. Qatar built a sophisticated metro system prior to the FIFA World Cup 2022 events, and its domestic rail is advanced. Yet Qatar’s Gulf Railway connection remains incomplete. Qatar has also planned rail links to the Saudi border for both passengers and freight. Bahrain being an island nation, faces the most distinctive physical challenge; it must first connect to the mainland through the proposed King Hamad Causeway, a 35-mile road-and-rail corridor linking Bahrain with Dammam, Saudi Arabia. Bahrain’s rail network depends on infrastructural progress in Saudi Arabia and the causeway project. These contrasting levels of progress underscore the challenge of developing cross-border links.
Today, the Gulf Arab states realize the need for an alternative route when maritime or air connectivity fails. The railway network could reduce dependence on long-distance trucking and strengthen links between ports, airports, logistics zones and industrial centers. It could be a strategic insurance for these states, precisely when the existing transport systems are under threat.
If the physical links can be completed and made interoperable, the railway could provide the region with a layer of economic and security resilience.
The key challenge is no longer the availability of finance or technical expertise, but the political and institutional coordination required to integrate six national railway systems. This is also the project’s central vulnerability. Without sustained political commitment, differences in national priorities, standards, financing, and border procedures could continue to delay a genuinely integrated Gulf network. If the physical links can be completed and made interoperable, the railway could provide the region with a layer of economic and security resilience to reduce dependence on vulnerable maritime and air routes during crises, even if it would not eliminate the threat since railways are stationary targets that drones or missiles could hit. Still, once laid, rail lines are more easily repaired than other infrastructure.
The strategic value of the railway network potentially could extend well beyond the Persian Gulf. If the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb remain disrupted, global trade would face a major shock. A completed Gulf rail network, linked to ports on the Gulf of Oman and onward to Europe and Asia, could provide alternative corridors. Connections through Saudi Arabia to Jordan, Turkey, and European markets could link Asia and Europe, while ports such as Fujairah and Sohar could connect Gulf Arab markets to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean without transiting Hormuz.
A railway network cannot replace the Strait of Hormuz, oil and gas pipelines, ports, or air transport, but it can provide an integrated overland logistics corridor linking all six economies with the wider global economy.
