For decades, the Gulf Arab states have been buying the most sophisticated military and defense systems from their Western allies, rendering the region one of the world’s most lucrative defense markets. Yet these purchases have not secured them against recent attacks, presenting a fundamental dilemma: Should they keep buying high-end weapons and technologies, marketed as attractive acquisitions by Western arms contractors and suppliers? How have these weapons secured them in the current war, and what kind of defense would they need in future conflicts? Finally, how can they balance military-security spending with the fiscal demands of their domestic economic and social priorities?
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 exposed weaknesses in the regional security architecture: a lack of manpower, strategic depth, command structures, intelligence access, and early-warning capabilities. While Kuwait’s defenses collapsed within hours, the broader Gulf Arab region also did not have integrated military mechanisms for a collective response. The U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait demonstrated the advantages of airpower, stealth, and sophisticated communications.
The U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait demonstrated the advantages of airpower, stealth, and sophisticated communications.
In 2003, the U.S. military was able to overrun Baghdad with remarkable speed, convincing the Gulf Arab states that military transformation through technological superiority, precision guided munitions and intelligence, could compensate for demographic and geostrategic vulnerabilities. The result was the signing of multibillion-dollar bilateral defense agreements with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Nevertheless, the decades afterward revealed that high-tech and expensive weapons also carry vulnerabilities that asymmetric responses can exploit or bypass, while also raising burdens for the security guarantors.
For the United States, arms transfers were more than commercial transactions; they were an extension of national security, strategic interests, foreign policy, and economic security. While strengthening defenses and deepening the institutional relationship between the U.S. and its Gulf allies, defense contractors also locked the Gulf Arab customers into decades of training, ammunition, maintenance, interoperability, and upgrades.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data reveal that the six Gulf Arab states accounted for almost 20 percent of global imports of major arms during 2021–25. Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 6.8 percent; Qatar, 6.4 percent; and Kuwait, 2.8 percent. Saudi Arabia spent $83.2 billion on its military, equivalent to 6 percent of its gross domestic product in 2025, making it the world’s eighth-largest military spender. Kuwait spent an estimated $8.1 billion on its military in 2025, equivalent to 4.7 percent of its gross domestic product. These states face threats and cannot sideline defense spending. Yet, they also have fiscal pressures to sustain their national vision agendas. Balancing both is critical, particularly for state and regime security.
The traditional Gulf Arab defense model remains dependent on the West. In 2021–25, 77 percent of Saudi Arabia’s, 62 percent of Kuwait’s, 48 percent of Qatar’s, and 42 percent of the United Arab Emirate’s major arms imports were from the United States. However, the Gulf Arab states are now seeking wider defense collaborations that may make the trade-offs between defense and development more consequential. The Ukraine war was an eye-opener in this context. Asymmetric warfare using inexpensive drones, electronic warfare, rapid innovation, and the ability to replace equipment at scale can render the most sophisticated weapons vulnerable. That makes it more viable for the Gulf Arab states to diversify their defense suppliers.
China is a strategic alternative, expanding economic ties, supplying select military capabilities, and providing infrastructural support, but as yet, it does not seek to be a security guarantor for the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Turkey’s growing defense industry and capacity in unmanned systems offers access to technologies and procurement models. Pakistan offers military training, personnel and strategic cooperation. India offers missiles, air defense, rockets, radars, electronic warfare, and naval systems. Ukraine represents battlefield experience through rapid innovation, especially counter-drone warfare, electronic warfare and scalable defense technologies.
The current war with Iran has revealed the limitations of relying on permanent force deployments, military bases, and overdependence on U.S. technology.
The Gulf Arab states need a security architecture within which different technologies can work together: early warning systems, intelligence, command-and-control, systems, interoperability, and access to sustainable replenishment. The Gulf Cooperation Council’s next security revolution will depend less on selecting and buying the most sophisticated weapons and more on assessing needs and affordability.
For the United States, retaining strategic influence in the Persian Gulf, protecting its defense-industrial base, and preventing China, Turkey, or any other external power from acquiring a dominant security role in the region are critical objectives. Yet the current war with Iran has revealed the limitations of relying on permanent force deployments, military bases, and overdependence on U.S. technology. A more durable strategy would be to support the Gulf Arab states in developing defense capacities through diversified security partnerships and domestic defense capabilities, while ensuring that they remain strategically aligned with U.S. interests in the region.
The strategic imperative for Washington should be to build a Persian Gulf that needs American partnership for security, but not American protection for its survival, even as the Gulf Arab states confront their more recalcitrant neighbors.
