Amidst rising tensions and instability in the Middle East, United Arab Emirates President Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed made a three-hour trip to India on January 19, 2026, marking his third visit to India as president. Although his visit follows recent high-level engagements with the crown prince and defense minister, the timing and brief duration of Mohammad bin Zayed’s visit have sparked speculation.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s warm welcome of the Emirati president resonates. Following the 2022 economic partnership agreement, Abu Dhabi has become India’s third-largest trading partner and second-largest export destination. Both countries signed a bilateral investment treaty in 2024, and the United Arab Emirates ranks as the seventh-largest foreign investor in India between 2000 and 2025, with a portfolio of real estate, energy, infrastructure, private equity, and financial services.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s warm welcome of the Emirati president resonates.
Bin Zayed and Modi signed a “letter of intent” to conclude the framework for the strategic defense partnership, reportedly focusing on co-manufacturing and research and development of defense platforms. Further, the countries signed a ten-year agreement for the delivery of a half-million tons annually of liquefied natural gas from 2028, making the United Arab Emirates India’s second-largest supplier of liquefied natural gas.
They also signed agreements to jointly develop the Dholera Special Investment Region in Gujarat, Modi’s home state, opening investment opportunities for the United Arab Emirates in regional infrastructure, including energy, airports, pilot training facilities, railway connectivity, and ports. Additionally, the two sides agreed to strengthen space and nuclear cooperation, including the development and production of large and small modular reactors.
That said, the India-United Arab Emirates relationship appears to be moving beyond the confines of trade, investment, and technology ties. Reading between the lines, this visit holds the possibility of Abu Dhabi and New Delhi exploring potential collaboration to counter the Saudi-Pakistani and possibly Turkey axis.
Strengthening Saudi-Pakistani ties, particularly after the two countries formalized the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement in September 2025, has rattled the Indian security establishment. Modi’s political opponents already criticize his foreign policy due to the growth of Pakistani and Chinese influence in its neighborhood at India’s expense and his aimless Russia policy. To showcase his Middle East policy counters such criticism. The rupture with the Saudis, and Pakistan gaining an edge in the battle of narratives over the 2025 war, reflects a foreign policy setback.
India has always faced major security challenges, internally and externally, from Islamist terrorist organizations like Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood, and their state sponsors like Turkey, Qatar, and Pakistan. Such threats now grow as South Asian Muslims resist Modi’s Hindu-centric policies and chafe at India’s closer ties with Israel.
India has always faced major security challenges, internally and externally, from Islamist terrorist organizations.
In this context, India’s security and intelligence leadership sees the United Arab Emirates as a counterweight to the Saudi-Pakistani strategic partnership. Additionally, Emirates’ financial leverage over Turkey assuages India’s worries. Abu Dhabi’s sincere ideological stance against Islamism encourages Modi’s government.
Whether India will commit to a clear anti-Saudi-Pakistani diplomatic alliance remains unclear, but history suggests it will not. India traditionally has been insular, status-quoist, and a South Asia-obsessed power, known for its disoriented idealism rooted in ancient mythologies, a short-term, superficial strategic outlook, and reluctance to take firm positions or involve itself in global affairs. This core trait persists, as seen in recent foreign policy initiatives, such as India’s efforts to strengthen ties with Armenia, where it still refrains from sending ground forces and from explicitly framing this partnership as a counter to Turkey and Pakistan.
While strengthened Emirati-India ties are a positive sign, a lack of coherence persists suggesting that India might once again fail to solidify its alliance as its adversaries consolidate theirs.
