Iraq has been told that the long-awaited Gulf Cooperation Council electrical interconnection project will not arrive on schedule, leaving Baghdad with one fewer option before the summer heat. The project was due to begin operating in early 2026, with a first phase supplying 500 megawatts through the Gulf Cooperation Council grid. Instead, the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority has pushed the timeline to at least the end of August 2026, with signs that full operation may slip into late 2026 or even 2027.
The delay reflects construction problems inside Iraq and Kuwait, difficulties at Umm Qasr port, and delays due to fighting and instability nearby.
Iraq’s power grid struggles because of weak infrastructure, poor transmission capacity, fuel shortages, and years of underinvestment. Summer heightens these problems. As temperatures rise, households and businesses rely heavily on air conditioning, and demand climbs faster than the grid can supply. The Gulf link would not have solve the crisis, but it would give Baghdad a useful margin and an alternative to politically sensitive imports.
The project was due to begin operating in early 2026, with a first phase supplying 500 megawatts through the Gulf Cooperation Council grid.
The numbers show the scale of the problem. In early 2026, Iraq produced about 29 gigawatts of electricity while normal demand already stood near 40 gigawatts. During summer, demand could rise to 40–55 gigawatts or more. Some official projections put peak needs at 60 gigawatts, while the Ministry of Electricity hopes to produce around 30 gigawatts. Even if the ministry reaches that target, the gap will remain large. Many provinces will face scheduled outages, with poorer areas and weaker local grids hit hardest.
That is why the missing 500 megawatts from the Gulf link matter. It would not transform the grid overnight, but it could help during peak hours, plant outages, or fuel interruptions. It would also start Iraq’s practical integration with the Gulf Cooperation Council electricity network and give the country another source of imported power.
The delay keeps Iraq tied to the same fragile balance it has faced for years: rising demand, limited domestic generation, and fuel supplies that depend heavily on Iran.
Iranian gas remains Baghdad’s main problem. Under contract, Iran has supplied up to 50 million cubic meters of gas per day to Iraq, feeding power plants that produce a large share of the country’s electricity. Iranian gas has often supported roughly one-third of Iraq’s power generation, and some estimates place the share at 40–43 percent during peak periods. These flows directly affect whether Iraqi households receive electricity or endure longer blackouts.
Recent disruptions show how quickly the system can weaken. Since early May 2026, Iranian gas supplies reportedly have ranged between 15 million and 20 million cubic meters per day, far below the roughly 50 million cubic meters Iraq needs to run its gas-fired plants properly. Earlier in the year, flows reportedly fell as low as 5–7 million cubic meters per day after conflict damaged energy infrastructure, including strikes affecting Iran’s South Pars field.
Those cuts removed an estimated 3,000–4,500 megawatts from Iraq’s grid. For a country already short of power, that loss means longer outages, heavier reliance on private generators, and higher costs for families and businesses.
This problem did not appear suddenly. Iraq has faced repeated interruptions because of unpaid bills, U.S. sanctions, uncertain waivers, Iran’s domestic gas needs, and damaged infrastructure. In earlier years, Iranian gas and electricity imports helped Iraq cover part of its domestic shortfall. Now those same imports expose Baghdad to every payment delay, diplomatic dispute, and shock from nearby conflicts. When gas flows fall, power plants cut output or shut units, and the grid feels the loss almost immediately.
Iraq has faced repeated interruptions because of unpaid bills, U.S. sanctions, uncertain waivers, Iran’s domestic gas needs, and damaged infrastructure.
Iraq has its own gas, but it still flares rather than captures much of it. World Bank data show that Iraq flared about 18 billion cubic meters of gas in 2023, enough to support significant electricity generation if captured. Gas-capture projects have moved slowly because of technical problems, weak coordination, financing delays, and poor management.
Other options offer little immediate help. The government has pushed the planned liquified natural gas terminal at Khor al-Zubair toward 2027, leaving Baghdad with few substitutes.
The delay also comes during a period of regional instability that has disrupted supply chains, port work, construction schedules, and investor confidence. Iraq depends heavily on oil revenue to fund public spending and emergency power measures. Any disruption to exports, shipping routes, or prices can leave Baghdad with less money to pay for fuel, repair infrastructure, or finance temporary generation.
The social cost will appear if the grid weakens during the summer. Long outages make homes harder to cool, hurt small businesses, interrupt hospitals and clinics, weaken water pumping, and deepen frustration with the government. Electricity shortages feed summer protests. People experience the crisis as heat, spoiled food, lost work, and nights without sleep.
Baghdad still has options, but none will be easy. It can seek emergency gas arrangements, import more expensive fuels, speed up plant maintenance, and push regional partners to protect the interconnection timeline. It also should move faster on gas capture, grid repairs, renewable power, and alternative links with Turkey and Jordan. As a new prime minister prepares to take office, though, two lessons must be clear. First, there is only so far politicians can kick tough issues down the road until the road ends. Second, basing policies on the most optimistic assessments does not bring lasting solutions.
