Recent “day after” plans for Gaza give Turkey no security or governance role. That judgment makes sense. A state that hosts and legitimizes Hamas leaders and funds their base in Gaza cannot stabilize Israel’s border. The same logic should guide U.S. policy on the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC).
At the 2023 G20 summit, the United States and partners presented IMEEC. Ships move goods and energy from India to Persian Gulf ports. They then traverse the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan by rail or road to Israel’s Haifa port, and then to Europe through Cyprus and Greece. IMEEC bypasses Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Russia. It diversifies routes and cuts exposure to choke points.
A state that hosts and legitimizes Hamas leaders and funds their base in Gaza cannot stabilize Israel’s border.
Ankara sees the stakes. If the line runs on its original route, trade and energy will flow through Israel, Cyprus, and Greece instead of Turkey. Turkish leaders now promote rival land corridors: the Iraq-Turkey “Development Road” from al-Faw to Europe, and a concept that links the Persian Gulf to Turkey through Syria and Jordan. They aim to pull the movement of goods away from the Israel-Cyprus-Greece axis and back through Turkey.
If Washington accepts that shift, the United States will again depend on a single gate between the Persian Gulf and Europe. Instead of spreading risk across several partners, the United States will rely on a state that turns transit and defense files into bargaining chips with NATO and Washington.
Turkey’s record supports this concern. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey hosts Hamas leaders, allows rallies that praise Hamas and attack Israel, and cuts trade with Israel while restricting air links. It pressures a U.S. ally while seeking a role in Gaza.
On the military track, Turkey bought the Russian S-400 air-defense system. It seeks new F-16s and upgrades and still talks about a path back to the F-35. Israel’s qualitative military edge relies on the F-35. Operating the S-400 alongside Western stealth aircraft raises hard questions for U.S. technology security and for the credibility of U.S. pledges to protect Israel’s edge.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey disputes the maritime claims of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel and challenges gas exploration in areas those states view as their zones. These moves deter Western investment, disrupt planning for pipelines and cables, and weaken the Israel-Cyprus-Greece framework that IMEEC needs on the European end.
Timing matters. In 2026 and 2027, Greece and Cyprus will hold the rotating presidency of the European Union. Both run large commercial fleets and focus on shipping lanes, maritime law, and energy security. If IMEEC advances along the India-Persian Gulf-Israel-Cyprus-Greece route, Athens and Nicosia can use their European Union roles to anchor a policy that backs lawful maritime claims, speeds energy and interconnector projects, and aligns with U.S. efforts to balance China and Russia.
With Gaza, IMEEC, and Eastern Mediterranean security, making Turkey the central solution could undercut U.S. goals.
From Washington’s view, this alignment offers a clear gain: a U.S.-led corridor from India to Europe through partners who want it to work, paired with a European Union agenda shaped by two of those partners. That gain shrinks if IMEEC diverts through Syria and Turkey or if disputes erode the Israel-Cyprus-Greece link.
Our point is not to punish Turkey or reward Israel. It is to match U.S. goals with U.S. tools. If the United States wants resilient, diversified corridors, it should build IMEEC and energy plans around partners who follow legal frameworks and act with the West. If the United States wants to protect Israel’s qualitative military edge as part of a wider structure that supports U.S. power, then decisions on advanced weapons for any country, including Turkey, should reflect that country’s conduct.
The United States manages a broad agenda with Turkey. Protecting American interests requires clarity, not a rupture. With Gaza, IMEEC, and Eastern Mediterranean security, making Turkey the central solution could undercut U.S. goals. Keeping Turkish forces out of Gaza, advancing IMEEC along the Israel-Cyprus-Greece route, and conditioning advanced arms on verifiable change would serve U.S. interests today and in the future.
