Many Kurds remain bitter that, despite years of rhetoric, Israel has done little to help them as Syrian forces attack them. What Kurds see as abandonment, perhaps even on par with that which occurred when the United States and Israel ceased support against the backdrop of the collapse of the 1975 Kurdish revolution, Jerusalem sees both as strategic restraint against the backdrop of balancing multiple interests and moving parts, and the lesser of all evils as policymakers fear the costs of public intervention would outweigh gains and could worsen already poor outcomes for the Kurds themselves.
Israel’s highest priorities remain the Iranian front and the effort to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capability. These goals require sustained military focus and coordination with Washington. Opening a visible front in northeast Syria would dilute that focus and create new liabilities. The timing of the Turkish-backed Syrian offensive against Kurdish forces appears calibrated to this reality. Damascus understands that Israel is distracted and that its capacity for escalation elsewhere is limited.
Israel’s highest priorities remain the Iranian front and the effort to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capability.
Turkey is central to the calculus. Ankara would read any overt Israeli support for Kurdish forces as direct alignment with groups Turkey sees as hostile. That would trigger confrontation at a moment when Israel cannot afford one. The risk is not confined to bilateral ties. Turkey’s leverage over Gaza arrangements, regional forums, and channels to Washington would convert a Syria move into costs in Gaza and beyond.
Recent U.S. signals amplify this constraint. The announcement of Turkish inclusion in Gaza governance structures indicates Washington’s intent to integrate Ankara into post-conflict management. This timing functions as a warning. The White House would likely blame any public clash with Turkey now upon Israel.
Dependence on President Donald Trump intensifies the restraint. Israel needs U.S. support on the Iranian front for sanctions enforcement, intelligence sharing, and potential strike options. Any public dispute that risks that support carries consequences Israel cannot accept. Gaza adds another layer. Israel requires U.S. cover and coordination to manage ceasefire terms, reconstruction oversight, and regional buy-in. Under these conditions, Jerusalem will not test Washington’s tolerance by challenging Turkey in Syria.
There is also the Syrian channel. Israel and Damascus may be exploring understandings on security arrangements. Core Israeli interests are on the table: freedom of action against Iranian assets across Syrian airspace; prevention of weapons transfers from Iran to Hezbollah via Syria; stability in southern Syria; and protection of Druze communities near the Golan. In such talks, Israel’s leverage lies in restraint and tacit recognition. Standing down—even abandoning the Kurds—against the backdrop of Damascus’ campaign against the Syrian Democratic Forces may be the price paid.
Adversaries would use visible Israeli backing to brand Kurdish forces as foreign proxies, inviting harsher repression.
Then there is Russia. Moscow seeks renewed influence in Syria. Israel wants deconfliction with Russia to preserve operational freedom against Iranian targets. Recent contacts between Israeli and Russian leaders, including offers by Moscow to mediate with Tehran, suggest active back channels. Energy competition also matters. Israel’s push to expand gas exports to Europe, in coordination with Greece and Cyprus, challenges Russian interests. Russia retains tools to pressure Israel indirectly, including through Syria and the Red Sea. Quiet understandings with Moscow can yield gains on higher-priority fronts while discouraging visible moves that upset Russian equities in Syria.
Public intervention also would risk harming the Kurds. Adversaries would use visible Israeli backing to brand Kurdish forces as foreign proxies, inviting harsher repression and widening the target set to Kurdish communities beyond Syria and into Iran and Iraq. Past episodes show that exposure raises the cost paid by local partners. Discretion can reduce that cost.
None of this should imply Israeli indifference, but rather, a preference for quieter or more covert channels. Such approaches aim to preserve Kurdish space without triggering escalation that Israel cannot sustain and that would leave the Kurds worse off.
To suggest any analogy to the 1975 collapse of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq would be a calumny. What has occurred in Syria is neither deliberate nor the result of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger-style cynicism, but rather, the tragic manifestation of too few options against the backdrop of a neighborhood not lacking in existential adversaries.
