One provision of the January 2026 agreement between the interim Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces called for the return of all displaced people to their homes, including those from Ras al-Ayn (Serê Kaniyê) and Tel Abyad (Girê Sipî), two predominantly Kurdish cities in northeast Syria that fell under the control of Turkey and Turkish-backed Arab armed groups in 2019.
Although many have returned, the same has yet to happen for the people of these two cities, despite repeated promises by the Islamist-led Syrian authorities.
The main obstacle is the continued presence of Turkish-backed armed factions and their families, who refuse to leave.
During a recent demonstration outside the provincial palace in Hasaka, the Damascus-appointed Kurdish governor told displaced protesters from Ras al-Ayn that security preparations were underway to facilitate the return of displaced residents, including efforts to clear landmines. However, these security concerns are not related to the remnants of war. After all, Arab settlers have lived in the city for nearly seven years. Instead, the main obstacle is the continued presence of Turkish-backed armed factions and their families, who refuse to leave. A recently circulated video showed several Arab tribesmen warning Kurdish families not to return to their homes.
Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad fell under the control of the Turkish military and Turkish-backed Syrian armed groups following the partial withdrawal of U.S. troops from northeast Syria during President Donald Trump’s first term. The withdrawal enabled Ankara and its allied factions to seize the area from the Syrian Democratic Forces.
The offensive displaced more than 100,000 Kurdish residents, including many Yazidis. In the aftermath, Islamist armed groups and their families occupied homes and properties belonging to displaced Kurdish residents, while the original owners remained in displacement camps in territories controlled by Kurdish forces.
The Syrian government’s inability to resolve this issue is fueling broader tensions in the already fragile relationship between Kurds and Arabs in the area. It also exposes the shortcomings of the proclaimed unification of Syria’s armed forces. Shortly after seizing power in December 2024, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his allies announced a plan to integrate all armed factions under the authority of the new Ministry of Defense. In practice, however, many armed groups, particularly those backed by Turkey, continue to operate independently, with some taking their orders directly from Ankara rather than Damascus. Some of these groups have committed atrocities against Druze, Alawi and Kurdish civilians since al-Sharaa came to power.
Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad are strategic cities on Syria’s border with Turkey, located near the M4 highway, a vital artery linking northeastern Syria to Aleppo and the rest of the country. Ras al-Ayn is also home to the Alouk water pumping station, a critical source of drinking water for much of Hasaka city. Since the facility came under the control of Turkey and its Syrian proxy forces, water supplies have been disrupted repeatedly, leaving more than one million residents of Hasaka and surrounding areas without a reliable supply of drinking water.
Turkey has expressed its intention to maintain a long-term direct military presence in parts of Syria, and the Kurdish border region is likely to remain central to that strategy.
Turkey seeks to maintain a long-term foothold in this part of Syria. Although Ankara wields significant influence over Syria’s newly restructured military, retaining control over allied armed factions in places such as Ras al-Ayn and Tel Abyad provides it with additional leverage to contain Kurdish groups and shape security dynamics along the border. This parallel chain of command also enables Turkey to exert influence independent of Damascus whenever its interests diverge.
Many displaced Kurds are likely to return to their homes eventually, even if the process gets delayed. Yet few are likely to feel safe returning as long as the current security conditions remain unchanged. That uncertainty serves the interests of Turkey and its Syrian allies by discouraging large-scale return of Kurds.
Still, whether Turkish-backed armed groups remain physically present in northeast Syria is ultimately of secondary importance. Turkey has expressed its intention to maintain a long-term direct military presence in parts of Syria, and the Kurdish border region is likely to remain central to that strategy. So long as Ankara retains decisive influence over the area’s security architecture, either directly or through allied factions, the prospects for the safe return of all displaced residents will remain uncertain.
