On November 17, 2025, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2803 that provided a U.N. mandate for President Donald Trump’s International Stabilization Force for Gaza. Although the resolution passed unanimously, albeit with Russia and China’s abstention, both Palestinian activists and their Western progressive supporters opposed it.
The 1993 Oslo Accords legitimized Palestinian demands for a “right of return” by placing it on the agenda as a final status issue.
The root of Hamas’s opposition rests in the resolution’s call for Hamas’s disarmament and expulsion from power, which the group seized in 2007. The inclusion in an appendix of the Trump plan’s aspiration that, only with time, “the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood,” upset many cheerleaders for Palestinian recognition, because it was a tacit admission that earlier recognition of a State of Palestine was little more than diplomatic virtue signaling. Many Palestinian activists, their progressive supporters, and both Western and Arab governments also are upset that neither Trump’s plan nor Resolution 2803 explicitly affirm the “right of return.”
France and Saudi Arabia, for example, both support a “right of return.” So, too, do groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Rep. Rashida Tlaib of Michigan explicitly called for the U.S. Congress to recognize a Palestinian “right of return.” The 1993 Oslo Accords legitimized Palestinian demands for a “right of return” by placing it on the agenda as a final status issue.
The Security Council is right to cast aside “right of return.” It is not an Arab or Islamic concept; rather, it is a Jewish principle, rooted in millennia of liturgy, covenant, and collective yearning for Zion. Jewish history anchored this idea long before the modern state of Israel existed. No parallel tradition exists in Islamic or Arab religious culture. Treating Israel’s “right of return” as equivalent to a Palestinian “right of return” distorts the historical record and legitimizes a political mechanism designed to eliminate Israel demographically.
Hamas leaders describe return as a path to replacing Israel through population pressure.
Islamist movements recognize this imbalance and exploit it. Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and their affiliates treat the “right of return” not as a humanitarian claim but as a strategy to end Jewish sovereignty. Hamas leaders describe return as a path to replacing Israel through population pressure. Palestinian Authority officials speak about return as the method for achieving a one-state solution with an Arab majority. Islamists do not hide their intent. When American political figures appear open to negotiating the issue, these movements read the signals clearly: Pressure produces movement, and demands should increase.
Ambiguity is not confined to rhetoric. The United States has taken inconsistent positions regarding Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist actors. At times, U.S. officials have treated these groups as political movements. At other times, they have acknowledged their violent doctrine. This inconsistency allows Islamists to shift their presentation depending on audience. They describe themselves as political reformers in Western capitals and as jihadist actors in Arabic media. American signals shape these calculations.
Ambiguous statements from U.S. leaders have strategic impact. Islamist movements track American discourse closely. Movements such as Hamas treat ambiguity from major powers as proof that maximalist bargaining positions carry low cost and potential benefit.
This type of ambiguity also affects regional allies. Arab states that normalized relations with Israel observe American rhetoric carefully. Clear U.S. signals embolden moderation. Ambiguous signals strengthen rejectionist factions inside their own political environments. States willing to cooperate with Israel prefer stability. They interpret American shifts on foundational issues—such as the status of refugees or the future of sovereignty—as signs that American commitments may fluctuate under pressure.
Arab states that normalized relations with Israel observe American rhetoric carefully.
Inside the United States, ambiguity weakens counterextremism efforts. Islamist networks rely on Western uncertainty to advance agendas under the cover of political advocacy. The American approach to domestic Islamist organizations often mirrors its foreign policy: inconsistent, unclear, and hesitant to define goals. When Washington sends mixed signals about core issues, it encourages these organizations to expand their influence and test boundaries.
The White House should reject a Palestinian “right of return” absolutely. Treating the claims as equivalent legitimizes a mechanism intended to dismantle a U.S. ally. Clarity on this point strengthens regional stability, deters maximalist demands, and aligns American policy with historical truth.
Clear policy signals deter aggression. Ambiguity invites it. Islamist movements interpret uncertainty as opportunity. Each time the United States sends mixed messages—whether on refugees, recognition, or engagement with rejectionist actors—it strengthens those who seek conflict. The United States should adopt a consistent approach that identifies Islamist maximalism as the central obstacle to peace and delegitimizes any policy proposal designed to erase Israel, whether via demographic manipulation or terrorism.
