Middle East Forum Director of Policy Analysis Michael Rubin spoke with Washington Watch about the expanding U.S.–Iran conflict, Tehran’s strikes on Gulf states, and whether sustained military pressure could topple the Islamic Republic. He examined Iran’s leadership vacuum, its strategy of targeting regional energy infrastructure, historical parallels for regime collapse, and the conditions that could determine whether the conflict leads to regional stability or civil war.
PERKINS: We’ve been talking about the U.S.–Iran conflict expanding as strikes continue for a third day. Iran has launched attacks on neighboring U.S.-allied countries, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. It appears the United States and Israel are targeting leadership, command and control, and missile infrastructure. Am I reading that correctly?
RUBIN: You are reading that correctly. What’s interesting, though, is that while some leadership figures have been taken out, others have not been targeted. The question becomes whether they are simply next on the list for a drone or missile strike, or whether President Trump is contemplating a Venezuela-like solution that could empower former regime officials. I’m thinking specifically of former presidents Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad Khatami, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani.
PERKINS: Speaking of leaders not taken out, who is directing Iran’s response right now?
RUBIN: That’s a very good question. We don’t know for sure, but it appears Ali Larijani has the strongest grasp over command and control. He has roots in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, later served in senior ministerial roles, and advised the supreme leader. He has publicly stated that Iran will not negotiate with the United States. If he’s issuing those statements, it’s likely he’s exercising authority.
PERKINS: Help us understand Iran’s strategy of striking neighboring countries and targeting energy facilities.
RUBIN: There are two dynamics at play, and both are mistakes on Iran’s part. First, by striking the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and even Cyprus, Iran is trying to pressure those governments to intercede with Washington and demand a halt to U.S. and Israeli operations. The opposite is happening. Countries that were previously fence-sitters are now aligning more clearly against Iran.
Second, by targeting energy infrastructure, Iran is attempting to drive up oil prices to generate revenue and create political pressure in the United States and Europe. But most Iranian oil was already under sanctions, much of it sold illicitly to China. With Venezuela reentering the market, Iran’s leverage is limited. The pressure Tehran hoped to create is likely to decline quickly.
PERKINS: What historical parallels might apply here? What are the likely outcomes?
RUBIN: The closest parallel may be Serbia in 1999. Slobodan Milosevic did not fall immediately during NATO’s bombing campaign. He lost power afterward when he attempted to cling to office following a fraudulent election. Some cite Imperial Japan, but that was after total war in the Pacific and nuclear weapons. That’s not what we’re discussing here.
Right now, many Iranians may believe they can simply outlast Donald Trump. They assume he lacks the attention span to sustain prolonged pressure. That perception could shape the regime’s calculations.
PERKINS: The president has suggested this could last four to five weeks. What is your sense?
RUBIN: The president has privately indicated he expects roughly 40 days and believes the United States is ahead of schedule. Instead of hunting down every individual leader, many gathered together early on, which accelerated operations. The real question is whether the United States, Israel, or Gulf states exhaust munitions or defensive capacity. But Iran will also run out of missiles and drones.
PERKINS: Does this open a chapter of greater instability or greater stability?
RUBIN: It depends entirely on the outcome inside Iran. If a stable, non-Islamist republic emerges, that would dramatically stabilize the region. If Iran descends into civil war, that would be the worst-case scenario.
