On October 30, 2026, Russia vetoed a U.S.-drafted Security Council resolution on Western Sahara that would have preserved a reformed United Nations peacekeeping force, while many countries opposed a Russian counterproposal. As a result, the 35-year U.N. mission for the Western Sahara now winds down. The dispute ends a Cold War remnant but also clears the way for new development centered on Moroccan sovereignty over the disputed region. Morocco is developing its Atlantic coast into a network of ports, industrial zones, energy infrastructure, and trade corridors that could link Europe, the Maghreb, and landlocked Sahel states. Washington should view this network as strategic infrastructure.
Launched in 2022, Morocco’s Atlantic African States Process now covers maritime security, connectivity, energy, and the blue economy.
Two days earlier, King Mohammed VI chaired a working session on two ports, Nador West Med and Tanger Med. Rabat announced that Nador West Med’s first container terminal would soon open and that construction would begin on Tanger Med 3. Once the planned expansions are complete, Morocco says Tanger Med could handle up to 20 million containers. Farther south, Morocco is building Dakhla Atlantic in Western Sahara, which the United Nations still lists as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. When it opens later this decade, the port will serve heavy industry and trade with landlocked Sahel states.
These are not isolated commercial projects. Launched in 2022, Morocco’s Atlantic African States Process now covers maritime security, connectivity, energy, and the blue economy. In July 2026, Morocco co-chaired the process’s seventh ministerial meeting in Cotonou. Rabat has also offered Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad access to Atlantic infrastructure to connect these landlocked Sahel economies with global markets.
That strategy intersects with United States interests. On July 13, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces and United States Africa Command signed a memorandum to establish an Africa Multidomain Training and Experimentation Center in Tan-Tan by 2030. In August, American and Moroccan forces used the center, which is still under development, for a live-fire demonstration of long-range precision-strike capabilities. In October, Morocco hosted planning for African Lion 2027, expected to involve over 45 countries.
Europe is also drawing Morocco further into its southern security architecture. In January, the European Union and Morocco reaffirmed their strategic partnership and discussed the Atlantic African States initiative and stability in the Sahel. In October, NATO’s special representative for the southern neighborhood visited Rabat to discuss terrorism, maritime security, and the Sahel. Spain has a particular stake: Moroccan ports lie across the Strait of Gibraltar and along sea lanes connecting Atlantic Africa with Europe. For Madrid, Morocco’s port expansion therefore has implications for trade, migration management, energy security, maritime surveillance, and access to the Sahel.
Yet Morocco is not shutting out Washington’s competitors. China has built a growing commercial presence around Tangier, and its Commerce Ministry describes Mohammed VI Tangier Tech City, near Tanger Med, as a bilateral industrial project. In January 2026, China’s ambassador visited Tangier Tech and Tanger Med, promoting closer supply-chain cooperation. By March, a Chinese government report said Tangier Tech had agreements with 42 companies, 34 of them Chinese, representing about $3.5 billion in planned investment.
While Rabat welcomes Chinese investment, it bases its defense cooperation on the United States and keeps close ties with Europe.
That does not constitute Chinese military access. Publicly accessible agreements suggest a focus on industrial investment, manufacturing, and trade, and do not indicate a Chinese naval foothold. In October, Morocco named Maersk-APM, a Danish-led operator, as the concessionaire for the new container terminal at Tanger Med 3. Meanwhile, Morocco is expanding military interoperability with the United States.
Russia presents another challenge. Moscow is strengthening its military ties with Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Russia’s October 30 veto on Western Sahara also showed that Moscow can challenge Washington on an issue central to Moroccan foreign policy. Morocco may therefore become an even more valuable bridge into the Sahel, where Western influence has waned.
The strategic question is not whether Morocco must choose one camp. While Rabat welcomes Chinese investment, it bases its defense cooperation on the United States and keeps close ties with Europe. Washington should not insist on economic exclusivity; instead, it should ensure that commercial dependence on critical infrastructure does not become a source of strategic leverage.
