The Sahel—an arid region that stretches nearly 3,600 miles from Mauritania to Eritrea—is increasingly contested by regional powers, Islamist groups, and both the United States and Russia. Instability and criminal networks operating along centuries-old smuggling routes move goods and people not only from south to north, but also across the Sahel and westward to the Atlantic coast.
For several years, the United States, European states, and Sahelian states themselves have coordinated to stymie the destabilizing migration route. Washington often views the Sahel primarily as a landlocked security issue focused on Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. However, Spain’s security evaluations consider a broader perspective. The strategic corridor extends from the central Sahel through Mauritania, following Atlantic migration routes and reaching the Canary Islands, a Spanish territory just 62 miles off the coast of northwest Africa.
The diplomatic story of the past several years in the interior of the Sahel has been the decline of French influence and concurrent growth of Russian and perhaps Turkish influence.
Although few illegal aliens have reached the Canaries since their highs in 2024, the strategic importance of the connection persists. By July 15, 2026, Spain reported 4,440 irregular arrivals in the Canary Islands—a 61 percent decline over the same period in 2025. Much of that decline is a direct result of U.S.-European-African maritime cooperation. In February 2026, Spain’s Specialized Immigration Committee, advising the National Security Council, underscored that tackling networks in origin and transit countries is key to preventing irregular flows.
Whether that success will continue, however, is increasingly uncertain. The diplomatic story of the past several years in the interior of the Sahel has been the decline of French influence and concurrent growth of Russian and perhaps Turkish influence. On July 10, 2026, Spain’s National Security Department announced that Russia and the governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso had signed a memorandum to strengthen diplomatic and military cooperation. Six days later, the department cautioned that terrorist groups throughout West Africa and the Sahel were evolving in sophistication and spreading toward the Gulf of Guinea. These developments are significant for Spain, as the closest European country to Africa.
The European Border and Coast Guard Agency’s annual risk analysis forecast migratory pressure on the Canary Islands driven by worsening political and security issues in the Sahel, humanitarian crises, Russian influence, and the malign use of migration to as a diplomatic tool.
Mauritania is a security partner due to both geography and the pressures it now faces, especially because of its nascent gas and oil industry. It is a crucial part of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Bordering both Mali and Algeria, it now faces terrorist threats along its eastern border. An August 18, 2026, State Department travel advisory warns Americans to avoid areas near the Malian and Algerian borders because of terrorist activity.
Russia has become a wildcard. Russia’s growing ties with Sahel governments herald competing military cooperation. This partnership does not imply that Russia controls migration toward Europe, though the Kremlin often uses all tools at its disposal as it approaches regional influence as a zero-sum game. At a minimum, a region impacting Spain’s Atlantic border is now at risk of Russian operational influence as Western presence and influence decline.
Migration is just one indicator; terrorist networks and organized crime can also propagate through interconnected routes and networks.
More broadly, the Canary smuggling route illustrates how security issues extend beyond their immediate origins. Instability in Mali can heighten pressure on Mauritania, which affects departures toward the Atlantic. Spain then faces the challenge of managing these repercussions at Europe’s southwestern border. Migration is just one indicator; terrorist networks and organized crime can also propagate through interconnected routes and networks.
Bureaucratic pigeon-holing presents a policy challenge: U.S. institutions divide areas such as North Africa, the Sahel, Europe, migration, counterterrorism, and Atlantic security into distinct portfolios. However, threat networks do not adhere to these boundaries. Terrorist groups cross borders, smuggling routes link inland paths to coastal departure points, and political instability in Mali can generate pressures that Mauritania and Spain need to handle further west.
Beyond maritime cooperation, Washington should include the Canary Islands in its more holistic consideration of the Sahel, and the State Department and U.S. Africa Command should include the Mauritania-Atlantic-Canary corridor in its Sahel evaluations—not because of an immediate terrorist threat, but because they represent a European vulnerability with pressures stemming from beyond Spain. Additionally, they provide Washington with a rationale to view Madrid as a partner in African and Atlantic security, especially at a time of significant strain in bilateral ties.
