A Kurdish proverb says, “Year after year, I long for last year.” As the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq continues to pay salaries only sporadically, it is becoming a frequent quip.
What unfolded across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was less a crisis than the normalization of dysfunction. Although incumbent caretaker Prime Minister Masrour Barzani says he has built “a stronger Kurdistan,” the opposite is true. Failure to form a new government following the October 2024 elections, the absence of a functioning parliament, unpaid public salaries, escalating elite rivalries, and the securitization of politics all suggest Barzani does not preside over a professional government. Instead, competing power centers perform triage as Kurdistan continues to hemorrhage.
The mandate of the regional parliament expired on October 9, 2022, but lawmakers extended its term by a year. In May 2023, Iraq’s federal court ruled the extension unconstitutional, declaring all parliamentary decisions made after the original expiration date legally void.
What unfolded across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq was less a crisis than the normalization of dysfunction.
Due to this paralysis, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, a political party ruled by the duumvirate of late founder Jalal Talabani’s sons Bafel and Qubad, has suggested a return bifurcated rule in which the Talabanis and Barzanisrule separately over distinct territories as the only way to avoid civil war.
As the Kurdistan Regional Government remains in default on October 2025 salary payments, Barzani and Talabani family members and affiliated elites continue profligate lifestyles. Corruption remains endemic, but public outrage has faded as Kurds become inured to it.
A lack of capacity and competence continue to characterize government, as the government stumbled over relief efforts following recent floods. Emergency relief came due to media exposure, civil society mobilization, and private philanthropy.
Security developments exposed the fragility of the system. Tribal forces, particularly the Harkis, clashed with government forces twice during the year. In November 2025, a protest turned deadly at the Lanaz refinery, where leaked documents suggest Mansour Barzani holds around 60 percent ownership. After pro-Iran militias attacked the Khor Mor gas field, a lack of effective Kurdistan Regional Government response deepened the riff between the Kurdistan Democratic Government and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan who dispute gas field management. Oil and gas infrastructure is less an economic asset than the center of power in the region. So long as the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan controls its own gas fields, it has no incentive to cooperate with, let alone subordinate itself to, the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Kurdish leaders have requested that the U.S. provide anti-drone equipment to protect the oil and gas industry; there has been no response from the United States, indicating that Washington’s patience with the Kurdistan Regional Government is limited.
Without a unified command structure or genuine coordination with Baghdad, the region remains exposed. A strong, united Kurdistan Regional Government would be logical, but 2025 confirmed that both unity and constructive relations with Baghdad have failed.
Reform packages for the peshmerga, led by the U.S.-led Global Coalition, have collapsed in substance, despite lofty rhetoric. The Kurdish armed forces and intelligence services, like the political administration, remain deeply divided along party lines. Rather than resolve this, authorities are moving to legitimize the division by creating two regional forces—one in Erbil, and one in Sulaymaniyah—nominally under the Ministry of Peshmerga but in practice loyal to the the two main parties, respectively.
At the political level, negotiations between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to form a new government are deadlocked as the Talabanis demand either the Interior Ministry or the Natural Resources Ministry, both absolute red lines for the Barzanis. In response, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has proposed forming a majority government with opposition parties, excluding the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan entirely, an action that would lead the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to establish a separate Sulaymaniyah administration.
As negotiations to form a new Iraqi government are underway in Baghdad, Kurdish divisions persist.
Elite conflicts intensify within each major party. In Sulaymaniyah, rivalry among the Talabani cousins escalated, culminating in the arrest of Bafel and Qubad’s cousin Lahur Talabani, an episode that shattered the illusion of elite cohesion. In the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s zone, Masoud Barzani continues to act as a stabilizing patriarch, but such a brake on violence among his sons, nephew, and grandchildren would end with his death. Masrour Barzani has been consolidating power and reportedly obstructing the economic networks of his cousin and regional president, Nechirvan Barzani, signaling a looming succession struggle. Former Kurdistan Democratic Party leadership council member Adham Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s cousin, is now exiled in Sulaymaniyah. The parties sanction political opponents, rival tribes, and competing businessmen, and frequently target journalists and activists with imprisonment, if not assassination.
As negotiations to form a new Iraqi government are underway in Baghdad, Kurdish divisions persist. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan views Baghdad as strategic depth to balance Erbil’s dominance. The Kurdistan Democratic Party, by contrast, seeks a compliant partner in the presidency, someone who follows Masoud Barzani’s preferences like former Iraqi President Fuad Masoum. This tension recalls 2018, when Masoud Barzani rejected Barham Salih for the presidency. Today, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s preferred nominee, Nizar Amedi, faces similar resistance, not only because he is a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, but because of tribal antagonisms long embedded in Kurdish politics.
As 2025 winds to an end, there is little reason for optimism that 2026 will bring relief to Iraqi Kurds.
