Pakistan’s engagement in the Middle East has expanded significantly, especially after it signed a strategic mutual defense pact with Saudi Arabia in September 2025, under which an attack on one is considered an attack on both. Although Pakistan’s engagement with the region has a long history, changing geopolitical dynamics have further increased its role. However, there is an important dimension to this development: Pakistan is now integrated with China. Defense, security, and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has expanded significantly in recent years.
Defense, security, and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has expanded significantly in recent years.
According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data, more than 80 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports between 2021 and 2024 came from China, reflecting deep integration and China’s increasing penetration in Pakistan’s defense sector. Although Pakistan continues to operate American military platforms, including F-16 fighter jets, and occasionally receives military assistance from the United States, the bulk of its military inventory is now of Chinese origin. Pakistan is actively promoting the JF-17 fighter aircraft, which it co-produces with China, as well as other Chinese-origin defense systems, including drones and air defense systems such as the HQ-9, and related military equipment.
Given recent reports of the growing number of defense discussions and proposed deals involving Pakistan with multiple countries—including Iraq, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia—especially in Chinese news media, there have been reports suggesting that Pakistan may be concluding multiple JF-17 deals with these countries. These platforms are increasingly being promoted across the region through defense exhibitions, military diplomacy, and cooperation initiatives.
One such proposed deal suggests Pakistan could provide JF-17s to Saudi Arabia in exchange for financial arrangements, including the $2 billion extended by Riyadh to Islamabad. No such deal has materialized yet, largely because of concerns regarding the quality of Chinese weapons, interoperability with existing U.S.-origin systems, and broader financial considerations. Nevertheless, China is using Pakistan for weapons promotion as a gateway to enter the region’s defense landscape, and Pakistan’s promotion of these systems supports China’s broader defense-industrial presence and strategic objectives.
Given the changing dynamics in the Middle East region, especially after the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, Pakistan can promote Chinese weapons in the region as Gulf Arab countries reassess their security priorities. For instance, following the ceasefire, Pakistan sent defense equipment, troops, and other assets to Saudi Arabia, including JF-17 fighter jets, as part of its defense pact commitments. This shows how Chinese-origin military systems can gain greater visibility in the region through Pakistan.
China has aggressively advertised its weapon platforms and builds narratives around its defense systems in the region.
China is also using Pakistan strategically. For example, the recent defense deal between Pakistan and the Libyan National Army involving 16 JF-17 fighter jets, training aircraft, and a broader package of military equipment worth over $4 billion, demonstrates how China can expand its defense footprint while avoiding direct criticism. Such arrangements have attracted criticism for potentially undermining the United Nations arms embargo on Libya, escalating Libya’s internal conflict by shifting the military balance, raising questions over the legitimacy of the recipient actor and intensifying broader geopolitical tensions in an already fragmented regional security environment.
Defense deals entail long-term defense partnerships and influence. It is not just about one platform, but about the broader Chinese defense ecosystem, including drones, air defense systems, and other weapon platforms. Such arrangements typically involve long-term commitments related to maintenance, spare parts, training, and logistical support.
Moreover, if the potential “Islamic NATO” that many of these countries, including Pakistan and Turkey, discuss takes shape, China might believe it has an augmented market. China has aggressively advertised its weapon platforms and builds narratives around its defense systems in the region. It has sought to leverage extensive propaganda about the supposed success of JF-17 and other Chinese weapon platforms in the May 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan.
In the aftermath of the U.S.-Iran deal, China might flood Iran with weaponry, further integrating its zone of interoperable countries. This reflects a broader shift in China’s regional security approach, where it increasingly exercises influence through networks rather than direct presence.
