In the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, terrorist attacks, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the only government to publicly and officially applaud Hamas’s actions and wish success to its operations. Yet, paradoxically, while left-wing parties, Islamist groups, and immigrant communities took to the streets across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Australia to express solidarity with the Palestinians of Gaza, no such demonstrations occurred in Iran. The regime attempted to stage pro-Hamas rallies, but participation was limited to its loyalists and Basij militiamen. The broader public was openly hostile toward Hamas.
This widespread antipathy among Iranians toward Palestinians stems from several factors. The Islamic Revolution made the Palestinian cause and the destruction of Israel central pillars of Iran’s foreign policy. Even the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions are framed within this broader agenda. But Iranians—regime insiders included—are aware of the economic burden these Palestine-focused policies have imposed on the country.
The Islamic Revolution made the Palestinian cause and the destruction of Israel central pillars of Iran’s foreign policy.
It was with Tehran’s assistance that Hamas built hundreds of miles of reinforced, multi-level tunnels in Gaza, and established rocket and missile workshops, underground launch sites, weapons depots, command centers, and living quarters for its leadership—all in pursuit of the illusion that Israel could be erased from the map. Sophisticated tunneling technology enabled excavation without vibration, making detection by Israel nearly impossible.
The precise scale of Iran’s financial support for Hamas is unknown, but informed estimates place it at roughly $100 million per month prior to October 7, 2023, in addition to direct aid provided to Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Shiite group Al-Sabireen. Over the past four decades, Iran has also built, equipped, and sustained Hezbollah in Lebanon. By the October 7 attacks, Hezbollah’s military capacity had surpassed that of the Lebanese army. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared in 2017 that the Islamic Republic had funded every aspect of Hezbollah’s infrastructure—from weapons and salaries to hospitals, schools, and housing. Analysts estimate that Iran’s Palestine-centered policies, including its nuclear program, have cost the country more than $2 trillion.
As the Iranian regime’s involvement with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups became more visible in the past two decades, Iran’s economic situation began to deteriorate. International and U.S. sanctions weakened an economy already hobbled by mismanagement. The population began directly blaming the Palestinians for the outflow of their wealth, while many Iranians were losing their living standards.
Iranian attitudes toward Israel and Palestine have evolved significantly. At the time of Israel’s independence in 1948, Iranians displayed little interest. For most, the Arab-Israeli conflict was remote and irrelevant—until Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser used Iran’s de facto recognition of Israel to stoke hostility against Tehran in the Arab world. His rhetoric, including the provocative rebranding of the Persian Gulf as the “Arabian Gulf” and Khuzestan Province as “Arabistan,” transformed political rivalry into cultural animosity, fostering Iranian resentment toward Arabs.
By the 1970s, virtually every major opposition group in Iran had incorporated Palestinian solidarity and anti-Israel positions into its platform.
Nasser’s alliance with the Soviet Union amplified this hostility, as Iranian communists echoed his stance, while Iranian clerics also embraced his pro-Palestinian messaging. Pressure from Arab nationalists, communists, and Islamists nudged the government closer to Israel, prompting cooperation across fields from agriculture and energy to intelligence. Direct Iran Air and El Al flights connected Tehran and Tel Aviv daily.
The global rise of guerrilla movements in the 1960s and 1970s also reached Iran. Groups such as the People’s Fedai Guerrillas and the People’s Mujahedin (Mujahedin-e Khalq, MEK) trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon, importing tactics of urban armed struggle. By the 1970s, virtually every major opposition group in Iran had incorporated Palestinian solidarity and anti-Israel positions into its platform.
In January 1979, Ahmad Jibril of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command revealed that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine had maintained ties with Iranian revolutionaries since 1970, training and arming dozens of Iranian guerrilla leaders. Palestinian involvement reached a peak during the Islamic Revolution itself. Accounts suggest that Palestinian fighters may have participated in the September 8, 1978, Zhaleh Square massacre in Tehran, where demonstrators and security forces were gunned down in circumstances that remain contested. Later testimonies from officials, including the revolutionary government’s Defense Minister Ahmad Madani, pointed to the presence of foreign militants, including members of Lebanon’s Amal movement.
Memoirs of former intelligence officials and testimonies from Palestinian representatives further indicate that some 300 Palestinian commandos carried out coordinated strikes on key Iranian military and security sites in the revolution’s final days—accelerating the collapse of the monarchy. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had a specific liaison to the Palestine Liberation Organization, but several members of his entourage maintained their own contacts and cooperation with various Palestinian organizations.
Collaboration between Palestinian guerrillas and the Islamic Revolution gradually fueled resentment among Iranians opposed to the regime.
Khomeini’s close ties with Palestinian leaders were symbolized by Yasser Arafat’s visit to Tehran immediately after the revolution’s victory; the only photograph of Khomeini smiling shows him in Arafat’s company.
This intimate collaboration between Palestinian guerrillas and the Islamic Revolution gradually fueled resentment among Iranians opposed to the regime, extending hostility from the clerical establishment to Palestinians themselves. Over time, the slogan “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon! I give my life for Iran” became a defining refrain of anti-regime demonstrations.
By the October 7 attacks, this resentment had hardened into open contempt. When Palestinian flags were displayed in football stadiums in Isfahan, Sari, and Sirjan, spectators responded with vulgar chants rejecting solidarity with Palestinians (“Set the Palestinian flag up your …”). In a football stadium in Tabriz, spectators pelted a religious singer attempting to perform a pro-Palestinian song with bottles until police escorted him from the field.
Over forty-five years of Islamic rule, Iranian public opinion has shifted dramatically—from indifference to Palestine, toward support for Israel. While the Islamic Republic’s longevity remains uncertain, one thing appears certain: Future governments in Tehran and Jerusalem will find themselves not as adversaries, but as close allies.
