The Iraqi Islamic Party historically has represented the Muslim Brotherhood’s political arm in Iraq, but it lost much of its electoral influence after participating in post-2003 governments. Its decline did not drive its leaders out of politics; instead, many moved into broader parties and coalitions that do not publicly identify as Islamist.
That deliberate ambiguity now appears to be breaking down. At a July 15, 2026, meeting of the State Administration Coalition, Mahmoud al-Qaisi appeared as the representative of Tahaluf ʻAzm [Azem Alliance] following the arrest of its leader, Muthanna al-Samarrai. Al-Qaisi was a prominent figure in the Iraqi Islamic Party. His assumption of ‘Azm’s representation places the organization in an influential position inside one of the country’s largest Sunni alliances.
The Muslim Brotherhood has expanded its activities in mosques and universities, while Brotherhood-linked figures have advanced inside the Hasm al-Watani [National Resolution Alliance] and the Sunni Endowment. The Brotherhood has returned through two political alliances, a religious institution that manages thousands of mosques and a missionary network rebuilding the organization from the ground up.
The Brotherhood transforms mosques into political bases, beginning with religious lessons and ending with voter mobilization.
The Islamic Party no longer needs to restore its old name or logo when Al-Qaisi manages ‘Azm and represents it in meetings of the forces that govern Iraq. Al-Samarrai’s arrest, meanwhile, removed the man who led the coalition that exposed the Muslim Brotherhood infiltration.
The Hasm al-Watani provides a second route. Wahib al-Aqidi both holds an influential political and media position within the alliance in Baghdad and serves as a preacher at a mosque in Hor Rajab, about 12 miles south of the capital. Al-Aqidi combines religious preaching with electoral work and oversees a media network promoting Hasm and its candidates. His position shows how the Brotherhood transforms mosques into political bases, beginning with religious lessons and ending with voter mobilization.
The Justice and Charity Movement, established by Iraqi Islamic Party veterans led by Ismail al-Najm, directs this revival. Faisal al-Issawi, one of its most prominent political and religious figures, has said that it is the only organized movement today representing the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq. When al-Issawi won a seat in the latest parliamentary elections, the movement’s leadership celebrated his victory as one of its candidates. According to local sources, he preaches at a mosque in Falluhab, where he combines tribal influence, religious authority, and parliamentary activity.
The movement’s structure extends beyond political leaders. Justice and Charity operates student, youth, and women’s offices and organizes Quranic courses, university forums, and educational programs. These activities recruit members and combine families, mosques, and universities within a single network. The political party contests elections, but the movement produces the social base that the party needs.
The Sunni Endowment gives the network its most important institutional tool. The body controls the appointment of imams and preachers, manages mosques, and authorizes religious activities. It effectively decides who may preach from its pulpit and who may not.
Religious and local sources say figures linked to the Islamic Party and Justice and Charity have expanded their influence inside the Endowment and used appointment and dismissal powers to remove preachers associated with Madkhalism, a quietest strain within Salafi thought, and replaced them with figures closer to the Brotherhood.
Madkhali clerics previously had built influence inside the Endowment and in mosques across Baghdad, al-Anbar, and Nineveh. The balance shifted after a political and security campaign targeted the movement, ultimately leading to leadership change. Public disputes between clerics reflect how the struggle reached appointments to pulpits and control over individual mosques.
The Iraqi Islamic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood have long served as the principal Sunni partners of Iraq’s Shi’i Islamist parties.
Within this network, the mosque is not only a place of worship. The preacher identifies young men who attend his study circles. Those circles create social ties that develop into associations, activities, and services. During elections, the same network mobilizes voters. Control of the Endowment allows the organization to repeat this process across multiple regions under official cover.
The Brotherhood also retained an armed extension. Kata’ib Thawrat al-Ishreen [the 1920 Revolution Brigades] is the armed wing that emerged from the same political and missionary environment, before the Islamic Resistance Movement split from it. According to local sources, this network maintained ties to the Islamic Party and the Justice and Charity Movement, and part of it later joined Popular Mobilization formations operating in western Iraq.
One of the clearest examples appeared in Amiriyat Fallujah, where members coordinated with Kataib Hezbollah, the Iraqi faction most closely linked to Iran. This cooperation enabled Tehran to insert a local Sunni force into its security project in Anbar and western Baghdad instead of relying entirely on Shi’i militias deployed from outside those areas. Such sectarian transcendence should not surprise. The Iraqi Islamic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood have long served as the principal Sunni partners of Iraq’s Shi’i Islamist parties. Both sides share a model that places religion at the center of the state.
The Brotherhood’s expansion serves Iranian interests in other ways. The organization attacks Salafi currents linked to the Saudi religious establishment, weakens Iran’s religious rivals, and supplies Tehran with politicians, clerics, and local forces capable of operating in communities where Shi’i militias face greater resistance.
