The End of the Five-Star Jihad in Qatar

From the Comfort of Its Control Center in Doha, Hamas Rejected Proposals to Free All the Hostages and Rejected Deals to End the War with Israel

Hamas militants in the streets of Gaza in February 2025.

Hamas militants in the streets of Gaza in February 2025.

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Israel struck Hamas in Doha on the morning of September 9, 2025, targeting the terror group’s senior leadership. The strike killed the architects of the October 7, 2023, attacks. This assassination was an act of self-defense, long overdue.

The operation against Hamas leaders like Khaled Mashaal and Khalil al-Hayya was a necessary act of war. It dismantled a command center that directed a genocidal campaign from the safety of a five-star hotel. The explosions in the Katara District ended the fiction of Qatar as a mediator. They proved that for the masterminds of terror, there is no safe harbor.

This strike brings the end of the October 7th war closer. It demonstrates strategic and moral clarity. A nation’s right to defend itself does not stop at the border of a state sponsor of terror. For years, Hamas leaders plotted murder from a protected sanctuary. That sanctuary is now gone.

To understand this strike, one must understand Qatar’s role. For thirteen years, Doha served as Hamas’s global headquarters. A naive Obama administration sanctioned this arrangement in 2012, believing a communication channel was a strategic asset. Instead, it created the single greatest enabler of Hamas’s war against Israel.

Qatar was not a mediator. It was an active enabler, providing the material support that fuels any terror enterprise. This support had three pillars: financial, diplomatic, and operational.

Qatar’s patronage was direct and substantial. The state funneled over $1.8 billion to Hamas-controlled Gaza.

Financially, Qatar’s patronage was direct and substantial. The state funneled over $1.8 billion to Hamas-controlled Gaza. The world accepted the cover story of humanitarian aid. Yet Israel knew the truth. Suitcases of cash, delivered with Israeli approval in a failed policy to “buy quiet,” were meant for salaries and aid. But Israeli intelligence warned that Hamas siphoned millions directly to its military wing. The policy continued. October 7 was the price of that policy. Qatari funds helped purchase the tools of mass murder.

Diplomatically, Qatar gave Hamas legitimacy. From suites at the Sheraton and the Four Seasons, Khaled Mashaal held court like a statesman. He met with foreign delegations. He used Al Jazeera as a propaganda arm. After the October 7 pogrom, Hamas official Ghazi Hamad declared from Doha that Hamas would repeat the massacre “again and again.” Qatar offered him protection. It provided a diplomatic shield, refusing to designate Hamas as a terror group while using the United Nations to condemn Israel. This was not mediation; it was advocacy.

Operationally, the Doha sanctuary was the command-and-control center for the war. From the comfort of their offices, Hamas leaders watched the October 7 attacks unfold. They used Qatar’s infrastructure to coordinate with commanders in Gaza and patrons in Tehran. This was not a passive safe haven. It was an extraterritorial military headquarters, protected by the diplomatic and economic might of a petrostate. This violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which requires all states to deny safe haven to terrorists. For thirteen years, Qatar has violated this law while hosting America’s largest regional military base.

Mediators, led by the terror group’s own host, proposed deals. Every time, Hamas said no.

Hamas’s intransigence paved the road to this strike. For twenty-three months, Israel fought a difficult war in Gaza. It took measures to avoid civilian casualties that no other army would contemplate. In return, the international community condemned Israel. Mediators, led by the terror group’s own host, proposed deals. Every time, Hamas said no.

Hamas rejected proposals to free all the hostages. It rejected deals to end the war. The strategy, conceived in Doha, was to leverage Gazan suffering to isolate Israel. Yahya Sinwar was the commander in the Hamas tunnels. But the strategic leadership—the men with the ultimate veto—sat in Qatar. From their safe perch, they had no incentive to end the war. Their families were safe. Their money was secure. The war for them was a spectacle.

This dynamic made a military conclusion impossible. Israel could clear every tunnel, but Hamas would regenerate as long as its head remained protected. The terror group promised it would.

The United States was slow to grasp this. For over a year, Washington maintained the fiction of Qatar as a mediator. Only in late 2024, after negotiations collapsed, did the pressure mount. Reports that Qatar had asked Hamas leaders to leave were a diplomatic feint. The game had already changed. Diplomacy had failed. The Doha office was no longer a political address. It was a military target.

An operation of this complexity requires years of intelligence and months of preparation. It bears the hallmarks of Mossad and the Israeli Air Force. Mossad gathered the intelligence. Pinpointing a high-level Hamas meeting in a hostile capital requires human sources, signals intelligence, and constant surveillance. On-the-ground assets likely confirmed the target. The targets—figures like Zaher Jabarin, Mashaal, and al-Hayya—ran Hamas’s finances and foreign operations. Eliminating them decapitates the organization’s external wing.

The message is clear: Terrorist leaders are not safe.

The Israeli Air Force delivered the strike. The precision required to hit a single building in the Katara district points to advanced, guided munitions. This was a scalpel, not a bomb, likely delivered by an F-35i Adir that could evade regional air defenses.

The message is clear: Terrorist leaders are not safe. Not in Damascus, not in Beirut, and not in Doha. Israel will find you. Israel will hold you accountable.

This was the only move. It recognizes the world as it is.

The strike brings the war’s end closer. It destroys Hamas’s greatest strategic asset: its leadership. The terrorists in Gaza no longer have a protected command structure. Their leaders are dead or running. This creates a new incentive: surrender.

To those who cry “escalation,” one must ask: escalation of what? The war began with the worst massacre of Jews since the Holocaust. Iranian proxies already fire on Israel from three sides. Weakness invites aggression. For two years, Israel’s enemies believed its hands were tied regarding Qatar. They were wrong. This action re-establishes Israeli deterrence more than any diplomatic cable.

For Qatar, this is a reckoning. For years, it played a cynical game, funding American universities and terror movements. It hosted the World Cup and Hamas. That game is over. The strike humiliates Qatar. It exposes the limits of its checkbook diplomacy. Qatar must now choose: remain a purveyor of radical Islamist ideology or join the community of nations. Its security depends on the choice.

As the smoke clears over Doha, clarity remains. The war against Hamas is a war for Israel’s survival. Israel must fight it on all fronts. In the tunnels of Gaza. In the halls of diplomacy. And in the capitals that give succor to its enemies. The strike in Doha was not a new chapter. It was the beginning of the end.

Gregg Roman is the executive director of the Middle East Forum, previously directing the Community Relations Council of the Jewish Federation of Greater Pittsburgh. In 2014, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency named him one of the “ten most inspiring global Jewish leaders,” and he previously served as the political advisor to the deputy foreign minister of Israel and worked for the Israeli Ministry of Defense. A frequent speaker on Middle East affairs, Mr. Roman appears on international news channels such as Fox News, i24NEWS, Al-Jazeera, BBC World News, and Israel’s Channels 12 and 13. He studied national security and political communications at American University and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, and has contributed to The Hill, Newsweek, the Los Angeles Times, the Miami Herald, and the Jerusalem Post.
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