The Eastern Mediterranean Has Become Europe’s Digital Fault Line

NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels Is Positive, but It Has No Permanent Base in the Eastern Mediterranean

Undersea communications cables are covered in feather-like hydroids.

Undersea communications cables are covered in feather-like hydroids.

Shutterstock

The Eastern Mediterranean is home to a race with implications for the digital and strategic future of Europe. Last summer, Turkish naval vessels turned back a survey ship chartered to plot a new fiber optic cable route between Israel and Greece in waters that Ankara claims as its continental shelf, producing a four-day standoff. While naval movements dominated the headlines, as significant is the rapid building of new submarine digital arteries from Greece through Cyprus to Israel.

European dependence on submarine cables for its international internet traffic and global financial flows is evident.

Undersea infrastructure is important in a global economy driven by data. European dependence on submarine cables for its international internet traffic and global financial flows is evident. This undersea infrastructure is composed of data cables, electric connectors, and undersea pipelines for the supply of oil and gas. According to the European Union Institute for Security Studies, submarine cables today account for nearly 99 percent of inter-continental data traffic. Yet many diplomats and analysts treat these cables more as mechanical components than strategic infrastructure. This is especially true in the Eastern Mediterranean where countries contest maritime boundaries and great-power footprints grow.

The Eastern Mediterranean matters because the region has become a critical corridor for new cable systems aimed to connect Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Projects such as the 4,400-mile, $400 million Medusa submarine cable system underscore the ambition. Simultaneously, Turkey contests the maritime areas declared by Greece and Cyprus, rejects the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning island-Exclusive Economic Zones, and repeatedly confronts research ships and cable-laying surveys.

Historically, anchors and fishing account for most sea-cable damage but analysts now warn about a pattern of deliberate sabotage. The cybersecurity firm Recorded Future reported nine instances of likely Russian or Chinese sabotage in 2024-25, both in the Baltic and near Taiwan. In response, the European Union issued a Joint Communication declaring the submarine communication and electricity cables warning that “a hybrid campaign aimed at these critical infrastructures may disrupt essential functions and services in the EU.” For the Eastern Mediterranean, where the depth is lower, jurisdiction uncertain, and naval forces strong, the danger of disruption, whether accidental or intentional, is higher.

A severed cable in the Eastern Mediterranean would hit at European finance, defense, and data systems. The map of submarine cable infrastructure published by the European Commission suggests Europe is “the continent with the largest sub-sea communications in the world.” The race for infrastructure is changing the balance of regional power. Landing stations give states like Greece, Cyprus, and Israel economic advantage, geopolitical weight, and influence. Turkey and perhaps Russia and China less directly seek leverage by menacing access to those states or installations.

Critical infrastructure resilience requires joint monitoring and response.

Europe cannot afford complacency. It must reconsider these underwater arteries, not as technical afterthoughts, but as strategic lifelines. Critical infrastructure resilience requires joint monitoring and response. However, the implementation of such an action plan proceeds slowly. NATO’s creation of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels is positive, but it does not have a permanent base in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this gap between NATO and the relevant European players, the establishment of a regional coordination cell in Greece or Cyprus would enable joint patrols, information-sharing, and rapid repair missions.

The Eastern Mediterranean long has been an arena for competitive energy, but today it is the theater for digital geopolitics. Should Europe continue to ignore the contest over its seabed, it might find its next major crisis will not be in the skies or on its borders but deep below the sea.

Alshifa Imam is a postgraduate student at Jamia Millia Islamia in India in conflict and peace studies.
See more from this Author
Many Communities Are Caught in a Power Structure Frozen in Time, Imposed by Both Tribal Elites and Ordinary People
Persian Gulf Countries in the Last Several Decades Have Built Mosques and Cultural Centers to Hold Sway in Europe and America
See more on this Topic
Most Members of the Political Elite Depend on the Corrupt Economy and Could Not Thrive in Democratic or Free-Market Environments
NATO’s Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels Is Positive, but It Has No Permanent Base in the Eastern Mediterranean
Egypt’s Double Game Continues, Using State-Sponsored Media to Fuel Hatred While Pretending to Be a Partner for Peace