Tehran now incorporates Africa into its broader anti-Israel strategy. What began as scattered arms shipments has hardened into a logistics network that delivers drones to African battlefields while building redundant supply lines to mock Western sanctions.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps moves Mohajer-6 drones and their components through Port Sudan and other coastal hubs, tightening the noose. Since late 2023, Iranian cargo aircraft have flown repeatedly between Port Sudan and Bandar Abbas. A Boeing 747 linked to Qeshm Fars Air completed at least six flights between December 2023 and January 2024. Satellite imagery confirms Mohajer-6 drones at Wadi Sayyidna air base near Khartoum. Battlefield wreckage matches the 6.5-meter platform, which carries precision-guided munitions and has a range exceeding 1,200 miles. The Sudanese Armed Forces used these systems to seize key territory around Khartoum, shifting the balance against the United Arab Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces.
Satellite imagery confirms Mohajer-6 drones at Wadi Sayyidna air base near Khartoum.
The same model appeared in Ethiopia in 2021 when Tehran supplied armed drones for operations against Tigray rebels in violation of a United Nations Security Council resolution. Additional transit routes through Eritrean ports such as Assab and Massawa further expand the pipeline.
The human toll is horrific. United Nations officials recorded nearly 700 civilian deaths from drone strikes in Sudan during the first three months of 2025. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project tallies show 198 drone strikes in the first two months of 2026 that killed 478 more civilians. Each Mohajer-6 or Shahed-136 variant costs between $20,000 and $50,000, yet Iran’s domestic production lines can surge to 10,000 drones per month at peak capacity. These cheap systems now dominate air operations across multiple African conflicts, turning the continent into both a lucrative market and a potential forward assembly zone for Tehran’s asymmetric arsenal.
By embedding itself in Sudan, Tehran secures access to the Red Sea and creates a direct link to Houthi forces that have carried out more than 100 attacks on commercial shipping since late 2023. The Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz represent pincers on global energy arteries. Every drone delivered to Khartoum strengthens this southern axis while Tehran barters weapons for gold and minerals that bypass sanctions entirely. The strategy neutralizes Gulf Arab rivals who back the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and counters Saudi and Emirati influence across the Horn of Africa.
Tehran’s reach now stretches into the Sahel. In February 2026, the Iranian defense minister traveled to Burkina Faso to offer drones and broader defense cooperation in exchange for resource concessions. Similar overtures target juntas in Mali and elsewhere, exploiting weak governance, porous borders, and anti-Western resentment.
In a multipolar world where Russia and China supply components and diplomatic cover, Africa becomes Iran’s sanctions-proof rear base and a springboard for hybrid warfare far from the Levant.
For Israel, the danger is immediate. Iranian drones already equip proxies that target Israeli-linked vessels and territory. An entrenched African network shortens resupply routes to the Houthis, opens potential forward operating sites, and multiplies attack vectors. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has repeatedly attempted to recruit local networks for strikes on Israeli diplomatic posts. In 2025, the Mossad, collaborating with African partners, dismantled plots against embassies in Senegal and Uganda, exposing operatives from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and local recruits conducting surveillance. Tehran clearly views Africa as contested ground where it can strike at Israelis and their interests but maintain plausible deniability.
Israel must expand intelligence-sharing with African governments, offering counter-drone technology and training.
Indeed, Jerusalem cannot treat this network as a distant nuisance. The Mossad has the mandate and experience to dismantle it. The same aggressive tactics that slowed Iran’s nuclear and missile programs—precise intelligence-gathering in key ports, targeted sabotage of procurement chains, elimination of critical Revolutionary Guard logisticians, and cyber intrusions—must now disrupt the African drone pipeline.
Israel must expand intelligence-sharing with African governments, offering counter-drone technology and training. Close coordination with Gulf Arab partners already active in Sudan and the Horn will isolate Tehran locally. Sustained pressure on Chinese and other intermediaries supplying dual-use electronics and avionics must continue through expanded sanctions and meticulous supply-chain monitoring.
The battle for air superiority no longer ends at the Mediterranean or the Persian Gulf. Tehran chose Africa deliberately because the continent is vast, under-governed, and strategically vital. Every delivered drone tightens the encirclement. Quiet, unrelenting Mossad work, supported by clear-eyed leadership in Jerusalem, is the only instrument sharp enough to tear apart Iran’s African enterprise before it matures into a permanent strategic nightmare.
