On January 12, 2026, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said he canceled all agreements with the United Arab Emirates to protest Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, a move which he implied Abu Dhabi backed. The move may not be as significant as Mogadishu implies. First, the Federal Government in Mogadishu has limited sway in other federal states like Puntland, where the United Arab Emirates continues to maintain projects in the port city of Bossaso, and Jubaland, where Kenyan influence remains important.
Still, Somalia’s diplomatic recalibration underrepresents a deliberate effort to reduce reliance on the United Arab Emirates while broadening external partnerships. Presented domestically as a restoration of policy autonomy and federal authority, the move reflects a maturing foreign policy posture. Yet geopolitical realignments rarely create vacuums. The United Arab Emirates’ extensive economic investments, diplomatic networks, and security footprint across the Horn of Africa suggest its influence is more likely to adapt than recede.
Sovereignty assertion coexists with strategic interdependence; it does not replace it.
At stake is not merely a bilateral disagreement but a broader recalibration across the Red Sea-Horn strategic corridor, where Persian Gulf states, Israel, Western security interests, and emerging African economic hubs increasingly intersect. Somalia’s leadership seeks to reinforce sovereignty credibility, diversify alliances, and reduce perceptions of external political leverage. These objectives resonate domestically, particularly in an environment where state consolidation remains ongoing.
However, Somalia continues to face structural constraints. Counterterrorism financing, institutional development, infrastructure investment, and maritime security cooperation require sustained engagement. Sovereignty assertion coexists with strategic interdependence; it does not replace it.
The Emirates retain substantial influence in the Horn through long-term port and logistics investments, significant financial and investment capacity, diplomatic relationships with major global powers, and maritime security and counterterrorism cooperation frameworks. These assets allow Abu Dhabi to recalibrate influence without direct confrontation. Strategic repositioning, rather than withdrawal, remains the more probable trajectory.
Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland elevated Somaliland’s international visibility and introduced new diplomatic variables into Horn geopolitics. For Gulf Cooperation Council actors and particularly the United Arab Emirates, Somaliland presents several comparative advantages: relative political stability, strategic coastal positioning near major shipping lanes, infrastructure investment opportunities, and potential logistics and maritime security partnerships. Even without diplomatic recognition, expanded economic or security engagement elevates Somaliland’s international standing.
Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland elevated Somaliland’s international visibility and introduced new diplomatic variables into Horn geopolitics.
Normalization frameworks linking Israel and several Arab Gulf states have matured into broader strategic cooperation encompassing trade, technology, and security. These relationships now influence external engagement patterns in the Horn of Africa.
The convergence of Israeli strategic interests and Emirati economic-security priorities in the Red Sea corridor may encourage parallel or complementary engagement with Somaliland. Such alignment would not necessarily reflect coordinated diplomacy but could produce cumulative geopolitical effects.
Foreign partnerships can indirectly shape political alignments in fragile political environments. Somalia’s evolving electoral landscape and institutional consolidation make balanced diplomacy important. Strong institutions, transparent governance, and diversified partnerships remain essential to minimizing perceptions of external political leverage while maintaining constructive international engagement.
Despite current tensions, a structured decoupling rather than a permanent rupture appears most plausible: reduced overt alignment with the United Arab Emirates, continued commercial and security engagement through indirect channels, diversification of Somalia’s diplomatic partnerships, and gradual recalibration as mutual interests reassert themselves.
Foreign partnerships can indirectly shape political alignments in fragile political environments.
Western policymakers should monitor Horn normalization dynamics. The intersection of Persian Gulf investment, Israeli strategic engagement, maritime security concerns, and emerging energy interests reshapes one of the world’s most strategically sensitive corridors. Somalia’s recalibration and Somaliland’s international engagement reflect broader structural shifts rather than isolated diplomatic developments.
Somalia’s pivot away from heavy United Arab Emirates reliance reflects a sovereignty-driven recalibration aimed at diversifying external partnerships. Yet Abu Dhabi’s financial depth, diplomatic reach, and investments ensure its influence will likely adapt rather than diminish.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has introduced an additional geopolitical variable whose implications continue to unfold. Whether through expanded economic engagement, security cooperation, or diplomatic signaling, the Horn’s strategic landscape is evolving rapidly.
For Somalia, the challenge will be balancing sovereignty with sustained partnerships necessary for stability and development. For regional actors, the priority will be navigating shifting alliances without destabilizing an already sensitive environment.
