The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked Tasnim website’s criticism of Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s reported 10-point negotiating framework, followed by street-level reactions from maximalist hardliners, points to something more nuanced than either “unity” or outright fragmentation. It reflects a controlled but increasingly visible rupture between two entrenched currents within the Islamic Republic’s power structure—the traditional Revolutionary Guard-linked security elite and the ideological hardliners clustered around figures such as Saeed Jalili.
Parliament speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf is most likely closer to Revolutionary Guard circles who might see the 10-point plan as too rigid and maximalist, while others who speak on behalf of Mojtaba are behind, devising tough pre-conditions for talks with the United States.
Analysts increasingly describe [Mojtaba Khamenei’s] position as dependent on those in command of the Revolutionary Guard and lacking independent legitimacy.
At its core, this tension is not new. Rivalry between Jalili’s ideological camp and figures like Ghalibaf has existed for years, often revolving around competing visions of how to preserve the system. What has changed is the context in which this rivalry unfolds. The death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei removed the single figure who, for decades, managed, balanced, and suppressed these contradictions. His leadership style relied on ambiguity—allowing factions to compete, but rarely to openly collide.
That mechanism is now weakened. Mojtaba, who remains invisible in public, has not reproduced the same authority. It is not even clear if he is capable of functioning as a leader or even if he is still alive. Analysts increasingly describe his position as dependent on those in command of the Revolutionary Guard and lacking independent legitimacy, with real power distributed across security networks rather than concentrated at the top. This has created space for rivalries to surface more openly, especially under conditions of war, economic pressure, and diplomatic uncertainty.
Within this environment, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is not a monolith. As many analyses emphasize, it is a network of overlapping power centers with economic, military, and political interests. The distinction between “classic Revolutionary Guard circles” and ideologically driven hardliners is critical. The former are often embedded in state institutions, economic networks, and operational command structures; the latter are more ideologically rigid, less constrained by practical considerations, and often aligned with movements such as the Paydari front.
The dispute over the reported 10-point framework reflects a clash over strategy, not objectives. Both camps remain committed to regime survival, but they differ sharply on how to achieve it: Maximalist hardliners see confrontation and ideological rigidity as essential to preserving legitimacy and deterrence. Some Revolutionary Guard-linked actors and others with less military background more likely recognize the constraints imposed by economic collapse, international isolation, and military pressure, and are perhaps more open to tactical flexibility.
This divergence becomes especially significant when it spills into the public domain. Historically, such disagreements were contained within elite channels. The use of media criticism and symbolic acts like graffiti suggests that internal discipline is loosening at the margins. It does not yet indicate a breakdown, but it signals that the system is under strain.
The key point remains that the coercive core of the state—the Revolutionary Guard’s command structure—has not fractured in an operational sense.
In the past, hardliners freely attacked elite segments known as “reformists,” but there were not many instances of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps elements and other hardliners attacking each other over key questions of nuclear negotiations.
At the same time, it would be premature to interpret these developments as a decisive institutional split. The key point remains that the coercive core of the state—the Revolutionary Guard’s command structure—has not fractured in an operational sense. There is no evidence of competing chains of command or regional military divergence. As long as that remains intact, the system retains its capacity to manage internal disputes.
What we are witnessing, therefore, is a transitional phase in which the central arbiter is gone, the successor is incapable of consolidating full authority, and multiple power centers are increasingly testing the limits of their influence.
In such conditions, competition over resources, influence, and strategic direction inevitably intensifies. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ vast economic role—spanning major sectors of the Iranian economy—raises the stakes of these internal contests, as control over policy is directly tied to control over wealth and patronage networks.
The broader implication is not immediate fragmentation but increasing difficulty in maintaining coherence. The Islamic Republic has historically survived by balancing factions under a strong central authority. Without that anchor, even limited public ruptures can become more consequential over time.
