New production figures released by some of Iran’s largest industrial companies suggest that the economic damage inflicted during the 39-day conflict between Iran and the U.S.-Israel coalition was deeper than previously estimated.
In recent weeks, Iranian officials have claimed repeatedly that damaged facilities are being restored and that industrial production is returning to normal. However, the new production data published by major petrochemical, steel, and automotive companies paint a different picture, revealing disruptions across key sectors of the economy.
The clearest evidence comes from Iran’s petrochemical industry, one of the country’s most important sources of export revenue.
The clearest evidence comes from Iran’s petrochemical industry, one of the country’s most important sources of export revenue.
According to an official report from Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), which accounts for roughly 38 percent of Iran’s total petrochemical output, six of its seven major petrochemical complexes that were targeted during the conflict produced a combined 410,000 metric tons in March and April 2026. That figure represents only 13 percent of the volume produced during the same period a year earlier.
The decline extends well beyond PGPIC facilities. Two of Iran’s largest petrochemical producers—Pardis Petrochemical and Jam Petrochemical—also have experienced near-total production shutdowns. Pardis, the largest petrochemical company listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange by production capacity, reported a 93 percent decline in output over the past month. Jam Petrochemical, one of the world’s largest olefin producers with an annual capacity of 2.8 million tons of polymer and chemical products, has effectively suspended operations.
The consequences are already being felt across the domestic economy. Prices of polymer-based products, particularly food and pharmaceutical packaging materials, have surged several-fold in recent weeks.
The petrochemical sector normally generates approximately $14 billion in annual export revenues for Iran. At the same time, shortages of various petrochemical products have emerged in the domestic market, forcing the government to increase imports.
Among the most critical shortages are agricultural fertilizers. Following the conflict, prices for many fertilizer products have increased six- to seven-fold, creating additional pressure on Iran’s agricultural sector.
This comes at a particularly vulnerable moment. Iran imports roughly $17 billion worth of grain annually, and according to the Food and Agriculture Organization, domestic grain production declined by about one-fifth last year, leaving the country dependent on approximately 15 million tons of grain imports. The sharp increase in fertilizer prices, combined with worsening drought conditions, is likely to further reduce agricultural output in the coming seasons.
Iran’s steel industry, another pillar of the economy, also has suffered substantial losses. During the conflict, two major steel producers—Mobarakeh Steel and Khuzestan Steel—were targeted. Together, these companies account for roughly 50 percent of Iran’s steel production. Newly released data indicate that production at Mobarakeh Steel fell by 67 percent last month, while output at Khuzestan Steel dropped by 76 percent. Even Esfahan Steel Company, which was not directly targeted, reported a 46 percent decline in production because of disruptions throughout the supply chain.
One of the sectors most impacted is automobile manufacturing, one of Iran’s largest employers and industrial consumers.
Iran’s steel industry typically generates between $4 billion and $5 billion in annual export revenues. The production collapse has already created shortages of various steel products within the domestic market and is increasingly affecting downstream industries.
One of the sectors most impacted is automobile manufacturing, one of Iran’s largest employers and industrial consumers. The country’s two largest automakers, Iran Khodro and SAIPA, reported production declines of 16 percent and 58 percent, respectively, over the past month. Combined production from the two companies totaled approximately 57,000 vehicles, compared with 82,000 units during the same month last year.
The implications extend beyond production statistics. More than 110,000 people are directly employed by Iran Khodro and SAIPA, while tens of thousands more work in related industries, including auto-parts manufacturing and supplier networks.
On June 22, 2026, the United States announced a two-month waiver allowing Iran to continue oil exports. Yet even if broader sanctions were eventually eased or removed, such measures would be unlikely to provide significant short-term relief for Iran’s labor market, accelerating inflation, or deteriorating living standards.
The war intensified structural weaknesses that already existed. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, many of Iran’s industrial sectors were struggling with chronic energy shortages, declining investment, financial constraints, and weak domestic demand. According to the latest assessment published by the Iranian economic outlet EcoIran, the country’s gross domestic product contracted by 4.9 percent during the last winter quarter when oil production is included, and by 4 percent when the oil sector is excluded.
The latest industrial data therefore suggest that the economic consequences of the conflict extend beyond damaged facilities. They point to a broader industrial slowdown that could weigh on growth, employment, inflation, and food security long after the ceasefire has taken hold.
