As the war against Iran’s Islamic Republic enters its second week, the potential for the Kurds to open a new front has entered mainstream discourse following reports that “the CIA is working to arm Kurdish forces with the aim of fomenting a popular uprising in Iran.” Once again, the United States needs the Kurds to help finish its job. However, the Kurds remain uncertain, and they are right to be cautious. History gives them reasons to doubt.
The Kurdish experience with the United States has been marked by cycles of cooperation and abandonment. The most recent example occurred only two months ago, when the Syrian Democratic Forces had to withdraw from areas they had liberated from the Islamic State and were forced to integrate into the Syrian army, which includes terrorist groups. Kurdish authorities still govern Kurdish regions, but Damascus has not recognized any territorial autonomy.
The Kurdish experience with the United States has been marked by cycles of cooperation and abandonment.
The Kurdish experience with the United States and Israel dates to the 1970s, when the United States abandoned Mustafa Barzani’s Kurdish movement against the Iraqi regime. That withdrawal paved the way for the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Saddam Hussein dismantled the agreement later, which contributed to the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war in 1980. Iran’s shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, also played a role in that betrayal. Years later, the United States designated some Kurdish parties —including the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)— years after their establishment as terrorist organizations. Kurds have not forgotten this decision, despite fighting alongside American soldiers against extremists and terrorists.
The Kurds’ non-state status should not excuse abandoning them. The Kurds have been one of the West’s most reliable allies in the Middle East. They are also the only nation in the region that is not hostile toward Israel. International politics no longer revolves solely around states. Non-state actors can shape political outcomes. In Iran, however, Kurdish parties remain hesitant to cooperate with the United States even as they face pressure to choose a side. What, then, should the Kurds do?
First, the history of U.S.-Kurdish relations shows that assurances from Washington carry no weight. Even promises made by a president offer no security because administrations change. Kurdish parties should nevertheless demand a clear, written agreement, signed by the U.S. government and the Kurdish organizations meant to participate in any operation against the Iranian regime to raise the cost of any U.S. betrayal.
Kurdish forces liberated many non-Kurdish areas from the Islamic State and extremist rule, yet those achievements did not translate into political guarantees.
Second, any successful Kurdish military operation against Iran’s regime would require establishing a no-fly zone over Kurdish regions—similar to the Coalition‑enforced no‑fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War, which helped create the conditions to establish the Kurdistan Regional Government. The Iranian regime is fighting for survival and could resort to violence against the Kurds. Shortly after taking power in Tehran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared jihad against Kurds that demanded autonomy. His order led to thousands of Kurdish deaths through summary executions and bombardment of Kurdish cities. Governments in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have often justified violence against Kurds through Islamic or ideological arguments.
Third, the Kurdish experience in Syria should guide Kurdish strategy in Iran. Kurdish forces liberated many non-Kurdish areas from the Islamic State and extremist rule, yet those achievements did not translate into political guarantees. Kurds should therefore avoid promising to liberate Azeri, Arab or Persian cities in Iran. The responsibility for liberating non-Kurdish areas should fall on the populations who live there. Such caution could reduce the risk of future political betrayal.
U.S. foreign policy rests on cold calculations of national interest, and so should Kurdish leaders. They must think strategically and focus on Kurdish national interests. At the same time, Washington must deal genuinely with Kurdish allies, both now and in any future political transition in Iran. Washington cannot rely on the Kurds to help overthrow a regime only to abandon them once a new government takes power in Tehran and strategic interests shift. Such a policy would not serve American interests. A genuine and consistent partnership with the Kurds, however, would represent a long-term U.S. investment in regional stability.
