The May 12, 2025, announcement by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that it would disband and disarm continues to reverberate across the Middle East. Especially in Qandil, the mountainous region in Iraqi Kurdistan along the Turkish border where the PKK has headquartered itself since the late 1990s, questions loom.
The PKK’s presence in Qandil has effectively prevented the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s two major political parties, the Barzani family’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Talabani family’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), from controlling Qandil’s sixty-plus Kurdish villages.
Over the years, the PKK has established a governance system for the Qandil region’s villages, implementing local elections and the co-presidency system for mayors—a distinctive hallmark of PKK-affiliated structures around the Middle East. PKK militias have provided security for the civilian population in Qandil, although intensified Turkish airstrikes in recent years have diminished the visible presence of PKK fighters.
The enclave’s current administrative status reflects a layered and evolving set of localized arrangements, shaped primarily by the shifting dynamics of the conflict.
And while both the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan have no physical control of the region, they have maintained varying degrees of contact with its residents, especially those receiving government salaries and pensions, and the Kurdistan Regional Government offers minimal services to some villages of Qandil. The enclave’s current administrative status reflects a layered and evolving set of localized arrangements, shaped primarily by the shifting dynamics of the conflict.
What will happen once the PKK has fully disbanded and withdrawn from the region? Who will assume responsibility for governing the area in the aftermath? Could the resulting security vacuum in the mountainous region spark yet another conflict and could both the KDP and PUK seek to fill the vacuum? The answers to these questions vary depending on whom one asks.
Qandil residents who have stayed in their villages despite Turkish and Iranian bombardments have participated in a localized system that has held elections every two years since 2009. This stands in contrast to the rest of Iraqi Kurdistan where local elections are delayed and often stage-managed. Several members of the Binarê Qandil local council, elected by residents of Qandil’s sixty-three villages, expressed cautious optimism that the PKK’s decision would usher in peace and stability. “It is uncertain who will take control, but we would certainly like to preserve the grassroot institutions we have built here,” one council member explained.
The prospect of the Kurdistan Regional Government assuming control of the region is on the table. The Kurdistan Regional Government’s local governance structure differs significantly from the system implemented in the PKK-controlled Qandil region. While the Kurdistan Regional Government, particularly the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party, has primarily relied on tribal alliances for political support, local governance in Qandil is largely based on the principles of the so-called “democratic confederalism” advocated by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Iraqi Kurdish officials will face significant challenges pushing such progressive governance into a tribal box.
A PKK withdrawal could trigger competition between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to fill the vacuum and control the region.
A PKK withdrawal could trigger competition between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan to fill the vacuum and control the region. While many local villagers may lean toward the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, due to its historical ties with the PKK, a significant portion of Qandil residents—including those displaced by the conflict—have maintained connections with the Kurdistan Democratic Party. It will be crucial to observe how each group works to rebuild its popular support in a post-PKK landscape.
If the PKK’s dissolution proceeds smoothly, Kurdish villages in Qandil could see a major shift toward peace and reconstruction. However, such a transition likely will be fragile given the complex nature of the conflict.
Much of this depends on how regional actors like Turkey and Iran will respond to the PKK’s withdrawal from the area. If past trends hold, particularly in the post-Islamic State era, the Iraqi central government is likely to pursue greater control over the region, further undermining the Kurdistan Regional Government’s autonomy. In the case of Qandil, Turkey and Iran would explicitly offer support for this move.
Baghdad already has expressed its readiness to take control of PKK weapons after the disbandment decision, signaling a growing interest in asserting authority over Qandil. Although Erbil and Baghdad generally align in opposing the PKK’s presence in Qandil and other parts of Iraqi Kurdistan, increased Iraqi government involvement in the region could spark new tensions between the two.
Much like the dissolution of the PKK, addressing local governance in Qandil likely will prove to be a difficult task. Sometimes, signing a deal is the end of the beginning, rather than the beginning of the end.
