Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met at the White House on August 8, 2025, to sign an “Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations.” Both leaders hailed the peace deal. Pashinyan called it a “significant milestone” and Aliyev claimed it will establish “peace in the Caucasus.” Celebrations are premature, though.
In March 2025, Yerevan and Baku agreed to the text of a peace agreement to end their dispute—but that agreement came to nothing as the Azeri government stalled and increased its demands.
Even for the best deals, dictators do not change overnight.
If that deal failed, how is the present agreement different? This time, the agreement offers Aliyev access to the 27-mile Zangezur Corridor that passes through Armenia, linking Azerbaijan to the Azeri exclave Nakhchivan. The parties agreed to rename the corridor the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) and it will operate under Armenian legal jurisdiction. The United States signed a 99-year sublease for the land and will grant a consortium the rights to develop infrastructure and management.
Despite his enthusiasm over the corridor, Aliyev has given ample reason for skepticism. Even for the best deals, dictators do not change overnight. Aliyev stated that he and Pashinyan had “pre-signed the Peace Agreement,” and “there should be no doubt that any of the parties will make a step back.” But “pre-signing” is not the same as signing. The condition that caused the March 2025 agreement to fail remains: Azerbaijan’s demand that Armenia amend its constitution. Although the text of the present Agreement does not require an Armenian constitutional amendment, after the August 8 signing, Aliyev reiterated his demand that Armenia amend its constitution to eliminate what Aliyev calls “baseless territorial claims” against Azerbaijan. Armenia has, indeed, planned to hold a referendum on its constitution in 2027, the draft of which should be ready in June 2026, before Armenia’s next general election. By the time the referendum takes place, though, Aliyev’s continued demands and hostile language will foment tension in Armenia that may discourage passage.
Aliyev’s demands are curious given that the new Agreement addresses territorial claims. Article II states that “the Parties confirm that they do not have any territorial claims to each other and shall not raise any such claims in the future” and Article XII requires that the bilateral relations between the two parties be governed by international law and the terms of the Agreement, in accordance with the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties. According to these clauses, Armenian domestic law cannot override the Agreement, so requiring an amendment to their constitution is not necessary. However, a failure to amend may be used by Baku to refuse to come to the table for a final signature, just as it did in March.
Another sticking point that could upend a final agreement is the fate of Armenians being held in Azerbaijan.
Another sticking point that could upend a final agreement is the fate of Armenians being held in Azerbaijan. Article IX requires the Parties to “address the cases of missing persons and enforced disappearances taken place in the armed conflict.” Yerevan considers the 16 Armenian government officials—including former Artsakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan—seized after Azerbaijan’s September 2023 invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh to be political hostages or prisoners of war. But Baku is prosecuting them on trumped-up criminal charges of war crimes and terrorism in lengthy show trials. Unless Azerbaijan releases its hostages, it is unlikely Armenia will agree to a final signing of the Agreement.
Elevating a dictator like Aliyev as a partner for peace by inviting him into the Oval Office while he holds Armenians hostage is troubling, as is the prospect that Aliyev may refuse a final signature on the Agreement if Armenia fails to amend its constitution. But there is a silver lining: Azerbaijan seeks to enter into the Abraham Accords for the economic benefits and regional influence, and the Trump administration requires resolving the dispute with Armenia as a prerequisite for Azerbaijan’s participation. The incentives of the Trump Corridor and the Abraham Accords may be just the things that will finally bring Aliyev to release the Armenian prisoners, let go of spurious demands, sign the peace agreement, and move forward in the region.
