President Donald Trump met today with Ahmad al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria who, less than six months ago, had a $10 million bounty on his head for his earlier actions as the Al Qaeda’s branch head in Syria. Trump’s willingness to meet al-Sharaa should not surprise; after all, he relishes breaking diplomatic china. During his first term, he not only traveled to Singapore and Korea’s Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to meet the totalitarian regime’s “Dear Leader,” whom he dubbed “rocket man,” but he also embraced talks with the Taliban. Both episodes were diplomatic disasters. North Korea doubled down on rogue behavior and now threatens Guam, if not California. The Taliban used Trump’s olive branch as a cover to rally their forces and advance on Kabul.
Will Trump’s outreach to Sharaa be any different?
Prior to the fall of Syria’s government, the Arab League was reconciling with former President Bashar al-Assad. Within Washington, this created some concern—not only because of Assad’s human rights records, but also because of the financial windfall that Assad might reap during the country’s reconstruction.
Trump’s willingness to meet al-Sharaa should not surprise; after all, he relishes breaking diplomatic china.
Today, Assad is gone, but the same dynamics apply to unelected al-Sharaa. The United Nations and international community could donate billions of dollars to rebuild Syria. Al-Sharaa will sign the deals and direct many of those contracts. He personally stands to siphon off hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars into the accounts of his friends and allies. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sees al-Sharaa as an ideological and economic investment. Erdoğan, too, now will demand payment, shoring up his base by dispensing Syrian contracts as patronage to family and supporters. Trump is a businessman at heart and understands the money at stake, though there is no evidence that Erdoğan, al-Sharaa, or their intermediaries promised anything to any of the U.S. president’s firms or family partnerships.
Lifting sanctions on Syria is premature for another reason: Al-Sharaa has not yet proved he controls his own movement, let alone Syria. First, consider geography: Al-Sharaa may control 35 to 40 percent of Syria. Southern tribes control the area around Deira and are within striking distance of Damascus. The Kurds still control north and east Syria, and Alawites remain a presence along the Mediterranean coast.
Then consider the bureaucracy: When al-Sharaa entered Syria’s capital, he commanded perhaps 35,000 to 40,000 men within his Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham movement. That former Al Qaeda group is faction-riven, though. Many members resent al-Sharaa’s moderate turn, whether sincere or not. It is impossible for Al-Sharaa to secure Syria with just 40,000 men, though, and so he began recruiting to double or triple that amount. At best, his lieutenants conducted superficial security checks; at worst, he is providing new uniforms to unrepentant terrorists. Concern about this dynamic increased when the government excused the March 2025 massacres of Alawites by Sunni militias by explaining it lacked full control, and when Al-Sharaa purged opponents from the interim government. By lifting sanctions on the promise of responsible governance, Trump risks pumping money into the hands of those who cheered the Al Qaeda attacks on New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C.
Trump now signals to Iran and the Houthis in Yemen that they should double down on terror and increase repression against opponents.
Trump’s sanctions-waiver undermines broader counterterrorism by sending the signal to terrorist groups that there are two ways to escape terror designation. The first is to reform. The second is to accelerate aggression and consolidate control. Trump now signals to Iran and the Houthis in Yemen that they should double down on terror and increase repression against opponents. As Iraq heads to elections, Trump’s waiver of sanctions will signal to Muqtada al-Sadr, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq chief Qais al-Khazali, and Badr Organization head Hadi al-Amiri that they can march on Baghdad, seize state coffers, and then escape consequences.
Syria should return to the community of nations, but such rehabilitation must be based on the reality of its actions, not the rhetoric of a single leader. To prioritize Al-Sharaa’s promises over his actions could represent a generational mistake, one that could produce an “Axis of Al Qaeda” from Ankara to Damascus to Doha, which, in turn, could imperil Lebanon’s reconstruction, Jordan’s stability, and Israel’s security.
