Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey signed a mutual defense agreement on August 7, 2026. The parties have left the door open for Egypt, which was a party to the initial de-escalation grouping in February 2026, to join later. While Saudi Arabia may be the weakest military power in the Mecca pact, named for where the parties signed it, the choice of Mecca points to the Saudi advantage.
What brings the three states together is not only the religion of their rulers, but also political alignment.
The three parties are different. Each is ethnically distinct, even in their ethnic minorities, though both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have sizeable Shi’ite minorities. They also arise from different historical origins. Pakistan was a part of the British Empire, while Turkey embraces “neo-Ottomanism” to tie itself to its former empire. The Saudis do not reciprocate the nostalgia, especially since the Hejaz along the Red Sea coast was an Ottoman territory. Militarily, Turkey is a NATO member and the strongest land power in the region. Pakistan is the only Islamic nuclear-armed state. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, hosts U.S. forces and traditionally has relied on the U.S. military umbrella. What brings the three states together is not only the religion of their rulers, but also political alignment.
NATO fashions itself as a “community of nations with shared values,” though in reality—as Turkey’s dictatorship showed—the force bringing its members together was a shared threat. In the case of the Mecca pact, a rising Iran, an unreliable United States, and ideological anti-Zionism appear to be the triangle uniting the three countries.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has responded cautiously. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s August 7 tweet summarizes Iran’s approach: “Iran’s Powerful Armed Forces have shown their readiness, capability, and might in face of the world’s most expensive military,” he wrote. “When Muslims stand together, we can face every challenge by malicious outsiders head-on. Time to rely only on ourselves and embrace true brotherhood.”
Nour News, close to the Supreme National Security Council, published an unsigned editorial analyzing the agreement. “Iran’s reaction is neither indifferent nor confrontational,” it wrote. Tehran did not view the pact as an immediate threat. It also noted that, unlike NATO where the United States is first among equals, the Mecca accord participants were near peers with their own unique advantages, but found Riyadh convened the parties because it no longer wishes to be reliant upon the United States. Other Iranian outlets have posted quotes both from Pakistani and Turkish officials denying that this is directed at Iran, and Pakistani denunciations of Israel since the pact and calls for Islamic unity.
Hossein Noosh-Abadi, a senior Iranian foreign ministry official and former ambassador to Oman, told the Iranian Students’ News Agency that, if anything, the pact is directed at the United States, stemming from Saudi Arabia’s dissatisfaction with U.S. security assurances and Israeli attacks against Qatar and Syria. He added that this is a sign of the collapsing American hegemony in the region and a “paradigm shift” among regional actors.
Alireza Zakani, former commander of the paramilitary Basij and now the mayor of Tehran, echoed the sentiment about the lack of trust in Washington. Koorosh Ahamdi, a former diplomat who served at the United Nations, wrote that the agreement could be a “a result of Riyadh’s disappointment with Washington’s impotence.” Indeed, he wrote, “The priority of the Mecca Pact is Turkey and Pakistan’s support for Saudi Arabia. Neither Saudi Arabia is supposed to help Pakistan in case of an Indian attack, nor Turkey, which is a member of NATO, will need Pakistan’s and Saudi Arabia’s assistance.”
The Islamic Republic News Agency, which the Pezeshkian administration officially oversees, examined the challenges of the treaty, including that participants do not necessarily share threats. Energy markets primarily concern Saudi Arabia; Pakistan is foremost India’s rival; and Turkey is a NATO member whose immediate threats are not near the Persian Gulf area.
The United States can accuse Pakistan of duplicity and deception, but Islamabad has been consistent in its Jew-hatred and anti-Zionism.
As Ahmadi points out, despite denials, it is difficult for Iran to dismiss the notion of a Sunni bloc and not prepare itself. More than a Sunni bloc, the Mecca coalition positions themselves between the U.S. coalition, including Israel and the United Arab Emirates, and the Islamic Republic’s Axis of Resistance.
The United States can accuse Pakistan of duplicity and deception, but Islamabad has been consistent in its Jew-hatred and anti-Zionism. Turkey has followed the path in recent years, and with Iran’s immediate patrons around Israel on their heels, Turkey sees an opportunity to step in as their new patron. Saudi Arabia, which flirted with the Abraham Accords and secularization, is taking a U-turn; its media have dialed up their anti-Zionist rhetoric, and it is making a rapprochement with the Islamists as Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious designs crumble. The kingdom has taken a much more confrontational approach toward the United Arab Emirates, too, including over the Abraham Accords.
Iran is right to be suspicious of both the intentions and prospects of the pact, but it is also right to believe the sun is setting on American influence in the region.
