If a popular uprising ousts the Islamic Republic, what will happen to Iran? Are democratic political forces positioned to lead the country and normalize Iran’s domestic governance and its foreign policy, or would chaos ensue? Some Iranians and many Western officials fear remnants of the old regime could cloak themselves in the rhetoric of democratic governance while they pursue other aims, or in a worst-case scenario, conflict might erupt or anarchy prevail.
The National Union for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), a U.S.-based advocacy group supporting Prince Reza Pahlavi, issued a roadmap on July 30, 2025, for the critical transitional period. The detailed plan is not final; NUFDI has asked Iranians to comment on it during a 45-day period.
The plan designates Pahlavi the “Leader of the National Uprising” during Iran’s revolutionary phase.
The plan designates Pahlavi the “Leader of the National Uprising” during Iran’s revolutionary phase. Two institutions will form: a National Uprising Council to advise and shape policy, and a Temporary Executive Team to implement decisions. Iranians inside and outside the country will choose members, though their identities will remain confidential until the regime falls. After the Islamic Republic’s collapse, a three-part transitional system would govern: the Council (legislative), a Transitional Government (executive), and a Transitional Divan (judiciary), all under the oversight of the uprising’s leader.
The National Uprising Council will play a key role in Iran’s transitional period. Its responsibilities include reviewing and dissolving institutions from the Islamic Republic era, reorganizing the military command structure, and identifying which laws should be annulled or retained until a new parliament forms. It will enact temporary laws, review and approve the national budget, and oversee reforms to school textbooks at all levels to reflect the country’s new direction. It also will determine the size and eligibility criteria for an elected Constituent Assembly.
The Transitional Government will function as the executive branch during the transitional period. Its head will appoint ministers, subject to approval by a majority of the National Uprising Council. Its duties include executing laws, managing daily governance, defending national borders, ensuring internal security, and overseeing foreign affairs—such as reclaiming embassies, replacing Iran’s representatives in international organizations, and protecting national assets abroad. It will prepare referendums on Iran’s future system of government and the fate of Islamic Republic leaders, with options for justice or amnesty. All referendums are to meet international democratic standards, according to the plan.
The same standards should apply to the election of the Constituent Assembly, to take place within two months after the referendum to determine the future system of government—constitutional parliamentary monarchy or a republic.
Interestingly, much of the initial criticism has come from monarchist circles. Many raise concerns about a clause allowing temporary use of Islamic Republic laws during the transition. The logic here is to allow certain laws to remain in force until a new parliament is elected in order to prevent administrative chaos during the transitional months—though critics argue even partial reliance on the Islamic Republic’s legal framework grants legitimacy to a system that, in their view, was illegitimate from the outset. Instead, they seek a return to the pre-1979 constitution. Anti-monarchists object on other grounds, fearing the prominent role for Pahlavi, which they view as a step toward power consolidation and a prelude to restoring a monarchy in post-clerical Iran.
Other activists urge restraint, reminding critics that the NUFDI document is a draft framework, not a binding or finalized decision.
A prominent constitutional monarchist put it bluntly: “When someone defends ‘preserving the laws of the Islamic Republic during the transition,’ they are either suffering from a delusional mindset or are consciously legitimizing one of the most illegitimate legal structures in modern history.” In response, Saeed Ghasseminejad, the plan’s lead author and project coordinator, pointed to clause 6.1 of the document, which affirms the annulment of the Islamic Republic’s constitution.
Other activists urge restraint, reminding critics that the NUFDI document is a draft framework, not a binding or finalized decision. One popular anonymous account on X, with 54,000 followers, posted: “It’s worth emphasizing again that NUFDI will not be the only organization involved in this effort. Institutions from inside and outside Iran also have the right to offer proposals and solutions, from which a workable and legitimate legal framework for Iran’s future can be drawn.”
Despite the objections and unresolved questions, the draft stands as the most detailed and serious proposal for a transitional period offered in recent years. It moves beyond slogans and abstract ideals, forcing activists and political groups to confront the complex realities of a post-Islamic Republic Iran. With the country facing economic disarray, social fragmentation, and the consequences of decades of ideological hostility toward the West and Israel, any future national government inherits a task of monumental scale.
