Hardliners in Iran who have long opposed negotiations and any form of accommodation with the United States appear sidelined as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei shifted course and authorized renewed talks.
While a few media outlets affiliated with Khamenei’s office or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have expressed limited criticism, the broader hardline faction in parliament has remained largely silent—or even supportive of the policy change. State-affiliated media have reported signs of division within the ultraconservative camp, suggesting a decline in the influence of those still opposed to outreach toward Washington.
In contrast, the Reform Front and relatively moderate figures within the regime have welcomed the shift, emphasizing that Khamenei himself has endorsed the negotiations.
On April 21, 2025 former president Hassan Rouhani, a centrist, addressed a gathering of his political allies and reiterated his longstanding support for diplomacy with world powers. He blamed hardliners for torpedoing efforts during his final months in office in 2021 to finalize an agreement with the Biden administration.
Rouhani said that during the negotiations between April and June 2021, a deal was within reach—one that would have lifted most U.S. sanctions and possibly even removed the IRGC from Washington’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. “Dr. [Abbas] Araqchi negotiated in the spring of 2021 and secured everything we had asked for,” Rouhani said. “Not only were previous sanctions to be lifted, but those imposed by Trump as well. They even nearly agreed to delist the IRGC. But hardliners blocked it.”
For two decades, hardliners have held sway over Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, and they are widely blamed for the sanctions that have impoverished the population—while they themselves have benefited from Iran’s opaque, state-controlled economy. Many Iranians believe this small group of ultra-Islamist “revolutionaries” owes its prominence solely to the backing of Khamenei and the IRGC.
Electoral vetting bodies under Khamenei’s control facilitated their dominance in parliamentary elections, especially in the 2020 and 2024 elections, when Khamenei’s proxies disqualified hundreds of relatively moderate candidates. As a result, hardliners won control of the legislature and other key institutions, sometimes with the support of as little as ten percent of eligible voters. Both the Supreme Leader’s financial institutions and the IRGC generously funded their media platforms. They control at least ten noteworthy newspapers and websites, and many more smaller outlets.
Over the past decade, Khamenei has also appointed staunch hardliners—mainly allies of ultraconservative politician Saeed Jalili—to key positions, including at the state broadcasting conglomerate Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), which enjoys a monopoly over radio and television. With a workforce estimated at 40,000, IRIB has promoted anti-American narratives and opposed negotiation and compromise over the nuclear issue.
Most Iranian analysts agree that hardliners are neither a grassroots nor independent force but rather function as instruments of the Supreme Leader’s agenda. Their power stems not from popular support but from their role in enforcing the regime’s domestic and foreign policy priorities. Since the outbreak of mass protests in 2017, their function in the state’s apparatus of repression has intensified. Although some may hold sincere Shiite Islamist convictions, Khamenei has carefully cultivated their collective influence.
By allowing nuclear talks to move forward, Khamenei has instructed hardliners to remain mostly silent. But this appears to be a tactical adjustment, not a fundamental shift. The hardliners have not lost institutional power; in fact, they maintain a disproportionate presence even within the administration of President Masoud Pezeshkian, the Reform Front’s nominal candidate.
Rather, Khamenei appears to prepared to keep his powder dry, enabling “good cop” reformers to push forward, while keeping “bad cop” hardliners in reserve to augment last minute pressure or to scuttle talks should they not achieve Khamenei’s goals.
