History appears ready to repeat itself. Reports suggest that the United States is considering arming Iranian Kurdish groups as part of a strategy to pressure Tehran. For many Kurds, this moment feels familiar. Because it is. Kurds have seen this film before.
In 1975, in 1988, in 1991, and more recently in northeast Syria, Kurdish forces entered unequal alliances with major powers. Each time, when geopolitical priorities shifted, the Kurds paid the highest price, often facing retaliation from regional states left to settle the score.
When global powers speak of opportunity, oppressed peoples naturally listen. But the Kurdish movement should approach the current moment with extreme caution.
Without a clear political framework or guarantees protecting their long-term status, they are left exposed when the dynamics shift.
History has shown repeatedly that Kurdish movements suffer most when they enter power confrontations between states. Without a clear political framework or guarantees protecting their long-term status, they are left exposed when the dynamics shift.
The signals currently coming from Washington are, at best, contradictory.
While some reports suggest discussions focus upon supporting Kurdish armed groups inside Iran to stretch the Iranian regime’s security forces and potentially encourage internal unrest, President Donald Trump has simultaneously made clear that regime change in Iran is not his objective.
During remarks at the White House alongside the German chancellor on March 3, 2026, Trump emphasized that change in Iran must ultimately come from “people inside the country.” His comments suggested that Washington does not see external opposition movements, including exile figures like the former shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, as viable alternatives to the current Iranian state.
This distinction matters. If the United States does not see external opposition as a political replacement for the regime, then any support for Kurdish armed groups likely would be tactical rather than strategic, designed to increase pressure on Tehran rather than to create a new political order. In that scenario, Kurdish forces risk becoming a tool rather than a partner.
There is also no evidence that Washington has developed a coherent Kurdish policy regarding Iran, or regarding Kurdish political aspirations across the region more broadly. Without such a framework, Kurdish actors entering this arena would be operating inside someone else’s strategy.
History offers many warnings. The collapse of the Kurdish revolution in 1975, after shifting regional agreements, demonstrated how quickly Kurdish alliances can evaporate when state interests change. Kurdish movements have repeatedly discovered that decisions affecting their fate are made by states negotiating with other states.
More recently, the experience of Syrian Kurds in Rojava offers a reminder. For years, Kurdish forces were the United States’ most reliable partner in the fight against the Islamic State. Yet when regional priorities shifted, the strategic logic behind that partnership changed almost overnight. What had been described as a cornerstone of stability was later framed by U.S. officials as an alliance whose purpose had “largely expired.”
Kurdish forces remain vulnerable to being treated as temporary instruments.
Great powers rarely make lasting commitments to non-state actors unless those actors are part of a broader political settlement. Without such a settlement, Kurdish forces remain vulnerable to being treated as temporary instruments. The United States has historically been unwilling to redraw internationally recognized borders on behalf of Kurdish movements. When Kurdish issues appear on diplomatic negotiating tables, they are often treated as one card among many, sometimes the first card to be traded away.
For Kurdish leaders today, the central question should not be whether pressure on Tehran is justified. The real question is whether Kurdish participation in such a strategy would strengthen Kurdish political security or simply expose Kurdish regions and communities to retaliation.
Iran has already demonstrated its willingness to strike Kurdish opposition bases inside Iraqi Kurdistan with missiles and drones. Any escalation along the border could turn Kurdish civilian areas into the frontline of a wider conflict.
The Kurds have been through this cycle too many times. There is an old Kurdish lament that captures this pattern with painful clarity: “The Kurds never seem to learn the lesson.” The phrase reflects a painful historical pattern: Kurdish movements often enter great-power struggles hoping that this time will be different. Sometimes it is. Too often it is not.
Before allowing their territory, their forces, or their political capital to be drawn into another regional confrontation, Kurdish leaders must ask hard questions. Pressure on Tehran may be part of Washington’s strategy. Kurdish survival must be the strategy for Kurds.
