As Damascus and the Kurds begin implementing their recent deal, diplomats have welcomed it as a step toward stability. But can this agreement alone deliver a lasting solution for Syria?
Western policy toward Syria rests on an assumption: The country’s fragmentation is temporary and stabilization, normalization, and consolidation of authority in Damascus can resolve it. This assumption is dangerous.
The Kurdish question has moved decisively beyond Syria’s borders.
Much of this perception comes from one year of Syria’s interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa abroad: He has used diplomatic outreach, reassurances, and moderated language to shape international views. But one year of Abuy Muhammad al-Jolani at home has produced a very different Syria—one divided not just territorially, but by fear, mistrust, and communal anxieties.
The evidence appears across Syria’s major communities, all of which have now felt the wrath of armed forces and militias.
The Druze identity has never been this consolidated or alarmed. For the first time, some Druze leaders and communities openly call for Israeli protection—an unprecedented statement of distrust in the Syrian state’s ability to guarantee basic security.
The Alawites face their most vulnerable moment in modern history. Fear of retribution and extermination drives large segments to seek external protection. When a group long tied to the state begins looking outward for survival, the issue becomes legitimacy, not optics.
The Kurdish question has moved decisively beyond Syria’s borders. Syrian Kurds no longer see themselves as a domestic minority negotiating with a state. They view their future as part of a global Kurdish bloc stretching across the Middle East and Europe. Daily protests and rallies in Europe and the region reflect this shift.
This shift grew from not only solidarity, but also violence and rhetoric on the ground. Syrian authorities have even used rhetoric associated with Anfal, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s genocidal campaign against the Kurds, to justify military “conquests.” Whether framed as mobilization or ideology, the broader effect is the same: The Kurdish issue has become internationalized and tied to historical memory.
Even Syria’s Sunni landscape—the presumed foundation of any reunification project—is fractured. Northern Sunni regions operate under Turkish influence, and southern areas fall under al-Sharaa’s control and, by extension, Saudi sponsorship. This is not a unified Sunni center—it is two distinct political fields shaped by external patrons.
Normalization without conditions does not build states; it entrenches power without legitimacy.
Much of the optimism around al-Sharaa assumes an ideological evolution based on his opposition to the Islamic State. This distinction is overstated. Within the Sunni Islamist ecosystem, the divide between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda is factional competition with different tactics, branding, and methods—not fundamentally different objectives. Akin to Democrats and Republicans (and without moral equivalence), these forces differ in style but operate within overlapping agendas. Removing one faction does not dismantle the structure that produced it.
What makes this trajectory troubling is that it has unfolded while Syria remains economically constrained. Sanctions are still largely intact, the economy struggles, and resources are scarce. If this degree of fragmentation has occurred under conditions of weakness, what will happen when sanctions lift and money flows without political safeguards?
Normalization without conditions does not build states; it entrenches power without legitimacy.
Before any serious push toward normalization with Syria—or with al-Sharaa personally—national reconciliation must become a condition, not a promise deferred. He must show that he can lead Syria at home as convincingly as he performs abroad. That requires commitments to genuine national reconciliation, constitutional guarantees for all communities, rule of law, protections against collective punishment, and mechanisms to rebuild trust between Syrians and the state.
Stability cannot precede reconciliation in Syria. It can only follow it. Without a new social contract, all talk of reunification will remain diplomatic theater—polished, persuasive, and ultimately hollow.
