Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence generated Turkish outrage and condemnation. While official press from Ankara objected to the Israeli decision on the grounds that it violated Somalia’s sovereignty, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s own plans for the Horn of Africa suggest the friction is both ideological and geostrategic.
Turkish diplomatic and military influence suffuses Somalia today. It anchors the eastern end of Erdoğan’s ambitions for leadership in Africa, where Turkey’s arms sales and defense agreements multiply. As such, regardless of Somaliland’s functioning government and Somalia’s dysfunction, Ankara opposes recognizing the government in Hargeisa, especially after Israel’s overture.
As Ankara attempts to enlist other Middle Eastern states against Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Israel continues to invest in its normalization with Somaliland. As the prospect of Israeli military and economic involvement in Somaliland increases, so too does the likelihood that Ankara will react negatively over a threat to its primacy in the Horn. Military escalation between Turkey and Israel over Somaliland risks derailing regional peace projects, emboldening terrorist actors, and rekindling war in one of the world’s most ravaged and destitute regions.
The Strategic Logic and Trajectory of Israel’s Somaliland Ties
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland carries momentum because no other United Nations member states have followed suit, and there remains little competition for securing privileges there. Hargeisa’s other partners—including the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan—are friendly with Israel. Likewise, Somaliland has responded to commercial prospects with Israel. Somaliland’s democratically elected president, Abdirahman Cirro, said on February 3, 2026, that Hargeisa hopes trade with Israel will start in high volume. Speaking to Somaliland’s largely untapped deposits of lithium necessary for modern electronics, Cirro proposed that commerce thrive on a critical minerals-for-technology basis.
Israel’s decision affirms Somaliland’s geostrategic value. It abuts the Gulf of Aden and some of the world’s crucial maritime shipping lanes. Its main port at Berbera lies just 180 miles south of the Bab el-Mandeb. Some 30 percent of global container traffic, amounting to about $1 trillion in goods, passes through the Red Sea every year. This route is vital for Israel’s third-largest port at Eilat, its only access to the Red Sea.
The terrorist leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi remarked just days after Israel’s recognition that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be a “military target.”
Security concerns are inextricable from Somaliland’s economic importance. A force presence in Somaliland would offer Israel military maneuver against nearby Yemen’s Houthis. Senior Somaliland Foreign Ministry officer Deqa Qasim told Israeli media on January 8, 2026, that Jerusalem and Hargeisa were discussing options to open an Israeli base in Somaliland. An Israeli base would lie less than 400 miles from Houthi military assets in Yemen’s port of Hudaydah, compared to assets on Israeli territory over 1,100 miles away. Early-warning radar and forward bases for naval and air assets could intercept Houthi threats to Israeli civilians and international shipping much quicker.
The terrorist leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi remarked just days after Israel’s recognition that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be a “military target.” In such a case, Houthi threats greatly increase the likelihood that Israel will pursue an agreement to station military assets as protection for civilian operators there.
For Israeli leaders, basing in Somaliland is an opportunity to counterbalance encirclement from Turkey just as much as from Iran and its proxies. Given the poor state of Israel-Turkey relations, Jerusalem understands Turkish force presence in Somalia to be part of a ring of geostrategic pressure points, together with Libya, Syria, and Northern Cyprus. The future of Jerusalem-Ankara dialogue is unclear: pro-Erdoğan outlets proclaimed Israel the “number-one threat” in December 2025, while Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan suggested in February 2026 that trade relations would resume once conflict ends in Gaza. Nevertheless, Ankara’s rejection of Israel’s Somaliland recognition makes unfriendly competition in the Horn likely.
Turkey’s Power and Influence Project in Somalia
A hallmark of Erdoğan’s foreign policy is the “pivot to Africa” that his administration has pursued over the past two-plus decades. Between opening more than thirty Turkish embassies and dispatching Turkish soldiers and weapons across the continent, the Turkish president has sought to compete for African influence as an alternative, middle-power leader. Intertwined with this is Erdoğan’s desire for recognition as the leader of the Muslim world, which Turkish agencies sow through soft-power investments across Asia and Africa. This has catalyzed Erdoğan’s ongoing campaign to rally Arab and Muslim governments against Israel’s Somaliland normalization, as seen in his joint declaration with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman on February 3, 2026.
This mission has also amounted to an extensive Turkish state-building project in Mogadishu, from which Somalia has become Ankara’s client. Starting in 2011, a year before Somalia established a central government, Turkey began pouring funds and humanitarian aid into Mogadishu. Since then, Ankara has claimed over $1 billion in aid and more than 500 humanitarian projects for Somalia, and as of December 2025, began constructing a spaceport there, which Turkish leaders hope will boost their global prestige. The Turkish Foreign Ministry even stated in February 2014 that Mogadishu was unable to pay public employees without monthly cash aid from Ankara. This stewardship far exceeds the level of influence Erdoğan enjoys even in Syria, which since Bashar al-Assad’s fall has permitted extensive Turkish military deployment and investment.
Turkish suzerainty over the otherwise-failed state of Somalia also shows in its extensive military presence the mantle of security guarantor. Ankara established its largest overseas military base, Camp TURKSOM, in Mogadishu in 2017 to train 10,000 Somali soldiers to combat al-Shabaab, a local Al Qaeda affiliate. Since then, TURKSOM has remained in continuous operation while Turkey has deepened its involvement. In February 2024, Turkey secured a ten-year defense and economic agreement that provided for Ankara to train and build the Somali navy from the keel up. While other countries, including the United States, have obtained contracts to develop Somalia’s military and infrastructure, Somali leaders have cited Turkey to be an exception among security partners.
Erdoğan’s effort to rally Arab and Muslim-majority states against Israel and Somaliland internationalizes what was previously a localized dispute.
The past year has seen an even broader investment in stationing and developing Turkish military capabilities in Somalia. Mid-2025 estimates on the number of Turkish soldiers in Somalia range from 800 to 2,000, accounting for a troop surge in response to a major al-Shabaab offensive launched earlier that year. At the same time, news outlets from the Horn claimed that SADAT, a private military corporation (PMC) with links to Erdogan’s regime and Syrian jihadists, was sending mercenaries to Somalia, which the PMC denied. Most recently, on January 28, Ankara deployed F-16 fighter jets to be stationed at Mogadishu’s international airport, adding to the arsenal of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones that Somalia has operated against al-Shabaab. Somali sources also allege that more F-16s may be stationed at an airfield under development near Warsheikh, northeast of the capital.
Israel’s involvement is anathema to Erdoğan because of how it challenges regional Turkish economic interests. Through its state-building efforts, Ankara has secured a major stake in Somalia’s offshore resource profits. In the February 2024 naval deal, Mogadishu also purportedly granted Ankara 30 percent of all forthcoming revenues from its exclusive economic zone. As Turkey prepares exploratory drilling for Somali offshore oil, Somaliland’s proposal for Israeli firms to explore offshore energy challenges Turkish privileges.
Competition in the Horn of Africa is no longer confined to diplomatic maneuvering; it now creates conditions for confrontation. Turkey’s escalating brinkmanship toward Israeli activity in Somaliland risks inflaming fragile tensions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. If Ankara chooses to embolden Somalia against what it views as an illegitimate breakaway entity, it could trigger violence between the two sides. More troubling, the growing strategic stakes raise the possibility of direct friction between Turkey and Israel themselves.
Erdoğan’s effort to rally Arab and Muslim-majority states against Israel and Somaliland internationalizes what was previously a localized dispute. While many Middle Eastern states may issue rhetorical statements, few have meaningful strategic interests in the Horn itself. This politicization nonetheless strengthens anti-Israel coalitions and risks undermining fragile regional normalization efforts, as illustrated by Erdogan’s attempts to coordinate positions with Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf actors.
These dynamics benefit al-Shabaab. Extremist organizations thrive in environments defined by state rivalry, political fragmentation, and security vacuums. Intensifying competition between Turkey, Israel, Somalia, and Somaliland creates such conditions. As rival powers expand military assistance and deepen security partnerships, the probability increases that advanced weapons systems—whether Turkish or Israeli—could divert into insurgent networks. In seeking geopolitical advantage, outside powers risk fueling the instability they claim to contain, further entrenching one of the world’s most persistent and dangerous terrorist threats.
