Greece’s rapid turn toward Emirati capital and its agreement to participate in joint military drills with the Persian Gulf state is shifting the Eastern Mediterranean’s balance toward a new pro-Western axis, or at least containment of Turkey.
Shifting political alignments, energy competition, and new partnerships are rapidly changing the Eastern Mediterranean. Bashar al-Assad’s fall in Syria to the Turkey-backed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has flipped decades-long rivals into allies. Expanding economic and military ties between Athens and Abu Dhabi are a natural reaction as regional states face a new reality and threat matrix.
Emirati investment has helped stabilize Greece’s post-crisis economy and solidify its recovery.
While Greece-Emirates trade remains just a small fraction of the volume of Turkey-Emirates trade, the bilateral trade between Athens and Abu Dhabi is increasing sharply, with non-oil trade rising by 80 percent over five years to more than $600 million. Emirati investment has helped stabilize Greece’s post-crisis economy and solidify its recovery. The Emirates have quickly become Greece’s top non-European investor. A major example is the $217 million investment fund jointly run by Mubadala Investment Company and the Hellenic Development Bank of Investments to support infrastructure, new technologies, and renewable energy.
In addition, a $3.5 billion deal signed in 2024 between Abu Dhabi and Greece’s GEK Terna supports Europe’s clean-energy transition. In May 2025, the two governments renewed their Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement to create a more predictable tax environment. They also confirmed that Emirati direct investment in Greece had exceeded the $4.3 billion goal set in 2022. Delegations from Abu Dhabi show mounting interest in Greek energy, digital technology and data-center projects. In health care, PureHealth has bought a majority stake in the Hellenic Healthcare Group, and Persian Gulf tourism continues to rise. Those trade ties soon may become a drop in the bucket: With negotiations launched in April 2025 on a European Union-United Arab Emirates free trade agreement, Greece soon could receive privileged access to Persian Gulf markets while it serves as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East. For the United States, such Greek positioning fits neatly with plans to diversify energy routes and limit Russian influence in the European market.
Strategic infrastructure also links the two countries. The Emirates are considering a $2 billion investment in the Great Sea Interconnector, an electricity cable that would link Greece, Cyprus and Israel. Masdar’s takeover of Terna Energy and Emirati involvement in projects under the Zayed Sustainability Prize suggest sustained interest. Abu Dhabi also has offered Cyprus desalinated water and logistics support, underlining a broader outreach in the Eastern Mediterranean. Defense coordination naturally follows. Since Athens and Abu Dhabi signed a defense cooperation agreement in 2020, the two countries have held joint exercises, crisis-response planning, special-forces training and officer exchanges to increase interoperability.
While Greece chooses to broaden its strategic ties with a Persian Gulf power, how far might this alignment go? Will Athens back Emirati positions in regional forums and will Abu Dhabi support Greece in quarrels with Turkey?
The Emirates will calibrate any support so as not to endanger their interests in Turkey.
Here the Emirates’ own diplomacy with Ankara matters. Since 2022, the two sides have repaired relations with high-level visits, multibillion-dollar investment pledges and joint energy and tourism projects. This rapprochement gives the Emirates economic leverage in Turkey even as they tighten defense cooperation with Greece. The result is a balancing act: Abu Dhabi is unlikely to take an overtly anti-Turkey stance, but its growing security links with Athens increase the political cost of Turkish escalation in the Aegean.
For Greece, benefits are clear—diversified investment, access to Persian Gulf energy finance, and a partner with regional weight. The constraint is equally clear—the Emirates will calibrate any support so as not to endanger their interests in Turkey. Athens, therefore, gains a well-capitalized friend and potential mediator but not an automatic security guarantor.
If Ankara resumes drilling in contested waters this summer, the first test could come quickly: Abu Dhabi might offer diplomatic backing for Greece at the United Nations, while dispatching a token naval presence to joint exercises—signals of support that stop short of confrontation. Conversely, a lull could see Athens echo Emirati concerns about maritime security in the Red Sea, demonstrating reciprocal alignment.
It is too early to know whether other states will replicate such an investment-driven security model. Yet one trend is unmistakable: Cooperation among Greece, the Emirates, Israel, and Egypt is coalescing into a more potent pro-Western front in the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing the strategic cost for revisionist challengers such as Iran, Turkey, and their partners. The next marker to watch, then, is if Athens and Abu Dhabi sign a naval logistics agreement this year to allow Emirati vessels routine access to Greek ports. Such a move would signal that the region’s security architecture has shifted decisively toward that strengthened pro-Western camp.
