The Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement, which states that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both,” has rattled Delhi, raising concerns about future ties with Saudi Arabia and its stance in a future conflict with Pakistan.
Until announcement of the agreement, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s record in the Middle East was successful. Veteran Indian foreign policy analysts hailed Modi’s success in building robust trade, diaspora, and energy ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and in striking a balance between Tehran and Jerusalem. The Saudi-Pakistan pact now punctures the Indian belief that Delhi can drive a wedge between Pakistan and the Arab countries. India fails to grasp the nuances of these bilateral engagements, rooted in religion, history, and ideology.
The Saudi-Pakistan pact now punctures the Indian belief that Delhi can drive a wedge between Pakistan and the Arab countries.
The Saudi-Pakistan defense pact caught the Indians, and practically everyone else, off guard. Many analysts see it as a Saudi reaction to Israel’s Qatar strike and Riyadh’s fears rooted in President Donald Trump’s unpredictability and Washington’s inability to protect its Major Non-NATO ally Qatar. However, at best, Israel’s Qatar strikes catalyzed what had been in the making for the past three years. It deepened and formalized the decades-long bilateral engagement, building on a half-century relationship between the two states.
Since the 1970s, Pakistan has deployed its military forces in significant numbers in Saudi Arabia, rendered military advisory services, and trained Saudi forces. In 1979, Pakistan’s elite Special Service Group commandos helped Saudis to drive out radical Islamists who had taken over the Holy Mosque in Mecca. In the 1980s, the Saudis funded Pakistan’s nuclear program and efforts to raise Mujahedin against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and in 1982, the two countries signed a bilateral security agreement. In the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the Pakistani Army protected the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. Saudi Arabia has consistently reciprocated with financial assistance to Pakistan.
The Saudi-Pakistan defense pact reflects both regimes’ aspirations to diversify their strategic partnerships. Saudi fears emanate from Israel’s retaliatory action after the October 7, 2023, attacks, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Houthi threat, and U.S. unwillingness to deal with the Houthis’ challenge in a structured way. While the pact is ambiguous, tightening ties make more likely Pakistani support for Saudi Arabia’s development of its own nuclear deterrence. Pakistan, meanwhile, wants to reduce its dependence on China for financial aid and assistance, as the volume of Chinese investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor slows due to its own security concerns.
With a formal defense pact, Pakistan can request and expect Saudi funds, which it can use to buy weapons and technology from the United States, China, and Turkey.
For Pakistan, it is a diplomatic win. As India faces difficult strategic choices and struggles to recalibrate its balance among China, the United States, Russia, Israel, and Iran, Pakistan strengthens its alliances. Indian analysts long have dismissed the Saudi-Pakistan defense pact as symbolic, ruling out the possibility of Saudis joining Pakistani forces in any future stand-off with India. However, the issue was never about Saudi forces fighting alongside Pakistan against India; in a recent summit in Russia, two senior Pakistani generals hinted to Indian intelligence that Pakistan does not need Saudi armed forces; rather, it seeks financial largesse. Now, with a formal defense pact, Pakistan can request and expect Saudi funds, which it can use to buy weapons and technology from the United States, China, and Turkey.
The new pact also will enhance Pakistan’s influence and stature in the Middle East. Greater involvement in Middle Eastern affairs elevates Pakistan’s global stature, especially in contrast to India’s confused fence-sitting.
Pakistan does have some hard choices, though. In 2015, Pakistan refused Saudi requests for help against the Houthis; the new pact makes this more difficult, forcing Pakistan to divide its deployment between the Saudi and South Asian theaters. However, Pakistan will simultaneously use its new diplomatic heft and leverage with Saudi Arabia to augment pressure on India. Saudi Arabia may prefer to remain neutral between India and Pakistan, but its new pact with Pakistan will make this difficult.
Finally, this pact sends a strong signal to India’s Muslim population, already radicalizing due to its exposure to global Islamism that encourages a sense of victimhood under Hindu rule, and India’s tilt towards Israel. With two powerful Muslim states—Turkey and Saudi Arabia—on its side, Pakistan’s credibility grows among the Indian Muslims, creating its own momentum. Emboldened with Saudi Arabia, China, the United States, Turkey, and even an Islamist regime in Bangladesh on its side, it may be only a matter of time before Pakistan believes itself to be in an ideal position to embark upon another military adventure against India.
