Who is a citizen? In Kuwait, Decree No. 52 of 2026 amended the Nationality Law (Decree No. 15 of 1959) governing citizenship, explicitly codifying existing practice and elaborating rules regarding citizenship acquisition by spouses and those born outside Kuwait. It defines Kuwaitis by origin in terms of historical settlement and descent. It provides that original Kuwaitis are those who settled in Kuwait before 1920 and maintained their habitual residence there until December 14, 1959. It further recognizes a person as Kuwaiti by origin if born in Kuwait or abroad to a Kuwaiti by origin, regardless of the degree of descent.
Yet, citizenship in Kuwait is more than a legal status, as it links to the economic and social contract between the state and its nationals. Kuwaiti citizenship provides access to a system of state benefits, including employment opportunities, education, health care, housing and social security. Such a “cradle to grave” welfare system is one of the most extensive in the world.
Since the citizenship amendments published in April 2026, Kuwait has initiated an official review of its nationality files.
The demographic imbalance between citizens and non-citizens further increases the economic value of citizenship. Data suggest that the number of nationals is approximately 1.56 million within a total population of 5.3 million. The oft-repeated declaration, “Ana Kuwaiti!” (“I am Kuwaiti”), represents a deeply rooted sense of identity, belonging, and entitlement. Understanding this inherent socio-economic bond between citizen and state helps explain Kuwait’s extraordinary focus on citizenship.
Since the citizenship amendments published in April 2026, Kuwait has initiated an official review of its nationality files. Reports published in Kuwait’s official gazette, Al-Kuwait Al-Youm, suggest the government revoked the citizenship of thousands of people. Some grounds for the revocations: holding dual passports, use of forged or illegal documents to claim citizenship, evidence of action contrary to national security interests or loyalty to the state, and offenses against religious sanctity.
From the government’s standpoint, the campaign stems from a need to correct fraudulent naturalization and protect the integrity of Kuwaiti nationality. No state can ignore citizenship obtained through forgery, deception or fabricated lineage. However, the broader implications of these actions warrant scrutiny. Citizenship revocation has occurred alongside mounting fiscal pressures and growing concerns about Kuwait’s economic vulnerability. This policy question is whether tightening the boundaries of citizenship can help preserve the welfare state, or will it reduce the number of people entitled to its benefits without addressing the structural weaknesses of the model itself?
Historically, Kuwait’s welfare model emerged within the framework of the 1962 Constitution designed primarily for its small citizen population, who receive substantial state support deriving from the huge resource wealth of the nation. Article 11 of the constitution requires the state to provide citizens with assistance in old age, sickness, and inability to work, alongside social security, social assistance, and medical care. Articles 13, 15 and 40 establish state responsibilities for education and health care, while Article 20 links the national economy to social justice, improved living standards and citizen prosperity.
Citizenship revocation has occurred alongside mounting fiscal pressures and growing concerns about Kuwait’s economic vulnerability.
Today, however, with increasing state expenditure, budget deficits, higher defense costs, and disruptions to oil exports and maritime trade arising from regional conflict, the state faces growing fiscal pressures. From this perspective, reducing the number of people entitled to citizenship-linked benefits may serve to reduce the state’s current and future fiscal obligations. Yet, this cannot resolve the underlying structural problem causing vulnerability—namely, dependence on oil revenues, extensive public-sector employment, limited economic diversification, substantial state subsidies, absence of broad-based taxation, and the state’s dominant role as both employer and provider. If the underlying problem is that most nationals depend on the state, a more sustainable approach would be to reform the welfare-state model itself, rather than limit those who benefit from it.
Kuwait recognized the long-term risks of oil dependence decades ago. In 1976, it established the Future Generations Fund to preserve part of the country’s oil wealth for its citizens through a post-oil future. The Kuwait Investment Authority manages the fund as an intergenerational savings mechanism, with investment income reinvested and withdrawals historically requiring legal authorization. On September 1, 2026, Decree-Law No. 81 of 2026 authorized the government to borrow from the Future Generation Fund, which now has assets worth more than $1 trillion, to support its General Reserve Fund. The government had previously drawn on the fund for post-Iraqi war reconstruction efforts.
The current decision reflects the fiscal pressures created by regional conflict, including higher expenditures on defense, security, infrastructure protection, and economic stabilization, as well as threats to oil production, exports, transportation, and government revenues. Although the decree places limits on borrowing and seeks to protect the fund’s principal, its timing is significant. Kuwait is in effect tightening the boundaries of citizenship, while simultaneously creating a mechanism through which the state can access the financial returns associated with its intergenerational savings.
Kuwait remains vulnerable to regional instability. The state has legitimate reasons to scrutinize nationality, particularly where national security, criminality, fraud, or questions of allegiance are involved. However, if citizenship is perceived as revocable or conditional, it may become a source of insecurity and endanger the strength of the relationship between the individual and state. At a time when Kuwait is realizing the dangers of overdependence on extra-regional alliances, it cannot underestimate the importance of building resilience through social cohesion and national trust.
What happens to individuals who lose citizenship while owning property or businesses, holding bank accounts, carrying loans, receiving pensions, or maintaining employment contracts?
Like any sovereign state, Kuwait has every right to establish procedures for granting and withdrawing citizenship. However, exercising that authority carries consequences for individuals and families, particularly for spouses and children. A credible nationality system requires transparent standards, clear evidentiary requirements, procedural safeguards, effective judicial review, and robust protections against statelessness. Citizenship revocation can also create complex economic consequences. What happens to individuals who lose citizenship while owning property or businesses, holding bank accounts, carrying loans, receiving pensions, or maintaining employment contracts? The government has begun addressing some of these consequences retrospectively. Under Ministerial Decision No. 1410 of 2026, the government is offering ten-year residencies to some categories of people who lost their citizenship. The Capital Markets Authority issued instructions allowing some individuals who lost their nationality to continue trading securities under defined conditions. Interim arrangements have similarly protected access to banks, businesses, and government-rented housing for certain categories.
The need of the hour, however, is not short-term fixes, but restructuring of the social contract for greater sustainability. Such reform is invaluable for a small state, especially when its security environment is deteriorating and its fiscal choices are narrowing.
