A Quiet Coup in Iran?

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s bayt—his office and inner circle—functioned as a parallel government, if not the true center of power in Iran, operating with exceptional discipline and stringent security to protect its most sensitive secrets. Some former insiders commented that the bayt was the most efficient and disciplined entity within the regime.

While outsiders saw a theocratic system dominated by clerical authority and governed by the Shi’i clergy since 1979, after the February 28, 2026, death of Khamenei, a significant transformation may have occurred: a shift in power from the clerical establishment to the military.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established the Islamic Republic as a system in which ultimate authority rested with the supreme leader, the undisputed Islamic jurist with the final say in all matters. The clerical establishment in Iran implemented his wishes and his appointed clerics supervised every organization and entity. To safeguard the theocracy, he created the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, less for protecting borders and more to protect the Islamic Revolution and the ruling clergy.

Ali Khamenei maintained this balance when he assumed leadership in 1989. Although the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps grew significantly in influence, wealth, and operational reach, Iran, including its military forces, remained under the control of Khamenei and the subordinate clergy who obeyed him.

Khamenei was cautious and vigilant about not allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to overshadow the clerical leadership. According to Kianoosh Razaghi, a graduate of Imam Sadegh University—a key institution for training officials of the Islamic Republic set up after the 1979 revolution—Khamenei was acutely aware of the risk posed by the expanding power of the Revolutionary Guard.

Khamenei’s concerns extended beyond institutional balance to his own family. Of his four sons—Mostafa, Mojtaba, Masoud, and Meysam—Mojtaba was the most ambitious, with close ties to the security and military apparatus. Razaghi claims that Khamenei viewed Mojtaba’s succession as risky, politically and personally, fearing vulnerabilities such as Mojtaba’s alleged homosexuality could discredit and destabilize the system.

Khamenei assigned Masoud to lead what can be described as a think-tank within his bayt—responsible for shaping and executing key political projects, including succession planning. According to this view, Masoud Pezeshkian’s rise to the presidency following the death of Ebrahim Raisi in a mysterious helicopter crash was another example of the outcomes planned and manipulated by this inner circle under Masoud’s direction.

The central claim made by Razaghi is striking: Following Khamenei’s death, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—particularly factions associated with figures like Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr and Ahmad Vahidi—has effectively taken control, sidelining the clergy.

He points to anomalies to support this argument. First, the Iranian constitution outlines the process for selecting a supreme leader, but those procedures appear not to have been followed. Not following the bylaws of the constitution itself is a manifestation of a coup, according to Razaghi. Second, Mojtaba Khamenei’s reported incapacitation from the airstrike that killed his father normally would trigger clearly defined contingency mechanisms, which also were not followed. Third, no public disclosure of Khamenei’s will has been made, likely to avoid disclosure of his wishes for succession. Silence from Khamenei’s other sons, particularly Masoud, has raised further questions. Even in instances when public statements are expected, such as after the deaths of Kamal Kharazi and his wife, to whom Masoud is related by marriage, there has been no response.

Taken together, these irregularities suggest that the Revolutionary Guard has bypassed the formal structures of the Islamic Republic and used Mojtaba Khamenei’s name to legitimize the transition of power, even though there is still no confirmation that he is alive.

If true, such a development would not be unprecedented in Iranian history. Nader Shah, the eighteenth-century ruler of Iran often dubbed the “Napoleon of Persia,” came from humble beginnings and, to legitimize his rule, initially titled himself as the “Servant of Tahmasp,” the last Safavid monarch, who by that point was little more than a nominal figurehead, before eliminating him and his heir to bring an end to over two centuries of Safavid rule and establish his own dynasty.

Similarly, Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, who modernized Iran, rose through military ranks from humble beginnings under the last incompetent and unwilling king of the Qajar dynasty, Ahmad Shah, as his commander of the Army and prime minister. In both cases, military power gradually displaced established authority while temporarily maintaining a façade of loyalty to the expiring head of the old order.

At present, Razaghi’s claims remain speculative. Iran’s opaque political system makes definitive conclusions difficult. Yet, even if taken as conjecture only, it resonates because it explains the growing list of unanswered questions about recent developments inside Iran—questions that official narratives have not addressed. Even President Donald Trump’s assertion that “regime change” has occurred in Iran—though rhetorical—takes on a different dimension under this interpretation: not a popular uprising, but an internal power shift.

Whether or not a “quiet coup” has taken place, one thing is clear: Iran’s internal dynamics are evolving in ways that remain hidden from public view. The balance between clerical authority and military power—long a defining feature of the Islamic Republic—may no longer be what it once was.

“There are four power cliques within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that have remained intact so far. Israel is reshaping the political stage of Iran with its targeted strikes,” Razaghi explained. It is unclear, however, which clique will be the final victor.