The term ‘cognitive egocentrism’ was long ago coined by Richard Landes to describe the phenomenon of projecting one’s own assumptions and ideals about the world onto others. I first remember reading Landes’ description of cognitive egocentrism in around 2008 or so. More than 15 years later, the notion of cognitive egocentrism remains highly relevant, especially with a considerable amount of discourse about the Palestinian cause since 7 October 2023 (though in many ways that discourse is a continuity of what came before).
Leaving aside questions of rights and wrongs, it seems to me that any political cause needs to be understood and dealt with according to the realities on the ground, and not on the basis of wishful thinking on the part of outsiders. Thus, the Palestinian cause and what represents it are defined principally by the Palestinians themselves who are on the ground in the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian factions that represent them. In turn, on the wider regional scale, the cause is principally defined and represented by the Palestinians in neighbouring countries and the factions that represent them.
Some of the discourse about the Palestinian cause in the pro-Palestine protests in Western countries is well out of touch with reality, and instead projects its own intellectual fantasies and ideals onto the Palestinian cause.
When this point is borne in mind, it becomes apparent that some of the discourse about the Palestinian cause in the pro-Palestine protests and wider advocacy in Western countries is well out of touch with those realities, and instead projects its own intellectual fantasies and ideals onto the Palestinian cause.
Probably the most striking example of this cognitive egocentrism is the concept of ‘queers for Palestine': that is, people who make a show of their ‘queer’ sexual identity and portray it as somehow relevant to the Palestinian cause and claim that Palestinian liberation is ‘queer liberation.’ There is even academic discussion about ‘queering Palestine.’ This sort of discourse is far removed from the reality of ‘queer’ life in the Palestinian territories where I have spent time.
The simple fact is that life is very difficult for ‘queer’ people in the Palestinian territories because ‘queer’ sexual identity and behaviour are generally not accepted in Palestinian society, whether among Muslims, Christians or even Samaritans (if you consider the Samaritans in the West Bank to be Palestinian). Objectively speaking, it is easier to be homosexual in Israel or any Western country than the Palestinian territories, and there is clearly an open ‘queer’ culture in Israel that one will not find in the Palestinian territories. This is the reality regardless of one’s position on so-called ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel. The fact that Samaritan priest Husni al-Samari, based in the West Bank, told me of the societal danger being posed to Israel by homosexuals in Tel Aviv but mentioned no comparative issue in the Palestinian territories is itself indicative of the contrast between Israel and the Palestinian territories. Similar observations on the difficulties for ‘queer’ people in the Palestinian territories are made by the writer Jonathan Krohn, who, unlike a lot of outside commentators, has specifically explored this issue through work on the ground.
None of the above is any comment on debates about ‘queer’ rights or scoring points for one side or the other. It is just an observation about how Western protest slogans and discourse equating Palestinian liberation and ‘queer liberation’ reflect idealistic, emotional projection, and not proper cognitive identification with the Palestinian cause.
Objectively speaking, it is easier to be homosexual in Israel or any Western country than the Palestinian territories, and there is clearly an open ‘queer’ culture in Israel that one will not find in the Palestinian territories. This is the reality regardless of one’s position on so-called ‘pinkwashing’ of Israel.
The same broader point goes for discourse that projects ideals of ‘anti-racism’ onto the Palestinian cause, either ignorant of or deliberately overlooking the issue of anti-Semitic sentiments within Palestinian society and the wider region. I am not going to make a claim as to knowing what percentage of Palestinian society is anti-Semitic or assert that ‘all’ or ‘most’ Palestinians are anti-Semitic. What has been clear to me, from my own observations, is that while anti-Semitism is not universal among Palestinians, it is casual and accepted within the Palestinian territories just as affection for Saddam Husayn is casual and accepted within those territories. The casual nature of these sentiments was probably more apparent to me than it would be to Western outsiders because I know Arabic and Palestinians would be more sympathetic to me as an Iraqi. In any case, I would suggest that if someone else wants to observe the pervasiveness of these sentiments for himself/herself, that person should go to the Palestinian territories and express anti-Semitic views and love for Saddam, and see if he/she gets major pushback for it.
Here are examples of casual anti-Semitic sentiments I witnessed. During a taxi ride from Ramallah to Tayba, the driver characterised Jews as ‘filthy’ people who should ‘go back’ to their countries of origin, by which he meant, of course, that Israeli Ashkenazic Jews (for instance) should go back to the European countries where their ancestors were residing some generations before, a sentiment that is also sometimes expressed at pro-Palestine protests. On another occasion, while crossing the Qalandiya checkpoint back into East Jerusalem, I hitchhiked with a driver (the crossing itself has a footpath, but when it is closed, your best option is to get in a car of someone driving onto the other side). That driver, among other things, berated rulers of some neighbouring Arab countries for not doing enough to help the Palestinians and insultingly referred to them as Jewish. Finally, during a visit to a Palestinian-owned antiques shop in East Jerusalem (which even claims Moshe Dayan, who served as Israeli defence and foreign minister and was a keen collector of antiques, among its past clientele- see below), I sat down for a chat with the owner, whose discourse quickly devolved into anti-Semitism as he characterised the Jews’ behaviour as reflecting continuity with their supposed rebellions against the prophets of the past. Who, indeed, are those ‘who have incurred God’s wrath’ (al-maghdub alayhim) as mentioned in Qur’an 1:7? The Jews, of course (a view that is quite well-known in tafsir- interpretation of the Qur’an). I suggested that, in summary, the Jews’ negative traits have been described in the Qur’an: a point he wholeheartedly agreed with and praised as insightful.
Of course, it can be pointed out in response that these anti-Semitic sentiments among Palestinians and in the wider region are not divorced from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and grievances about Israel’s actions, just as affection for Saddam has roots in the perception that Saddam treated Palestinians well and was supportive of their cause. There is truth to that, and the existence of religious or racial prejudices does not necessarily invalidate the legitimacy of grievances surrounding displacement and deprivation of rights under occupation. But then downplaying those prejudices or pretending that they do not exist either reflects ignorance or intellectual dishonesty. The Palestinian cause on the ground does not represent the ideals of anti-racism and the fight against prejudice.
The issue of prejudices in turn leads to a final issue of projection of intellectual fantasies onto the Palestinian cause: namely, the idea that the Palestinian cause represents a cause for open borders and against nation-states (see below as an example, H/T: Jonathan Krohn). Now, whether one conceives of a ‘two-state solution’ or a ‘one-state solution’ to the conflict, the reality is that the Palestinian cause is based on the idea of a national identity group that has the right to its own sovereign state based on that identity. In other words, it is fundamentally a nationalist cause, based on establishing a Palestinian state: a state that is Palestinian precisely by virtue of having a Palestinian demographic majority.
The issue of prejudices in turn leads to a final issue of projection of intellectual fantasies onto the Palestinian cause: namely, the idea that the Palestinian cause represents a cause for open borders and against nation-states
Some ‘one-state solution’ advocates suggest that the end ideal is a single state that encompasses all of what is now Israel and the Palestinian territories, grants all people living in those lands ‘equal rights’ and is seemingly devoid of a clear national identity. In practice, it is obvious that if an actual ‘one-state solution’ were to be realised (especially with the notion of ‘right of return’ for Palestinians), it would be a Palestinian state in which Palestinian Arabs are the demographic majority and would understandably feel that the state’s identity should be based on that demographic majority. In this regard, protest chants along the lines of ‘from the river to the sea/from the water to the water, Palestine is Arab’ have one thing going for them: they are at least intellectually honest about what the end-goal would be in reality.
Whatever the final scenario in which a Palestinian state were to be realised, it would clearly be a sovereign state with its own borders and right to exercise who can and cannot enter its territory. Does anyone suppose in the event of a two-state solution or one-state solution, that the Palestinian state would allow free Jewish or other non-Palestinian immigration into its territory? Of course not. Indeed, historically, it has to be noted that the Palestinian cause, prior to Israel’s establishment, was partly based on (understandable) opposition to the idea of large-scale Jewish immigration to Palestine that was seen as altering the demography of the region. This sentiment is still relevant today. ‘Open borders’ advocates can rail against nation-states all they want, but the reality is that nation-states and the right of control of own’s one borders are fundamental principles of the international system today, and fear about large-scale immigration of ‘out-groups’ and the potential for demographic change is a normal sentiment. Thus, by extension, it is completely understandable why the political consensus in Israel is based on the idea of Israel as a Jewish state that is Jewish by virtue of its Jewish demographic majority, with restriction on non-Jewish immigration that could alter that majority: it is really not some expression of irrational ‘ethno-fascism’ unique to Israel.
None of the above should be read as advocacy for one side or the other in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is simply an analysis of how some activism and advocacy for the Palestinian cause in the West reflects cognitive egocentrism described by Landes so long ago, as some project their idealised perceptions and pet causes onto the Palestinian cause in a way that is divorced from sober ground truths. In other words, there is an emotional and romanticised identification with the cause, but not one that has been well thought through.
