In another misuse of International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) mechanisms, the Turkish government effectively lobbied to halt a collaborative project between Interpol and reputable UK-based research organization Conflict Armament Research (CAR). This action followed a damning report by CAR that traced explosive materials obtained by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) back to Turkish firms.
The Turkish government’s endeavor to undermine a proposed project between Interpol and CAR was detailed in a recent report issued by Turkey’s Security Directorate General (Emniyet) in February and hailed as a success by Turkish authorities.
The 83-page report, acquired by Nordic Monitor, revealed that CAR had been flagged by the Turkish Foreign Ministry for an extended period subsequent to the organization’s investigation in February 2016, which exposed Turkish companies implicated in a fertilizer supply chain linked to ISIS.
During CAR’s two-year investigation into ISIS weapons in Iraq and Syria, it was discovered that the majority of ISIS improvised explosive devices (IEDs) consist of a blend of aluminum and nitrate-based fertilizers, such as ammonium nitrate. The report pointed to Turkey as “the most important choke point” for components utilized in ISIS’s IED manufacturing. These components include chemical precursors such as fertilizers as well as containers, detonating cords, cables and wires that were either produced or sold in Turkey before being acquired by ISIS in Iraq.
Established in 2011, CAR specializes in the documentation of weapons, ammunition and associated materials diverted to armed groups, including terrorist entities globally. Deploying field teams, the organization identifies weaponry and munitions, traces their origins and exposes vulnerabilities within supply chains and control systems. CAR boasts partnerships with prominent entities such as the European Union, United Nations, US State Department and the foreign ministries of the UK and Germany for the tracing of weapons.
Following its damning report, the organization attracted the ire of the Turkish government, resulting in strong opposition by Turkish government representatives to CAR’s proposed projects with intergovernmental organizations.
The proposal for collaboration aimed to facilitate data exchange between Interpol and CAR, thereby boosting efforts to trace supply chains associated with arms in conflict zones. This proposal was presented to the 13-member Interpol Executive Committee for discussion last year.
Upon instructions from the government, Turkish representative Selçuk Sevgel lobbied against the proposal at the Executive Committee and rallied the majority to decline the project. The proposal was subsequently rejected by a vote of 9 to 3, preventing its advancement to the General Assembly.
It came to light that the Turkish Foreign Ministry drafted a confidential report on CAR, asserting that the organization “publishes reports containing unfounded allegations against our country, and its reports based on unreliable sources could potentially harm the activities of our critical sector companies.” The ministry further recommended “preventing, if possible, the establishment of an official relationship with Interpol.”
Indeed, Sevgel, a police chief appointed to the Executive Committee for the 2021-2024 term, executed precisely what was outlined in the foreign ministry’s report, effectively terminating the project.
Turkey’s misuse of its position at Interpol is not unprecedented. Between 2016 and 2021, Interpol rejected 839 Red Notice submissions by Turkey for members of the Gülen movement, a group critical of the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Interpol cited violations of its rules as the basis for refusal and urged Turkey to refrain from resubmitting similar requests.
Interpol went to the extent of briefly cutting off Turkish police access to its database when Turkey inundated the system with an excessive number of filings against exiled critics and opponents of Erdogan’s government, all under fabricated terrorism charges.
In response, the Turkish government attempted various methods to circumvent the restrictions and persuade Interpol to process politically motivated requests, efforts that were unsuccessful.
On May 4, 2018 the Interpol General Secretariat conveyed to the Turkish government via letter that the summary filings against 115 individuals believed to be affiliated with the Gülen movement were not acceptable. The letter also cautioned against new filings targeting these individuals, citing violations of the Interpol Constitution.
The General Secretariat’s letter specifically referred to Article 3 of the Interpol Constitution, which says, "[I]t is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” It added that all filings made by the Turkish Interpol department would be deleted and urged it not to file new requests.
Nordic Monitor previously disclosed an internal government communication in which Turkish authorities deliberated strategies to circumvent objections by the Interpol Secretariat. The communication, dated June 10, 2018, underscored the necessity for a new approach and urged the Erdogan government to lobby both the General Assembly and the Executive Committee. This lobbying aimed to bypass the restrictions and bans imposed by the General Secretariat on fraudulent filings intended to target critics and opponents of the government.
The 89th Interpol General Assembly, held in Istanbul in November 2021, presented an opportunity for the Erdogan government to execute this plan. In a letter addressed to parliament in April 2021, Erdogan’s government said the event would be advantageous for Turkey in advancing its perspectives within the General Assembly. Moreover, during the meeting, Turkey successfully secured a seat on the Executive Committee.
Following his election to the Executive Committee, Sevgel remarked, “For a long time, we didn’t have representation on the Executive Committee. ... Now, we have gained representation at the highest level. ... It can be said that this executive committee is responsible for all decisions taken, and we have a say here, as Turkey. ... We will make decisions in line with the interests of our country.”
Not only has the Turkish government exploited Interpol’s Notices system, it has also manipulated its messaging and diffusions, particularly those concerning Lost and Stolen Passports, to exert pressure on government critics abroad.
Nordic Monitor previously published documents showing how the Finnish Interpol service denied Turkey’s request to deport a political asylum seeker after a diffusion, a notice sent by the Interpol section of the Turkish national police, was used against a Turkish national resident in Helsinki. The document showed that the Turkish police triggered the Interpol diffusion process in the absence of a judicial decision. Similar notices were filed against others in Belgium, Poland and Germany, in some cases targeting exiled journalists who fled Turkey to avoid wrongful imprisonment.
The most well-known case of the Turkish government’s abuse of Interpol mechanisms took place in 2017 when Enes Kanter, a former NBA basketball star from Turkey, had barely escaped arrest while in Jakarta, where he stopped as part of a global goodwill tour on May 19, 2017. Kanter was detained on May 20, 2017 at Henri Coandă International Airport in Bucharest because his passport was reported to have been cancelled by the Turkish government.
Kanter was subsequently released after the US government and NBA officials intervened on his behalf. In 2019 Turkey tried to put the NBA star’s name on the Red Notices list, prompting Kanter to decline to join his then-team, the New York Knicks, on a trip to London for an NBA game in early January 2019. Kanter, who later played for the Boston Celtics, is currently no longer active in the NBA.
Since 2015 the Turkish government has cancelled the passports of some 650,000 people who are alleged to have been affiliated with the Gülen group. The revocation of passport privileges was also extended to spouses and children in an unprecedented campaign of intimidation that is claimed to be the largest witch hunt against government critics in Turkish history.
When their nationals of Turkish origin were detained in Spain in 2017 on a fraudulent Red Notice requested by Turkey, the German and Swedish governments immediately reacted and brought these political cases to the attention of the European Union, which later took action by asking Interpol to prevent such abuse. The EU as well as the Council of Europe raised the question of violation of the Interpol Constitution by Turkey through filing cases that did not warrant any criminal action but were rather seen as politically motivated harassment tactics.
In addition to having a seat on the Executive Committee, Turkey also has six people assigned to the Interpol Secretariat at the organization’s headquarters in Paris. Among them, one serves as a senior fingerprint examiner in the Forensic and Police Data Management Sub-Directorate, while another works as a crime intelligence officer for the Counterterrorism Directorate. Two of these people were appointed in 2023.
The Turkish government’s manipulation of Interpol mechanisms, from leveraging its representation on the Executive Committee to strategically placing personnel within the Interpol Secretariat, underscores its concerted efforts to exert influence and pressure on critics both domestically and abroad.
Through systematic abuse of Interpol’s systems, including the Notices and messaging channels, Turkey has sought to stifle dissent and advance its political agenda, even at the expense of violating Interpol’s principles and regulations. The termination of CAR’s partnership project with Interpol highlights the broader implications of Turkey’s interference within Interpol, damaging its integrity and impartiality.
