Thanos Davelis: Hi, everyone, and welcome to our discussion on Eastern Mediterranean Contributions to Middle East Security. A special thanks to the Middle East Forum, our programming partner for this event. Since the discovery of natural gas nearly 15 years ago in the Eastern Mediterranean, this region has come together in unexpected ways. Ties have expanded beyond Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to include a number of Middle Eastern countries, the United States, and the European Union, moving well beyond energy into the security realm.
This has taken on new significance in the post-October 7th Middle East, and as the Trump Administration approaches this region, we will tackle these issues today with Michael Rubin, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; Gregg Roman, Executive Director of the Middle East Forum; Jonathan Spyer, Director of Research at the Middle East Forum; and Ian Lesser, Distinguished Fellow and Advisor to the President at the German Marshall Fund.
Michael, let’s start with you. For many in the policymaking world, countries in the Eastern Mediterranean have traditionally been categorized under Europe, the Middle East, or Africa, particularly within different bureaus at the State Department. This has changed in recent years with initiatives spearheaded by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Can we discuss the Middle East today without considering the broader Eastern Mediterranean region?
Michael Rubin: No, we cannot. When I taught for the Navy, I showed a map of our military bases and facilities in the Persian Gulf, but the Eastern Mediterranean is increasingly critical in the 21st century. We have Souda Bay and Alexandroupolis, and the Sixth Fleet is no longer just a transit point—it’s a destination due to regional instability. Jonathan, who recently returned from Syria, is an expert on this.
The cooperation between Israel, Greece, and Cyprus has reshaped strategic calculations. The elephant in the room is Turkey. Even if the Trump Administration avoids confronting Turkey directly or calibrates policy toward wishful thinking, the Turkey problem won’t disappear. This makes the bipartisan Israel-Greece-Cyprus partnership even more vital.
Thanos Davelis: Gregg, what have the deepening ties across the Eastern Mediterranean meant for the security of Middle Eastern countries, particularly Israel, which straddles both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East?
Gregg Roman: Greece serves as the democratic gateway for Middle Eastern countries, especially Israel, via Cyprus, to connect with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This includes the proposed pipeline, the electric interconnector, joint defense treaties, maritime patrols, and creating a southern bulwark against Turkish aggression.
Beyond Israel, Cyprus and Egypt collaborate on joint pipeline projects, particularly for refining natural gas from Cypriot fields. Washington recognizes the need to solidify this alliance—built on strategic dialogue and exercises like Noble Dina and Argonaut—into a formal defense agreement backed by the United States. As Turkey’s threats grow, including in Turkish-occupied Cyprus and through hybrid warfare, a stronger response from Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and other Arab states is essential to connect Europe and the Middle East.
Thanos Davelis: Ian, you’ve closely watched the transatlantic relationship. As Greece and Cyprus lean into their Eastern Mediterranean role, bringing NATO and the European Union to the Middle East’s doorstep, what does this mean for the region?
Ian Lesser: The Eastern Mediterranean is a nexus of Middle Eastern and European security environments, extending even further with initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and Red Sea connections. Protecting infrastructure is a multi-regional challenge. Earlier today, an Egyptian colleague asked why the Mediterranean wasn’t mentioned more in these discussions—it’s a critical question. Even if the United States reduces its presence in European security, it’s likely to remain engaged in this region politically, militarily, and economically. The United States will also be a stakeholder in the ongoing Greece-Turkey détente, which is vital for the European Union and NATO. NATO has significant assets in the Mediterranean, including command structures and ballistic missile defense, which is largely sea-based and unlikely to change.
Michael Rubin: To build on Ian’s point, the United States has a base in Rota, Spain, outside the Strait of Gibraltar, but our key facilities are Souda Bay, Naples (mostly administrative), and Alexandroupolis (logistical). Cyprus has made itself indispensable with facilities like Cyclops, enhancing port and airport security and detecting chemical, biological, and radiological threats. The Eastern Mediterranean’s importance stems not just from its strategic location but from Cyprus’s foresight in becoming a trusted partner to all regional actors.
Thanos Davelis: Jonathan, countries in the region face threats not only from malign state actors like Russia or Turkey but also from non-state actors, such as terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah operating in Syria. How does growing Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy contribute to countering terrorism?
Jonathan Spyer: The cooperation between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece has already yielded results. In June 2023, a serious attack planned on a Jewish and Israeli site in Cyprus was intercepted. In October 2023, two Iranian citizens attempting to enter Cyprus from Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus were arrested, and seven Pakistani nationals operating for Iran were detained in Greece. These successes stem from robust cooperation among the three countries’ security bodies. However, this cooperation also brings new risks, such as Hezbollah’s open threat against Cyprus in June 2024. We must also complicate the notion of non-state actors. Many, like Hezbollah, operate as proxies for states, a practice pioneered by Iran but also adopted by Turkey, which facilitates such actors from Northern Cyprus. This demands close attention.
Thanos Davelis: Gregg, you follow Syria and groups like Hamas closely. How drastic has the shift been since October 7th, particularly regarding Turkey?
Gregg Roman: Turkey hosts Sunni terror groups much like Iran supports Shia and other Sunni groups. Beyond violent actors, Turkey launches influence operations against the West, Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern countries. Hamas attacks planned in Istanbul were executed in Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel. Turkey backs Syrian militias responsible for atrocities against Alawites and others. Turkey also uses migration as a weapon, allowing tens of thousands to cross into Europe to pressure the continent. The tripartite alliance of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, backed by the United States, NATO, and the European Union, is the only shield against Turkey’s violent proxies and asymmetrical warfare, protecting Western democratic ideals.
Michael Rubin: Erdogan’s extremism mirrors Iran’s, but he also resembles Yasser Arafat, prioritizing process over peace to evade accountability. Washington sees him as an intermediary with Russia, Ukraine, and Iran, while Europe often pressures smaller democracies like Cyprus into ill-conceived concessions to appease Turkey. Cyprus should not bear the cost of Turkish malfeasance.
Thanos Davelis: Ian, you’ve worked extensively on Turkey. President Trump recently highlighted his close relationship with Erdogan during a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu. How do you see the U.S. role vis-à-vis Turkey?
Ian Lesser: The U.S.-Turkey relationship has always been challenging, with no golden age. It’s somewhat optional for the United States, unlike for Europe, where Turkey’s diaspora, economic ties, and migration issues make the relationship unavoidable. NATO remains critical for Turkey, providing a seat at the table and a hedge against regional insecurity. The West has leverage over Ankara, but the relationship’s fragility, especially if driven by personal dynamics between Trump and Erdogan, could lead to rapid shifts.
Thanos Davelis: Jonathan, what do you make of the potential U.S. response, especially given Trump’s recent comments on Erdogan?
Jonathan Spyer: Turkey’s aggressive strategy spans Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, the West Bank, Gaza, Syria, and Iraq, aiming for regional hegemony through semi-state paramilitary actors, a practice seen in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. It’s puzzling that U.S. policymakers, including Trump, seem unaware of this threat, as evidenced by his recent comments calling Erdogan a “good guy.” This contradicts the evidence of Turkey’s radical path, which the United States and its allies should seek to contain.
Thanos Davelis: Ian, you wanted to chime in?
Ian Lesser: The discourse around Trump and Erdogan highlights the relationship’s fragility. If it hinges on personal dynamics, it’s highly changeable. Congress, where Turkey has few allies, would likely temper this if the normal executive-legislative balance were in place. The strategic constituency for the U.S.-Turkey relationship has collapsed, and with critical assets like Incirlik Air Base and nuclear weapons at stake, this volatility is concerning.
Gregg Roman: An analysis of the Trump Administration’s priorities is needed. Erdogan’s actions—threatening Christian communities, challenging Egypt, and undermining U.S. energy companies like Chevron and ExxonMobil through the Turkey-Libya exclusive economic zone agreement—conflict with American interests. If organizations like the Middle East Forum make this case, Erdogan’s overreach could fray his relationship with Trump, exposing the threat he poses to U.S. security and economic interests.
Michael Rubin: Turkey may use NATO as a shield, potentially leveraging the Russian-built nuclear power plant in Akkuyu to import nuclear goods for a covert program, hiding behind NATO’s Article 5. This could endanger Europe, Israel, and Arab states. The Trump Administration’s challenge is that Erdogan is playing for time, and the next four years could have lasting consequences.
Ian Lesser: Another scenario is a more European NATO without strong U.S. involvement, prompting other NATO members like Poland or Sweden to pursue nuclear capabilities. In this context, Turkey’s pursuit of a nuclear program could look different, posing a significant risk.
Michael Rubin: Turkey’s occupation of three countries distinguishes it from Sweden, amplifying the threat.
Thanos Davelis: The Great Sea Interconnector is a transformative project for Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, connecting energy islands. How does this factor into Eastern Mediterranean contributions to Middle East security? Gregg, your thoughts?
Gregg Roman: The U.S. Congress, European Parliament, and private sector are working to create a permanent security framework for infrastructure projects like the Great Sea Interconnector and IMEC, connecting Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. A U.S. bill proposes underwriting cybersecurity and electronic warfare to protect these projects. Israel is ready to secure the eastern flank from Cyprus to Israel and is open to strategic dialogue with Greece and Cyprus, potentially placing forces permanently in both countries. Turkey seeks to disrupt this, but momentum is strong if Greece and Cyprus make financial adjustments.
Michael Rubin: This cooperation allows Israel to lead on Eastern Mediterranean maritime security, freeing Greece to counter Turkey in the Aegean. Without this, Greece’s navy would be overstretched. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Jonathan Spyer: The Great Sea Interconnector faces active Turkish disruption, as seen in the 2019 Turkey-Libya exclusive economic zone agreement that bisects the project. This urgency underscores the need for Israeli security underwriting. These projects, alongside the EastMed Pipeline and Abraham Accords, form part of a broader strategic and economic alliance from Greece to India, countering Turkey’s opposing agenda.
Thanos Davelis: Ian, is there a sense of urgency in Brussels about these projects, given the priority in Athens, Nicosia, and Jerusalem?
Ian Lesser: Brussels is distracted, but a subset of policymakers focuses on connectivity like IMEC, which aligns with European priorities over defense investment. Funding remains a challenge, and while these projects won’t disappear, they may be overshadowed by other priorities.
Thanos Davelis: With two minutes left, what’s one area we should focus on for Eastern Mediterranean security as it relates to the Middle East? Michael?
Michael Rubin: First, Turkey’s potential nuclear weapons capability. Second, we must abandon the notion that Turkey will revert to normalcy after Erdogan. His influence on education, bureaucracy, and the military will persist for generations.
Gregg Roman: The tripartite agreement’s diplomatic, security, and economic strength counters Erdogan’s neo-Ottomanism, offering Middle Eastern countries an alternative trade route to Europe through Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, bypassing Turkey.
Jonathan Spyer: Syria’s developments, particularly the arrival of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Damascus on December 8, 2024, represent a Turkish strategic triumph. Turkey’s investment in Syrian Islamist groups and plans for a new exclusive economic zone with Damascus signal its rising influence, which we must closely monitor.
Ian Lesser: Two underexplored areas: Turkey’s commercial stakes in Lebanon and Syria’s reconstruction, and migration, which remains a significant regional challenge.
Thanos Davelis: Thank you all. Our time is up, but please stay for the upcoming panel, “Lessons from FIDE on Strategic Competition,” with Dr. Aias and Andrew Novo.
