Daniel Levy has of late become one of the most sought-after leftist commentators on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and one of the most frequently quoted and interviewed pundits on the subject in the mainstream press. His name regularly appears in news stories in the New York Times and Washington Post, among other papers. Cultivating an image of expertise and sobriety, he is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, which advertises itself as a center-left source of serious analysis. The day after Annapolis, he debated David Frum for 40 minutes on bloggingheads.tv, the video of which was posted at the end of last week and which has now been posted on the New York Times‘s website.
Levy’s performance was astonishing. His preferred tactic was to repeatedly digress from the debate in order to lecture Frum on what he claimed to be the “historic context” of the conflict; his appearance on Bloggingheads is one of the most misleading performances I’ve ever seen on the conflict from a putatively serious person. This is a long fact-check, but I think it’s a necessary one.
Yasser Arafat’s Involvement in the Intifada
Frum: I think there are very few people who would take the view that what happened on the Temple Mount was a spontaneous upsurge of Palestinian public opinion.
Levy: Well, the Mitchell Commission actually took that view. there was a commission, an international commission, that was brought in to say what happened and how do we stop it, and the Mitchell Commission did NOT come out on the side of the argument that said, ‘the Palestinians were just waiting to for a moment to start a violent intifada.’ So the one internationally-sanctioned but non-partisan group that was asked to look into this drew a very particular conclusion.
Frum: So there are people who say that Yasser Arafat did not start that war?
Levy: Well I’m saying that the Mitchell Commission did not come out with the finding — and this was the only internationally authorized, non-partisan assessment of this — the Mitchell Commission did not come out with that finding, and I think it’s very important to put that out there.
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of witnesses or the production of documents. Most of the information we received came from the parties and, understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments. [emphasis added]
Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the GOI [Government of Israel] to respond with lethal force.
After everything that has come to light about Arafat’s involvement in instigating and then clandestinely leading the intifada, it is beyond misleading for Levy to pound the table about a report published in the first months of the intifada that was charged with neither investigating nor judging Arafat’s involvement in the hostilities. This is not honest analysis.
The Khartoum Conference and the Six Day War
As part of his project to advance the theme of Israeli intransigence, Levy said to Frum:
This is rubbish. The Khartoum Conference, where the famous “three no’s” were declared — no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel — took place in late August, 1967. What Levy doesn’t mention is that immediately following the Six Day War, Israel, using America as an intermediary, attempted to give the Sinai back to Egypt and the Golan back to Syria. I quote from Conor Cruise O’Brien’s history of Zionism and Israel, The Siege:
In the immediate aftermath of the dazzling victory [in the Six Day War], Levi Eshkol’s Government of National Unity was prepared to surrender large quantities — though never all — of the occupied territories, in exchange for peace. On June 19, 1967, the Cabinet adopted a four-point resolution, which it communicated to the Government of the United States on June 22, but did not make public.
Why would Egypt and Syria have needed to join an “opening ploy in a negotiation” — by way of the Three No’s, no less — when Israel had already offered those states their territory back? The reason, of course, is that Egypt and Syria wished to continue attempting to destroy the state of Israel, which they again tried in 1973. But in Levy’s telling, Israel apparently didn’t catch on to the nuances of the signals emanating from Khartoum, which the Israeli government should have understood to mean that the Arabs wished to open negotiations. If only Daniel Levy had been around back then to explain all of this!
Levy’s treatment of the Six Day War is equally bizarre, as revealed in the following exchange, after Frum mentioned that the Arab states started the war:
Levy: Wait wait, so wait, the Arab states started the war in ‘67, David?
Frum: They provoked it.
Levy: I kind of remember a preemptive Israeli strike, maybe I’m wrong.
Frum: They provoked it by violating the terms of the armistice of 1956.
Levy: But there was a preemptive strike by Israel.
Frum: Yes, there was a first strike by Israel, after the Egyptians violate the armistice that ended the conflict, the hostilities in 1956, you know this.
Levy: But you also know who started the war.
Frum: Yes, because there was a direct threat to the existence of the state. When you violate an armistice, that starts the clock toward a conflict.
Levy: [Angrily] But when you violate international law every day, that’s fine. When you put a civilian settler population in occupied territory, that’s fine.
It feels ridiculous to even be writing a defense of Israel’s preemptive strike against Egypt in 1967. The only people who insist that Israel started the Six Day War are crackpots and unhinged anti-Zionists. And Daniel Levy.
Suicide Bombings
Levy lectures:
This is not historical context — it is historical fabrication. The first suicide bombing against Israeli civilians happened on April 16, 1993, at the Mehola Junction, almost a full year before Baruch Goldstein’s atrocity in Hebron. The Engineer was killed on January 5th, 1996, and in that three-year period, not including the Mehola attack, there were seven Hamas suicide bombings that killed 58 Israeli civilians, and one Islamic Jihad bombing that killed 21 Israeli civilians — 79 Israelis total. The very reason The Engineer was killed by the Shabak was because of his involvement in the Hamas bombings that occurred exactly during the period in which Levy claims there was a “hiatus” in attacks.
His telling of the second intifada is as equally twisted. According Levy, suicide bombings commenced in response to Israel’s targeted killings of Palestinians, a cause and effect proposition. But suicide bombings in the second intifada didn’t begin “several months” after the intifada started — they began exactly in the opening weeks of the intifada. There were Islamic Jihad and Hamas bombings on October 26, November 2, 20, and 26, and on December 22, 2000. Meanwhile, the first Palestinian terrorist killed in a targeted killing was Hussein Abayat, who in the weeks before he was killed by the IDF had perpetrated the shooting murders of three Israelis and the critical wounding of another. Abayat was killed on November 9, two weeks after the first suicide bombing of the intifada. Whoops.
There is a reason why Levy’s “errors” all work in one direction, and one direction only: It is because he would like to convince his listeners of a narrative which holds that Palestinian terrorism has always arisen in response to Israeli provocations — and thus that Israel has brought such terrorism on itself. His telling of history would also have us believe that Israel has never been genuinely interested in peace with its neighbors, while the Arabs, despite all the genocidal rhetoric and wars of annihilation, have actually been trying to signal to Israel for decades that they are ready for peace. Beyond these observations, I would rather speculate on Levy’s deeper motives. It is not clear, after all of this, what credibly is left of Levy’s views on the conflict — or what should be left of his reputation for honesty, objectivity, or expertise.