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Raphael BenLevi, a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Haifa and lecturer at the IDF military command academy, spoke to a June 6th Middle East Forum Webinar (video). BenLevi discussed the two groups in Israel’s “foreign policy elite” with “alternative worldviews regarding grand strategy.”
BenLevi said the two groups can be divided into “assertive realists” and “defensive realists.” He explained that the term “offensive realists” applies in international relations to “great powers” which, owing to Israel’s status as a “regional power,” would not apply to the Jewish state. To differentiate between the two, BenLevi refers to Israel’s “offensive realists” as “assertive realists.” He adds “realists” to the two categories because both groups share concerns about “hard power and recognizing limitations,” but their strategies “diverge” on critical issues. The background against which both were formed was established in the years prior to the Jewish state’s founding. For centuries, the Jewish people were politically powerless, and the divergent worldviews developed as the country’s “independent sovereign existence” evolved.
More than a century ago, the Zionist movement debated whether it should align with the British to oust the Turks, aiming to further “leverage ... their national aspirations,” or instead use its own force. Supporters of the latter, such as Jewish nationalist leaders Joseph Trumpeldor and Ze’ev Jabotinsky, formed Jewish brigades. Much of the Socialist Zionist leadership, however, believed that “Zionism would not require a violent clash” and thought they could ingratiate themselves to the Arabs by improving the Arabs’ economic conditions.
Widespread Arab riots against the Jews in Mandate Palestine during the 1920s dispelled that notion. Jabotinsky published an article where he assessed that the Arabs would continue attacks unless their violence was resisted with “overwhelming power.” Only then would the Arabs “adjust” to the realization that the Jewish state was a fact. Jabotinsky called his plan the “Iron Wall” which Israel’s first prime minister Ben-Gurion adopted, and which was the Jewish state’s official policy during its first four decades. Ben-Gurion realized the strategy would require “rounds of fighting in which Israel must win decisively.”
During the 1950s, Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first foreign minister, opposed Ben-Gurion’s strategy since he believed “decisive Israeli power” undermined peace by provoking neighboring hostile countries. Rather than engaging in rounds of fighting, Sharett endorsed compromise and concessions to reach peace agreements. BenLevi said that Ben-Gurion’s strategy lost support in the 1990s when his Labor party adopted a 1920s “defensive power” view which is supported today by the left-leaning party’s defensive realists. Members of the hawkish wing of Ben-Gurion’s Labor party, the assertive realists, ascribe to Jabotinsky’s vision and have their counterparts in the right-wing Likud party which continued the “mainstream Israeli strategy since its founding.”
BenLevi said the “roots of the conflict” between the two groups are in the areas where they have clear differences. The assertive realists see the Arab rejection of Israel as “ideological,” whereas the defensive realists insist that “friction” is merely a result of “geopolitical competition” between the Arab states and Israel. The divergent views drive Israel’s approach to its security needs. Thus, assertive realists believe Israel’s stability is dependent upon “regional superiority of hard power” to dissuade adversaries from engaging Israel in conflict. Moreover, they insist their strategy is “what will lead to peace agreements, through the recognition of Israeli power, not territorial concessions.”
Defensive realists also endorse Israeli power to “balance our adversaries,” but not to the point of “Israeli superiority or overwhelming power.” Ben-Gurion’s strategy included working with great powers like the U.S., provided Israel was willing “to break with them if necessary and cooperate with other powers at the same time.” The defensive realists argue that Israel is dependent upon those great powers who are allies and must prioritize “dialogue” and cooperation to “avoid tensions” with them.
Another area of divergence is “the importance of territory.” Assertive realists support the necessity of “territorial control for security buffer zones,” while the defensive realists “embrace territorial entrenchment.” Prime minister Ehud Olmert, who is of the latter group, proposed his “Convergence Plan,” which would have Israel withdraw from most of Judea and Samaria to avoid “overextension” and enable the Jewish state to “strengthen its defensive capabilities.” The assertive realists oppose withdrawals, which they say, “projects weakness.”
The conflicting approaches affect the use of force. Thus, assertive realists claim that “possessing overwhelming power” lowers the need to use force because a strong Israel acts as a deterrent. According to Ben-Gurion’s approach, if force is necessary, each round must be applied “decisively and unilaterally” to achieve victory so that any adversary fully understands the futility of its hostile acts. Defensive realists agree and would not hesitate to use “defensive” force, but to stabilize the conflict and reach “political agreements,” they would look for support from the U.S. as its superpower ally. The split between the two groups’ divergent strategies has a significant impact on “Israel’s strategic priority.”
Since the 1990s, assertive realists say the “Iranian threat and its proxies” are an existential threat to Israel, while the Palestinian Arab issue is secondary and can be “managed.” Assertive realists also argue that “concessions to Palestinians embolden Iran,” but they get pushback from their opponents who claim the “Palestinian arena is at least as important as Iran” and requires concessions to gain U.S. support for opposing Iran.
BenLevi pointed out that the Abraham Accords are a result of Israel’s overwhelming power and that Egypt, Jordan, and other Gulf states decided “normalization” with Israel takes priority over solving the Palestinian issue. In particular, the Gulf states see Iran as a threat to their interests and realize that Israel is the only state in the region capable of acting against Iran.
As for Jabotinsky’s Iron Wall, BenLevi said that applying the strategy internally has been more complicated because the issue of Israeli Arabs is connected to the Palestinian Arab issue. Considering the May 2022 Arab Israeli riots, many Israelis on the center-left discovered that “Arab Israelis identify with the Palestinian National Movement,” which BenLevi believes may cause leftist Israelis to be less dismissive of Jabotinsky’s strategy.
BenLevi said most of Israeli society supports the assertive realist position, but many of the people in Israel’s security branches, such as the IDF, Shabak, and some in the Mossad are in the defensive realist camp. He said developing a long-term strategy is “undermined by the instability of electoral politics.” If Israel had a more stable political system, “the views which have the support of the vast majority of the population would be able to be applied and implemented long-term in a much more effective way.”
