Sirwan Kajjo, a journalist and researcher specializing in Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, and Syrian affairs, spoke to an October 27 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
“Of course, like everything else in Syria and the rest of the Middle East, it’s easier said than done.”
In the months following the December 2024 collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, the post-Assad state was still in formation. When the group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham conquered Damascus, the Kurdish-led U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) controlled a third of Syrian territory, mainly in the northeast of the country. A complex eight-article agreement jointly drafted and signed by Syria’s interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and SDF’s general commander, Mazloum Abdi, stipulated that the northeast territory would be integrated into the new Syrian state. The SDF has been outside of government control for more than a decade, but now the U.S.-trained and equipped force is to be embedded within the new Syrian state’s defense system. This arrangement—designed to make amends for the Kurds’ historical grievances—is intended to allow the Kurdish community to have a say in what lies ahead. “Of course, like everything else in Syria and the rest of the Middle East, it’s easier said than done.”
Although milestones have been achieved under the agreement, clashes between the forces of the Syrian state and the Kurds have broken out on a number of occasions. As stipulated in the agreement, local Kurdish forces are to be embedded in two Kurdish-majority neighborhoods in the north–– a dynamic that existed prior to Assad’s defeat. However, tensions arose, and local Kurdish forces have clashed with the Damascus-backed general security forces, showing that “Damascus has no control over all of its forces.”
The Kurds maintain that the Damascus government “has not demonstrated any willingness” to exert its authority over all of Syria. The SDF argues that negotiations with Damascus are useless if the government is unable to resolve its problems with “all of its patchwork of former jihadist factions and Islamist, Turkish-backed groups” purportedly under its control. Many jihadi elements within the regime are anti-Israeli, with the expected outcome that Jerusalem will not be signing any deal “with a transitional government that has no authority over all its components.”
Damascus contends that the Kurds are making excuses to avoid executing the articles of the agreement so that they will not have to make military or political concessions. Given the tensions between Damascus and the Druze, as well as those between Damascus and the Alawites in the coastal region, the Kurds are hoping a new situation will unfold in Syria. The Druze distrust the Syrian government, after the “massacres and the atrocities” committed in Suwayda by government forces and others affiliated with Damascus. These actions reinforced the sentiment in the Druze community for full-fledged independence from Syria. For the time being, ongoing negotiations between the Kurds and Damascus have yielded little.
Damascus contends that the Kurds are making excuses to avoid executing the articles of the agreement so that they will not have to make military or political concessions.
In contrast to the Druze, the Kurds want to be included in the new Syria because their survival is tied to “regional and external factors.” Turkey, with its population of 20 million Kurds, is concerned about the prospect of a Kurdish nation, particularly as many communities within Syria are seeking political autonomy. In the post-October 7 reality of a weakened Iran and its Middle Eastern proxies, the Turks leveraged their membership in NATO to influence the U.S., the Gulf countries, and Damascus to pressure the Kurds to enter a deal with the Syrian government that would block any Kurdish impulse for independence.
Turkey also occupies Kurdish enclaves in northwest Syria. Historically, Turkey has used military force to thwart any moves towards Kurdish autonomy and independence. Given that Turkey is supplying weaponry and military equipment to al-Sharaa, the two have an agreement for Ankara to build new bases in northwest Syria and allowing “the Turkish military to carry out strikes” against the Kurds if negotiations between the Kurds and Damascus “don’t lead anywhere.”
The U.S. military still supports the Kurds, “but it can only continue as long as it doesn’t conflict with the U.S. interests with Turkey.” Ankara is more heavily involved with regional issues that could cause instability for the U.S. “if Turkey chooses to do that.” The Kurds are fully cognizant that “U.S. support for the Kurds is not sustainable” and that they risk facing attacks from a Turkish military “willing to violate international treaties.”
The U.S. government plays a mediating role in the ongoing negotiations between the Kurds and Damascus, with the hope that Syria will develop a unified military incorporating “a growing Kurdish involvement in military affairs in Damascus.” This is attributable to ISIS’s expanding presence in central Syria, as the U.S. believes a partnership between Damascus and the SDF will be more effective in countering “not only ISIS, but other extremist elements that might exploit the current security and political vacuum in Syria.” Despite the tensions between the two sides, the U.S. contends that the current Syrian military controlled by Damascus “does not have the political will and the military capabilities” to counter ISIS without the Kurds’ involvement.
An additional complication challenging the new Syrian government’s hoped-for alignment with the West is Russia’s return to Syria. In an effort to reinforce military and business agreements with the new Syrian government that had existed under Assad, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently hosted al-Sharaa in Moscow. Putin’s retention of the Russian airbase in Syria’s coastal Latakia province proves that the relationship not only survives, but that “Russia has never really left Syria.” Perhaps because of Syria’s reliance on Russian energy and oil, Damascus believes it can only function if Moscow supports Syria’s economic interests in “building and sustaining the military infrastructure” and its “key strategic sectors.”
A problem in siding with a Middle East strongman is that, unless the diverse Syrian communities are integrated peacefully, it “doesn’t necessarily lead to stability.”
Al-Sharaa “says that he has changed” from a jihadist into a “statesman” whose ideology is no longer aligned with radicalism and terrorism. Yet, to accrue power, it is in al-Sharaa’s interest to tone down his anti-American rhetoric and “jihadist ideology in general.” It is in America’s interest to engage in helping stabilize Syria and the greater region, “but I don’t think stability comes with aligning with a strongman in Syria.” Although the Bashar al-Assad’s father Hafez achieved stability by ruling Syria “with an iron fist,” it led to an expansion of Iranian support for Hezbollah and Iraqi-backed militias that destabilized the Middle East.
A problem in siding with a Middle East strongman is that, unless the diverse Syrian communities are integrated peacefully, it “doesn’t necessarily lead to stability.” Half of Syria’s 24 million people are “non-Sunni, non-Arab, and non-Muslim.” Other communities are comprised of 15 percent Kurds, 10 percent Christian, nine percent Alawite, and three percent Druze.
“For the U.S. and for U.S. partners in the region and elsewhere to have a stable Syria, they should focus more on bringing good governance for Syria and trying to make sure that the next system that will replace the Assad regime will be one that includes all components, all segments of Syrian society, because if the civil war in the past 13, 14 years showed us anything, it’s that you can’t sideline any group in the Syrian context without risking a new conflict, especially as more and more communities in Syria are aware of the dangers of the rise of Islamism and Islamist power in Damascus.”
