Eyal Zisser, the Yona and Dina Ettinger Chair of Contemporary Middle Eastern History at Tel Aviv University, spoke to an April 6 Middle East Forum podcast (video). The following summarizes his comments:
Although Lebanon was considered a friendly neighbor when Israel was established some 80 years ago, for nearly 60 years it has been a threat. From the mid-60’s until the late 80s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had established itself in Lebanon, launched attacks against Israel’s northern border communities. Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon was meant to deal with the threat.
Over the past 30 years, since the Iranian regime’s Ayatollah Khomeini established Hezbollah, Tehran has supported it with billions of dollars and supplied it with between 150,000 and 180,000 rockets.
The PLO was replaced by Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite organization whose main aim, according to its charter, is to “destroy Israel and to so-called ‘liberate’ Jerusalem.” Over the past 30 years, since the Iranian regime’s Ayatollah Khomeini established Hezbollah, Tehran has supported it with billions of dollars and supplied it with between 150,000 and 180,000 rockets. By deterring the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Hezbollah has served as a “defense shield for the Iranian regime.” Such was the case in the second Lebanon war in 2006, and again during Hamas’s October 7, 2023, invasion when Hezbollah planned to join in the onslaught as part of the “Iranian grand plan to destroy Israel.” Instead, Israel went to war with Hezbollah.
Israel learned lessons from the second Lebanon war by improving its operational and intelligence capabilities, bringing about a dramatic change by targeting, defeating, and eliminating Hezbollah’s rockets as well as its political and military command. Unfortunately, in its 2023 war with Hezbollah, Israel yielded to pressure from the Biden administration to stop the war and institute a ceasefire. The assumption was that Hezbollah’s setback was severe enough to enable the revival of the Lebanese state. President Aoun, the newly elected leader, and Nawaf Salam, who formed the new government, were both hostile to Hezbollah and committed to disarming the Iranian proxy.
By the end of 2024, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria had collapsed, and the new regime established by Sunni rebel Ahmed al-Sharaa was hostile to both Iran and Hezbollah. Under the influence of Turkey and the Gulf states, Syria’s new administration befriended the U.S. Changes in Syria, “an important link between Iran and Hezbollah,” looked promising, but the reality is that Lebanon “is not really a state. It’s a gathering of ethnic and religious communities, headed by notable families. There is no sense of nationality and commitment to the state, and everybody is after [their] own interests.”
Hezbollah shrewdly used the ceasefire, along with the weak Lebanese governance system, to rebuild itself. The organization exploited the “identity politics” of Shiites who threw their support behind Hezbollah because it is seen as the only power representing Shiite interests. Moreover, anyone who tried to challenge the status quo risked igniting a civil war. Relatives of the many Shiite soldiers in the Lebanese army were in Hezbollah’s ranks. The Lebanese government did nothing to disarm or dismantle Hezbollah. “What we saw was total paralysis of the Lebanese system.” Hezbollah recovered from its near defeat by Israel.
Anyone who tried to challenge the status quo risked igniting a civil war. Relatives of the many Shiite soldiers in the Lebanese army were in Hezbollah’s ranks.
Hezbollah is ideologically dedicated to the Shiite doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, which commits the organization to the Iranian regime’s clerical leader. As a result, in accordance with Iran’s instructions, Hezbollah has again dragged Lebanon into war with Israel in an effort to restore the organization’s status quo ante on October 6, 2023. Hezbollah’s current aim is to force a ceasefire on Israel through a war of attrition.
Israel, currently focused on Iran, has decided that this war with Hezbollah will be the last one. The Lebanese government, which includes the president, army, and state, has proven useless. Israel is creating a buffer zone between Hezbollah’s position and Israel’s northern border communities to prevent both rocket attacks and an October 7-type invasion.
Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 “was a terrible mistake.” Instead of a buffer zone inside Lebanon, the area effectively reverted to Hezbollah control, thereby giving it a victory. Will it be different this time, as Israel appears to be creating a new buffer zone?
“The problem with the previous buffer zone or security zone was that, first of all, Israeli forces were deployed in a territory where hundreds of thousands of Lebanese, many of them supported by Hezbollah, lived and there was a constant engagement between the Israeli forces and the residents and, of course, warriors of Hezbollah who used this situation, many of them established within the local villages in the security zone. Now the idea is that this buffer zone will be empty of any residents, so the possibility for Hezbollah to engage with the Israeli forces will be much more limited.
The other thing was that Hezbollah and Israel in 2000 or prior to 2000 focused mainly on the security zone, didn’t deal with Hezbollah more than to the Litani in Beirut, in Adachi and other areas. And now the idea is that Israel will not only focus on its deployment and presence in the buffer zone, but will continue to go after Hezbollah targets all over Lebanon. So the war will continue in other parts of Lebanon with no military forces or boots on the ground there, but there will be a continuation of the effort, airstrikes and so on and so forth. So it can be different.”
It is an illusion to expect any different because weakness is actually “the essence of Lebanon. This is the nature of the system.”
The Lebanese residents being forced to vacate the buffer zone are placing pressure on the Lebanese government, but the pressure is aimed at the cause—Hezbollah. While not a permanent solution to ending Hezbollah operations in parts of southern Lebanon, the buffer zone will ameliorate some of the more pressing threats on Israel’s northern border. Additionally, Israel will continue targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon via airstrikes.
There is a debate in Israel and the U.S. whether the Lebanese government and Hezbollah are different or one and the same. “I don’t make any difference.” Given that there are two Hezbollah ministers in the Lebanese government, it may be that Lebanese infrastructure provides Hezbollah with needed support. The Lebanese government’s strategy is to tell the Americans, Israelis, and Europeans that Hezbollah will be disarmed, but then it does nothing.
In 2006, Condoleezza Rice said to give the Lebanese government a chance. In 2024, the French and Americans said the same thing. The Lebanese did nothing. It is an illusion to expect any different because weakness is actually “the essence of Lebanon. This is the nature of the system.”
