Zelin and Margolin, both fellows at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (TWI), present a series of essays by contributors who participated in a January 2024 TWI workshop focused on jihadist governance. By “jihadist,” the editors mean armed groups that “embrace jihad as fundamental to their worldview and use the language of jihad when framing their fighting activity.” The contributions cover a variety of groups across a vast geographic area, from affiliates of al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State in West Africa to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iranian-backed Shi’a groups in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic State in the Philippines.

As the editors rightly stress, the contributions lead to a key insight: no single model of analysis applies to jihadist governance. Rather, it should be understood as spanning a spectrum. At one end are jihadist groups seeking to establish and build their own states, intending fully to replace the existing nation-state order. Thus, the Islamic State’s Caliphate project seeks to impose an Islamic system of governance that abolishes all nation-states, and, ultimately, rules the entire world. At the other end, jihadists operate within the existing Westphalian order. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed Shia groups in Iraq exemplify this approach. The Taliban occupy a middle ground: they overthrew the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, replaced it with their own Islamic Emirate, and, as Zelin shows, have focused heavily on securing diplomatic ties and trade agreements within the existing state order.

The essays provide a generally accessible overview of jihadist governance, though maps would help readers better understand where these groups operate. Specialists may find the essay on the Islamic State in the Philippines novel; others are more superficial—such as the comparative essays on the governance models of al-Qa‘ida in the Arab Peninsula and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, or on the economic models of the Islamic State and the Taliban.