President Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan aims to stabilize Gaza under a technocratic, Palestinian-run regime. However, historical experience in conflict zones such as Southern Lebanon suggests the plan could falter, potentially allowing Hamas to rebuild militarily and exploit reconstruction efforts. (Shutterstock/Asset ID: 268671731)
Introduction
On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led jihadi groups massacred men, women, and children. Islamist terrorists slaughtered 1,200 people. They sacked Israeli towns, military bases and kibbutzim, and butchered music festival attendees. Hamas and its allies took over 250 hostages, hoping to diminish Israel’s post-10/7 reprisal. After the 10/7 attacks, Israel warred against Hamas for over two years. The Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) campaign against the group has unleashed destruction across Gaza, with some 67,000 people (militants and civilians) killed. Over half of Gaza’s civilian infrastructure has been destroyed and almost two million are homeless.[1] Ninety percent of Gaza’s housing has been destroyed.[2] Israel’s Gaza invasion force weakened Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam battalions. Hamas military structure in Gaza is vastly depleted. Israel’s detractors condemn Netanyahu’s government for the territory’s “famine” and devastation. Throughout two years of warfare, Netanyahu critics demanded a ceasefire, an Israeli withdrawal, the return of the hostages, and a Palestinian-run, postwar regime. Hoping to advance peace, some Western countries announced their recognition of a Palestinian state.
Such pressures influenced Netanyahu’s acquiescence to the Trump administration’s Twenty-Point Plan, ratified on October 13, 2025, by the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey at the Sharm el-Sheikh Conference.[3] The Trump plan assumes leaving Gaza ungoverned after an Israeli overthrow of Hamas’s regime would prove catastrophic.[4]Consistent with past studies on Gaza’s postwar development, the administration believes that a “day after” plan in Gaza is needed to prevent Hamas’s resurgence.[5]
Avoiding anarchy’s destabilizing impact drives Trump’s Gaza state-rebuilding proposal. The Twenty-Point Plan foresees using international development funds to create a technocratic and apolitical Palestinian-run entity secured by an international peacekeeping force [6]—all under the aegis of a Board of Peace, chaired by President Trump with the participation of former British prime minister Tony Blair.
Among the proposal’s key features are: (1) the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners within 72 hours; (2) an apolitical Palestinian-run committee to manage Gaza’s civil governance; (3) a Board of Peace chaired by Donald Trump to guide the Strip’s future political and economic development; (4) an International Security Force (ISF) charged with the disarming of Hamas, the liquidation of its tunnel infrastructure, and responsibility for the training of Palestinian police; (5) more aid deliveries facilitated by the opening of the Strip’s Rafah crossing at the Egyptian border; and (6) a condition-bound Israeli military withdrawal to a narrow security perimeter within the Strip.[7]
The plan envisions an untimed transfer of governmental authority to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) and a possible pathway to a deradicalized, independent Palestinian state. Having renounced Israeli annexation of Gaza, the Netanyahu government has pledged to cooperate with the new Palestinian-run regime, assist international peacekeeping forces, and facilitate the flow of commercial assistance into the Gaza Strip. Israeli military disengagement is conditioned upon Hamas abiding by the plan’s terms. Should Hamas refuse to cooperate with the newly created security and civil authorities, commercial assistance would flow to IDF-controlled points in Gaza. To assist the development of the new ISF, the U.S. military has set up in southern Israel a civil–military command structure to facilitate security assistance.
The plan adheres to past proposals offered by the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Egypt, and the Biden administration.[8] Given its ambitions, the plan faces a myriad of difficulties and possibly fatal obstacles. Beyond the initial success of the hostage-release and prisoner-exchange provisions, continued fighting during the ceasefire suggests Hamas’s non-compliance with the scheme’s disarmament provisions.
The Twenty-Point Plan resembles failed nation-building projects undertaken by the United States and France after they overthrew jihadist proto-states in Afghanistan and Mali. Rapid U.S. and French military victories against jihadi emirates were followed by protracted guerrilla insurgencies. After twenty years of failed nation building, the United States witnessed the collapse of its Afghan ally when the Taliban seized power on the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The French disastrously followed suit in Mali, when in 2021 the country’s military government expelled them.
Despite having 4,000 elite troops in Mali during Operation Barkhane, the French proved incapable of weakening al-Qaeda and Islamic State-linked jihadi insurgents operating across the Sahel.[9] Efforts to implant an indigenous democratic regime in Mali were frustrated by tribal rivalries and military coups. Since the French military withdrawal in 2022, Bamako’s military regime has relied on the Russian mercenary Wagner Africa Corps, which similarly has been unable to defeat jihadi insurgents
U.S. and French efforts to develop capable indigenous security forces and a local transparent democratic political class in Afghanistan and Mali were bedeviled by corruption, poor military morale, weak domestic leadership, and sectarian tribal and ethnic divisions. Flush with U.S. and French military and economic assistance, local political elites failed to win public support, and security forces withered before jihadi insurgents.
Postwar stabilization projects in Afghanistan and Mali played to insurgent strengths. Jihadists upended national reconstruction plans and compromised security. Islamic insurgents attacked occupation forces and diverted development assistance to finance their terrorist violence. Aligned with the Taliban, the Haqqani network amassed a huge fortune based on extortion payments by international contractors and aid agencies working in Afghanistan.[10]
Despite significant numerical advantages in troops and superior military hardware, Afghan security forces collapsed after four months of fighting between May and August 2021.[11] Absent U.S. contractor support, the Afghan air force could not operate, and the army could not resupply its forces.[12] After the Taliban defeated the U.S.-equipped and trained Afghan army, al-Qaeda (who the United States had originally entered Afghanistan to expel) hailed the Taliban’s victory over “humiliated” infidel forces.[13]
International efforts to boost state capacity in postwar zones have historically emboldened Islamist insurgents. In this regard, some analysts worry that Gaza will become Israel’s new South Lebanon.
International efforts to boost state capacity in postwar zones have historically emboldened Islamist insurgents. In this regard, some analysts worry that Gaza will become Israel’s new South Lebanon.[14] After its 2006 war and ceasefire with Hezbollah, Israel was assured by the international community that South Lebanon would be demilitarized by interim U.N. peacekeepers. Instead, those troops ignored Hezbollah’s remilitarization. Assisted by Iran and North Korea, Hezbollah expanded its tunnel and missile infrastructure.[15]
The U.N. acquiescence to Hezbollah’s strengthening of its capacities resulted in renewed war between the Lebanese terrorist network and Israel after the Hamas 10/7 attack. Israel later routed Hezbollah in a devastating 2024 military campaign. Under the terms of a September 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, the Lebanese government has struggled to disarm Hezbollah. Prospects for the Lebanese army disarming the Shiite Islamist militia look poor.[16]
The Twenty-Point Plan’s implementation would likely undermine Israel’s long-term security and lead to renewed fighting between the IDF and Hamas. But paradoxically, the plan’s very failure may allow Israel to pursue a more efficacious divide-and-conquer strategy.
Based on past experiences, Trump’s plan will probably assist Hamas’s future military resurgence. My argument proceeds on two levels. First, I argue that after 2005, Gazan stability contributed to Hamas’s jihadi state, leading to its catastrophic 10/7 attack. Second, I critique Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan in Gaza, based on Israel’s past Gaza and South Lebanon experiences with U.N. assistance.
Gazan Stability and 10/7
In 1993, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreed to a comprehensive two-state formula. The Oslo Accords envisioned a framework for democratic Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that would transition to a sovereign Palestinian state. The agreement signaled the PLO’s transformation into an interim governing body known as the PA.
Oslo’s framework assumed that PA chairman Yasser Arafat was sincere in securing a peaceful resolution of the Palestine issue. Arafat’s subsequent behavior demonstrated support for continued violence against the Jewish state.[17] Over a thousand Israelis died due to Palestinian terrorism in the turbulent period following Oslo’s implementation.
The PA’s rejection of the 2000 Clinton–Barak two-state proposal led to renewed violence in the Palestinian-occupied territories. Despite failed negotiations, Israel conducted a withdrawal from Gaza five years later. Israel assumed that the PA would dominate Gazan political development.
Consolidating PA control over Gaza proved challenging. Israel permitted the U.N. and Qatari aid to flow into the Strip. Securing the area’s economic viability, Israel had expected a PA victory in the territory’s local elections. Though Hamas rejected the Oslo Agreement, it participated in Gazan elections. Hamas’s unexpected 2006 election victory, and its seizure of power a year later in Gaza raised concerns that the Oslo Accords had collapsed.
With Hamas as the sole governing force in Gaza from 2007, international actors continued to aid the territory’s political and economic development. Israel hoped that governance responsibilities would convince Hamas to soften its commitment to Palestine’s violent “liberation.”[18] U.N. development assistance, Qatari financial support and Israel’s guest workers program for Gaza during Hamas’s sixteen-year rule were seen as stabilizing anchors leading to Hamas’s moderation. Though Israel fought four short wars with Hamas between 2009 and 2021, Jerusalem viewed these conflicts as containable. The IDF saw its periodic incursions into Gaza as “mowing the grass”—deterring Hamas’s military adventurism.[19]
Containing Hamas proved impossible. Jerusalem’s facilitation of Qatari aid instead assisted the group’s military capability. The damage Israel was able to inflict against Hamas in its “mowing the grass” campaign was insufficient to prevent the group’s creation of a vast underground tunnel system that it used to smuggle Iranian, Chinese, North Korean, and Russian weapons into the territory. Known as the Gaza metro, Hamas’s intricate tunnel network is estimated to extend 500–700 kilometers and may have cost over $1 billion to construct. It features some 500 shafts linking command centers, field hospitals, and weapons depots.[20] Hamas used its subterranean network to shield its forces from Israeli military retaliations and to mount offensive military operations against the Jewish state.[21] After its 10/7 attacks, Hamas utilized its tunnel system to imprison hundreds of Israeli hostages. Hamas post-10/7 strategy was designed to force Israeli forces to enter the tunnels in an extended costly asymmetric conflict.[22]
Hamas’s financial and military capability was amplified by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and Qatari and Iranian support for Hamas’s regime. [23] UNRWA schools and hospitals served Hamas as command centers, arms depots, and storage facilities.[24] Billions of dollars spent by UNRWA and Qatar assisted Hamas’s offensive capabilities and weapons smuggling. Corrupt Egyptian border authorities facilitated underground smuggling of Iranian- supplied arms into Gaza’s Philadelphi Corridor. Clandestine smuggling enabled Hamas’s creation of massive amounts of weapons and ammunition. By the end of its rule, Hamas had created a formidable jihadist army of 40,000 soldiers organized into thirty battalions and five brigades. [25]
Starting in 2007, Hamas amassed significant stockpiles of rockets, missiles, and small arms. With Iranian and Hezbollah assistance, it created an artisanal armaments industry. Instead of governing Gaza and improving the territory’s economic fortunes, Hamas planned for war.[26] By 2023, its jihadist army had the capacity to inflict terrible damage upon the Jewish state. Hamas’s determination to attack Israel was furthered by its Judeophobic, genocidal ideology expressed in its 1988 founding charter.[27] Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar even shared information about the 10/7 attacks with Hezbollah and Iran a year before its assault. [28] Sinwar hoped that they would join Hamas’s attack in a coordinated multi-sided war against the Jewish state.[29] Though Hezbollah and Iran reacted positively to Sinwar’s proposal, they argued that the timing was not propitious. Israel underestimated Hamas’s will and capacity to launch a catastrophic attack on its soil. Intelligence failures to thwart the 10/7 attacks were sweeping.[30] The IDF’s focus on the northern front and the West Bank lowered its Gaza military readiness.
With Israeli forces dispatched elsewhere, Jerusalem’s Gaza border communities were lightly defended. By October 7, 2023, Hamas and its allies readied its forces. Their attacks were devastating. The Hamas-led 10/7 al-Aqsa Flood-coordinated offensive operations with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other smaller organizations. Timed during an Israeli religious holiday, thousands of Palestinian militants breached Israel’s Gaza security fence in nineteen places and stormed across the frontier in jeeps, paragliders, cars, and trucks laden with heavily armed militants.
Prior to its invasion, Hamas overwhelmed Israeli air defenses with massive rocket barrages. Its forces disabled border communication towers and remotely controlled machine-gun installations. Having overrun Israel’s southern defense perimeter, 3,000 Palestinian fighters sacked dozens of Israeli towns, kibbutzim, police stations, and army bases. Israel’s early military response to the assault was poorly coordinated. Police and army units often acted on their own initiative, and repelling Palestinian invaders took days. The devastation wrought by Hamas’s offensive had severe repercussions in Israel. It accelerated Israeli political polarization.
Despite these divisions, Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza crippled Hamas. Over two years of attritional warfare have killed more than 20,000 Hamas militants, eliminated eighty percent of its senior military leadership, and degraded three-quarters of its armed brigades.[31] The IDF has decimated Hamas’s mid-level brigade and battalion commanders, and its military wing is combat-inoperable.[32] Senior Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Sinwar, Ismail Haniyah, Marwan Issa, Saleh al-Arouri, and Mohammed Deif were killed in Israeli military operations. Hamas’s critical tunnel infrastructure, munition factories, and arms depots have been degraded.
In May 2024, the IDF seized the Philadelphi Corridor that served as a critical Gazan-Egyptian hub to resupply Hamas with Iranian-supplied arms and material support.[33] By August 2024, Israel disabled 150 Hamas underground tunnels that ran between Israel’s Rafah border crossing and the Egyptian border. Israel’s 2025 military campaign hoped to unravel Hamas’s remaining military capacity in Gaza City.[34] The IDF’s offensive during this period was increasingly criticized by the international community. By late 2025, many European countries had recognized in principle a Palestinian state, and Israel was facing growing diplomatic isolation.
The second Trump administration was moreover eager to attain a quick diplomatic victory. Analysts seem convinced that U.S. President Donald Trump used Israel’s controversial strike in September 2025 against Hamas officials in Qatar to pressure Netanyahu’s government into accepting a peace deal prior to completing the destruction of Hamas.[35]
The Twenty-Point Plan for a Peaceful, Prosperous, and Deradicalized Gaza
Throughout the Gaza war, commentators warned that an ungoverned Gaza would jeopardize Israeli and Palestinian security.[36] The call for a “day after” plan increased appreciably after the IDF killing of 10/7 architect Yahya Sinwar, suggesting Israel pursue an off-ramp to the Gaza war.[37] The controversies bred over Jerusalem’s Gaza war policy, coupled with Israel’s growing diplomatic isolation, forced the Trump and Netanyahu administrations to create the foundations for a day-after vision. The Netanyahu government’s acceptance of Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan ended its planned conquest of Gaza City.
Map of President Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan for Gaza: the map illustrates Trump’s three-stage plan, with color-coded areas showing phased Israeli withdrawals, security arrangements, and buffer zones on both the Israeli and Gaza sides. (Wikimedia Commons; OpenStreetMap data, and White House-released plan)
Hoping to forestall instability, Trump’s postwar governance proposal envisions a technocratic Palestinian-run regime secured by multinational Arab and Muslim peacekeeping forces.[38] Chaired by the U.S. president, the Board of Peace would guide the territory’s future political and economic development. The Twenty-Point Plan foresees deradicalizing Gaza by dismembering Hamas military and tunnel infrastructures. Those Hamas members who renounce violence would be amnestied and offered safe passage out of Gaza. Like past Egyptian and U.A.E. day after proposals, Trump’s strategy sees a reformed PA eventually ruling over the Strip.[39]
Though the timeframe of the plan’s execution is unspecified, once the foundation of Palestinian governance is implanted, a local police force formed, and security maintained by multinational Arab and Muslim peacekeepers, apolitical elites would transfer authority to the reformed PA. Eventual PA control over Gaza, advocates argue, advances the Oslo framework for a sovereign Palestinian state. Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan echoes the Arab League’s proposed Hamas disarmament initiative to secure a ceasefire and facilitate PA governance over the Strip.[40] Having governed the West Bank, the PA is viewed as a logical, if imperfect, candidate to rule over Gaza.
The PA’s rule in the West Bank is not inspiring, and extending its administration over Gaza could prove dysfunctional.[41] PA President Mahmoud Abbas suspended West Bank elections in 2009, eliminated the Legislative Council, and undermined judicial independence. His regime is viewed by Palestinians as corrupt, incompetent, and despotic.[42] Thirty years of Western development and security assistance to the PA have resulted in poverty and insecurity. The West Bank is a cauldron of political and terrorist violence. Since 10/7, Israel has conducted hundreds of raids against Hamas and PIJ terror cells. Violence between West Bank Israeli settlers and Palestinian communities occurs daily.
Despite the PA’s poor record, Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan envisions an internationally supported, democratic, Palestinian-run Gaza.[43] At present, there is no Palestinian political force capable of performing this task. The absence of a credible Palestinian partner to manage Gaza furthermore requires the creation of a local political elite tied to international forces. Such an entity would invariably be undermined by insurgents.
From Iraq to Afghanistan to Mali, Western and international actors failed to create a legitimate political class capable of ruling over Muslim societies. Instead of weakening jihadist movements, past international development measures strengthened them, leading to protracted civil war and jihadist military resurgence. Western and Israeli efforts to manage postwar Gazan political and economic redevelopment will likely yield similarly dismal results.
U.S. military and technological support created huge paper armies in Iraq and Afghanistan, plagued by ghost soldiers who collected salaries but failed to perform basic duties.[44] Throughout the post– 9/11 war on terror, the United States failed to nurture a professional Iraqi and Afghan officer corps capable of commanding their troops who, plagued by poor morale and inferior pay, capitulated to numerically inferior but determined insurgents.[45]
There is no precedent suggesting that the United States or any international authority can succeed in creating a viable Palestinian political authority in Gaza or a security force capable of defending it.[46] The U.S. experience in securing Afghanistan after the Taliban’s removal failed. The U.S.’ efforts after the 2003 Iraq war empowered a Sunni insurgency, dominated by an al-Qaeda affiliate that eventually morphed into the Islamic State, which seized control of Northwest Iraq. Though the United States succeeded in defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and its IS successor, Iraq remains a failed, dysfunctional state dominated by pro-Iran Islamist militias and their associated political parties.
France’s comparable effort to rebuild Mali after its forces defeated the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) jihadi state also fared badly. Invariably, Western-led reconstruction efforts were undone by cultural, ethnic, tribal, and religious resistance. This is particularly true of Muslim societies that have proven hostile to Western political reconstruction schemes. Here, religious resistance to foreign encroachment is a galvanizing force for jihadists. Local elites tied to Western interests are seen as a toxic presence that needs to be erased.
Hamas’s historic development reflects sectarian hostility toward a non-Muslim presence in former Islamic territories. Created in 1988, Hamas ideology explicitly states its desire to liberate Islamic holy lands from Jewish infidels. Hamas’s foundational document sees Jerusalem as part of the global ummah (Muslim community), which needs to be liberated. [47] Sinwar’s big project, the 10/7 attack plan, contemplated a regional-wide religious war against Israel joined by Iran and Hezbollah.
Hamas sees warfare to regain Jerusalem (al-Quds) as theologically willed. The 10/7 attacks reflect a religious conviction to defend the al-Aqsa Mosque from supposed Jewish predation. The assault’s barbarity matched theological ends with means. Writing after the 10/7 attacks, analyst Bruce Hoffman argued that Hamas’s al-Aqsa Flood operation illustrates the continued relevance of its 1988 charter that openly calls for the destruction of Israel and the killing of Jews. [48]
Any internationally supported local rule established in Gaza would be viewed as a heretical affront. In its fourteen years of governance over Gaza, Hamas indoctrinated the population’s youth to embrace martyrdom and jihad. Trump’s plan for stabilizing Gaza plays into Hamas’s hands and fits well into a jihadist war strategy of making occupation forces “pay a price.”[49] Hamas would likely divert development assistance to support its insurgency.[50] The organization’s remaining forces would seek to disrupt any international effort to create a local political class beholden to U.N. or Israeli interests.
Hamas will seek to emulate the success jihadi groups have had in disrupting reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though often considered a nationalist insurgent group in western discussions, Hamas is, in fact, an Islamist movement with ties to the global jihadist movement.[51] This includes how Hamas uses its military forces.
Hamas war doctrine reflects the jihadi playbook advanced by al-Qaeda’s Abu Musab al-Suri. His Call to Global Islamic Resistance advocates guerrilla assaults, mass attacks, and decentralized individual jihad.[52] Hamas’s asymmetric and conventional military operations are identical to those advocated in al-Suri’s playbook. Money from government contractors would be extorted, and any new governing authority co-opted. Those who refuse to cooperate will find themselves, their friends, and their family members killed or kidnapped. Iraq, Somalia, Mali, and Afghanistan are troubling reminders that foreign occupation and reconstruction in Muslim societies have failed. Initial military victory over insurgents led to frustrating efforts to rebuild the country, as insurgents extorted contractors and weakened security forces.
Hamas would likely degrade any occupational force via long-term attritional warfare. International development agencies and local political and economic allies, moreover, could be coerced by insurgents. This is not speculation. Past international assistance to Palestinian communities has financed Hamas’s military capability. UNRWA exemplifies how humanitarian assistance is diverted into terrorist financing.[53] Over a billion dollars in UNRWA funds were appropriated by Hamas money changers in Gaza who diverted profits from currency transactions into the group’s financial coffers.
Hamas use of UNRWA funds and facilities has led to legal action against the agency’s leaders. Reports that a dozen UNRWA employees were involved in the 10/7 assault and that thousands of its personnel are Hamas members have resulted in some governments suspending funding for the agency. UNRWA educational materials promote Hamas ideology of jihad and a culture of martyrdom while demonizing Jews.[54]
Throughout the Gaza war, Hamas used UNRWA schools, grain storage facilities, and hospitals to mount insurgent actions against Israeli forces. Hamas tunnels run underneath and connect to UNRWA buildings. UNRWA aid convoys have been commandeered by Hamas and aid resold in markets to replenish the terror organization’s finances.[55] Hamas penetration of UNRWA led Israel to pass legislation in October 2024 restricting its ties to the international agency.[56]
The U.N.’s enablement of insurgent groups is not limited to Israel’s occupied territories. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was powerless to prevent Hezbollah’s armed reoccupation of the country’s south.[57] Deployed after the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war to police a demilitarized zone, UNIFIL’s mission failed.
Since the 2006 war, Hezbollah expanded its missile, rocket, and drone force in South Lebanon. Hoping to avoid Hezbollah attacks against its troops, multinational forces failed to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for an arms-free zone in South Lebanon. Skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli forces across the border increased daily after Hamas’s 10/7 attack. Hezbollah rocket and missile fire coerced Jerusalem to relocate 60,000 residents living in northern communities. The subsequent war between Israel and Hezbollah is emblematic of UNIFIL’s failed mission in Lebanon.
Starting in September 2024, Israel intensified its military campaign against Hezbollah. Israeli intelligence activated explosively charged pagers and radio devices it had clandestinely sold to the group, killing dozens and wounding thousands of the Party of God’s members.[58] Having destroyed its communication network, Israeli air strikes targeted Hezbollah’s senior leadership, killing the organization’s legendary leader Hassan Nasrallah. The Institute for the Study of War’s assessment of the IDF’s anti-Hezbollah campaign reports that Israel eviscerated Hezbollah’s Islamic Jihad council leaders, killing dozens of Hezbollah senior and field commanders.[59]
Subsequent IDF bombing raids degraded Hezbollah’s missile and rocket delivery systems. Israel’s air campaign may have destroyed up to fifty percent of Hezbollah’s rocket and missile infrastructure.[60] With Hezbollah in disarray, Israel invaded South Lebanon to destroy its military and tunnel infrastructure. Faced with unprecedented damage, Hezbollah was forced to accept a new ceasefire with Israel. The IDF military campaign against Hezbollah is a consequence of the failed U.N. mission in Lebanon. Based on the UNRWA/UNIFIL experiences, international peacekeeping and development would lead to Hamas remilitarization and renewed war.
Hamas hopes to exploit future reconstruction funds and has signaled its support for a new Palestinian regime in Gaza. [61] The group has assented to Trump’s plan without formally committing to disarmament. Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan provides Hamas with exploitable opportunities. It removes Hamas from governance while allowing it to coerce and coopt any new regime.[62] This explains Hamas’s outreach to its PA rival to forge a national unity front in Gaza. Hamas naturally aspires to rule as the power behind the throne.[63]
With its military wing intact, Hamas could extort international development money to enhance its future armed capability. Given the immense destruction in the territory, Hamas stands to benefit from massive reconstruction funds. Like the Taliban, Hamas can coerce protection money from government contractors and international aid agencies. Driven by its Islamist ideology, Hamas would aim to re-seize Gaza. This would replicate the group’s 2007 consolidation of power when it drove PA forces from Gaza. Copying Hezbollah, Hamas could use U.N. or Arab League peacekeepers as international cover to rejuvenate its military forces and plan future wars against Israel.
Conclusion
The deficiencies of Trump’s Twenty-Point Plan are obvious. There are already signs of impending failure. Though Phase 1 hostage-release and prisoner-exchange provisions succeeded, the plan’s partial IDF disengagement has led to renewed fighting between rival Palestinian factions. Hamas aspires to establish its military presence over areas where the IDF has withdrawn. Currently, Israel controls 53 percent of Gazan territory behind the Yellow Line and has skirmished with Hamas. Since the October 2025 ceasefire, several Israeli troops and hundreds of Palestinians have died in the fighting in over sixty-four violent confrontations between the IDF and jihadi insurgents.[64]
Hamas is unwilling to disarm. Calls for an international peacekeeping force grow daily, and their introduction, as this analysis demonstrates, is likely to lead to Hamas’s future military regeneration. The Trump–Netanyahu December 29, 2025 meeting at Mar-a-Lago failed to advance the peace process beyond the initial ceasefire period. Talk of discussing the force’s formation and implementation has been delayed.
Israeli security planners fear that Gaza will become a renewed terror sanctuary as international peacekeeping forces provide cover for Hamas’s remilitarization. . . . If current trends continue, a weakened Hamas will consolidate its rule.
Israeli security planners fear that Gaza will become a renewed terror sanctuary as international peacekeeping forces provide cover for Hamas’s remilitarization. We may never get to this point. If current trends continue, a weakened Hamas will consolidate its rule. The group’s conflicts with Gazan criminal gangs have led to bloody fighting, killing dozens. At present, prospective participants—Egypt, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Indonesia—in an international force have shown reluctance to participate. Establishing such a force is an innately precarious venture, and the future horizon for the force’s successful insertion is not propitious.[65]
Phase 2’s possible collapse may allow Israel to exit the deal and pursue an alternative policy. Here the legacy of Israel’s post-10/7 wars against Iran’s Axis of Resistance offers a propitious external environment to weaken Hamas. With the release of the hostages, the Netanyahu government has latitude to use Hamas recalcitrance to sideline the Trump plan and devise an alternative strategy.
The IDF’s weakening of Hezbollah and Iran and the overthrow of the Assad regime degrade Hamas’s outside lines of support. Throughout the 2023–2025 Swords of Iron War, Israeli forces in Gaza have attacked, retreated, and reengaged Hamas terrorists when the Islamists have sought to restore their authority in evacuated zones. Israel’s mobile attack, withdrawal, and reattack strategy denies Hamas the ability to strike at stationary targets. The failure to implement Trump’s plan paradoxically enhances Israel’s capacity to influence future security developments in Gaza. Securing this end state requires some limited IDF forces occupying border areas and retaining control over the Netzarim Corridor, which bifurcates the Strip.
Israel could create a semi-governance zone in Gaza, where the IDF assists local actors to fight insurgent forces.[66] The IDF could expand its support for anti-Hamas Rafah and Gaza City-based tribal clans and criminal gangs to distribute aid.[67] Such a strategy limits the human and material costs of occupation while bolstering indigenous force capabilities dependent upon Israeli military and financial support. Here, the successful record of the United States in working with Kurdish militias in Syria and the Anbar Awakening Movement in Iraq to beat back jihadi insurgents offer a meaningful precedent that Israel could emulate.[68]
Working through proxies is an imperfect strategy. These disadvantages, however, pale in comparison to the dangers of Hamas regeneration that the international postwar Gaza redevelopment scheme portends. Exploiting the security vacuum created by the plan’s likely failure may be Israel’s most efficacious strategy to pursue.
Anthony Celso is a professor in the Department of Security Studies and Criminal Justice at Angelo State University in San Angelo, Texas. He is the author of Al Qaeda’s Post-9/11 Devolution (Bloomsbury, 2014), The Islamic State: A Comparative History of Jihadist Warfare (Lexington Books, 2018), and co-author with Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. of Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership between Iran and North Korea (University of Kentucky Press, 2025). He can be contacted at anthony.celso@angelo.edu
Endnotes
1Robert A. Pape, “The Unparalleled Devastation of Gaza: Why Punishing Civilians Has Not Yielded Strategic Success,” Foreign Affairs (August 7, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/gaza/israel-unparalleled-devastation-robert-pape/.
2 Pape, “Unparalleled Devastation of Gaza.”
3 The White House (@WhiteHouse), “President Donald J. Trump’s Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict,” Twitter (now X), September 29, 2025, https://x.com/WhiteHouse/status/1972736025597219278
4 Dana Stroul, “The Dangers of an Ungoverned Gaza,” Foreign Affairs (May 20, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/dangers-ungovernable-gaza; Raphael Cohen, “Is Israel Losing Sight of Its Long Game?: Why Dismantling Hamas Requires More Aid to Gaza,” Foreign Affairs (February 16, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israel-losing-sight-its-long-game; Daniel Byman, “Can Anyone Govern Gaza? The Perilous Path to the Day After,” Foreign Affairs (July 30, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/palestinian-territories/can-anyone-govern-gaza/.
5 Jonathan Rynhold and Toby Greene, “Urgent: An Israeli Strategy for a Post-Hamas Gaza,” Perspectives Paper No. 2,225 (Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), Bar-Ilan University, Israel, October 25, 2023), https://besacenter.org/urgent-an-israeli-strategy-for-a-post-hamas-gaza; Eran Ortal, “A Sustainable Strategy: Principles for Updating Israel’s Strategic and Security Concept,” Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 205 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, July 2024), https://besacenter.org/a-sustainable-strategy-principles-for-updating-israels-strategy-and-security-concept/; James Jeffrey, “How ‘Day After’ Governance Can Draw from Existing Plans,” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., August 12, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-day-after-governance-gaza-can-draw-existing-plans/.
6 Trump, “Comprehensive Plan for Peace.”
7 Trump, “Comprehensive Plan for Peace.”
8 Ghaith Al-Omari, “Washington Needs to Intervene in Choosing Gaza’s ‘Technocratic Apolitical Governing Committee,’” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., October 30, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/washington-needs-intervene-choosing-gazas-technocratic-apolitical-governing/.
9 Abdelkader Boukhars, “Mali’s Challenges Post-French Intervention,” Combating Terrorism at Westpoint (CTC) Sentinel 6, no. 5 (2013): 9–12, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/malis-challenges-post-french-intervention ; and Benjamin Whitehouse, “The Malian Government’s Challenge to Restore Order in the North,” CTC Sentinel 7, no. 2 (2014): 12–13, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-malian-governments-challenge-to-restore-order-in-the-north/.
10 Devin Lurie, “The Haqqani Network: The Shadow Group Supporting the Taliban’s Operations,” Perspective (American Security Project, Washington, D.C., September 2020), https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Ref-0241-The-Haqqani-Network.pdf/.
11 Jonathan Schroden, “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan Security Forces,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (2021): 45–53, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-security-forces/.
12 Schroden, “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan Security Forces,” 53–57.
13 Ahmed Mir, “Twenty Years After 9/11 (A Special Issue of CTC Sentinel): The Terror Threat from Afghanistan Post the Taliban Takeover,” CTC Sentinel 12, no. 7 (2021): 29–43, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/CTC-SENTINEL-072021.pdf/.
14 Matthew Levitt, “Hamas Is Not Done Fighting,” Foreign Affairs (October 14, 2025), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/palestinian-territories/hamas-not-done-fighting/.
15 Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. and Anthony N. Celso, Rogue Allies: The Strategic Partnership Between Iran and North Korea (University Press of Kentucky, 2025).
16 “Israel Eliminates Hezbollah Officer Rebuilding Terror Infrastructure in South Lebanon,” (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C., October 31, 2025), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/10/31/israel-eliminates-hezbollah-officer-rebuilding-terror-infrastructure-in-southern-lebanon/.
17 Efraim Karsh, “From Oslo to Be’eri: How the 30-Years-Long Peace Delusion Led to Hamas’s 10/7 Massacres,” Israeli Affairs 30, no. 5 (2024), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537121.2024.2399882/.
18 Mark Klein, “Hamas in Power,” Middle East Journal 61, no. 3 (2007): 442–459, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4330419/.
19 Eli Shamir, “The End of Mowing the Grass: If Israel Wants to Continue to Exist, It Must Uproot Hamas from Gaza,” Perspectives Paper No. 2,223 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, October 22, 2023), https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2223-Shamir-The-End-of-Mowing-the-Grass.pdf; J. E. Jeffrey, “Invading Gaza Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs (October 28, 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/levant/invading-gaza-least-bad-option-israel/.
20 Kenneth R. Olsen, Pam Olson, and Elaine Wagner, “Israel Border Security Threats: Soil Tunnels,” Journal of Soil Science 15, no. 6 (2025): 361–381, https://www.scirp.org/pdf/ojss_1661024.pdf/.
21 Eado Hecht, “Hamas Underground Warfare,” Perspectives Paper No. 259 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, July 27, 2014), https://www.besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Hecht-Eado-Underground-Warfare-DW-edit-most-recent.pdf/.
22 M. Abuamer, “Gaza’s Subterranean Warfare: Palestinian Resistance Tunnels vs. Israeli Military Strategy,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (May 5, 2024):1–26, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2024.2347843/.
23 Matthew Levitt, “How Hamas Built an Army,” Policy Analysis (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C.,January 2, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/18557/en; and Amos Yadlin and Uzi Evental, “The War in Gaza: Why Israel Slept and the Search for Security,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/why-israel-slept-yadlin-evental/.
24 Jared Nagel, “The UNRWA Are Ensuring the ‘Day After’ Includes More Wars,” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., January 6, 2024), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/01/06/the-unrwa-are-ensuring-the-day-after-includes-more-wars-opinion/; and David May, “Now the UN Admits Employee Involvement in October 7, It’s Time to End UNRWA,” (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C., August 8, 2024), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/08/08/now-that-un-admits-employee-involvement-in-oct-7-its-time-to-end-unrwa/.
25 Bret Carter and Daniel Mealie, “The Order of Battle of Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassem Brigades,” (American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats Project, in Collaboration with the Institute for the Study of War, December 8, 2023), 5–9, https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/Hamas-ORBAT_12.8.23-PDF-2.pdf/.
26 Matthew Levitt, “For All That Has Changed, Hamas Is Still Hamas,” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., January 22, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/all-changed-hamas-still-hamas; Devorah Margolin and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Retreat from Legitimacy: Hamas Engagement and Disengagement from Governance,” Jihadist Governance and Statecraft: Policy Focus Analysis No. 180 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., August 6, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/jihadist-governance-and-statecraft/.
27 Anthony Celso, “Hamas Unholy Jihad,” Israel Affairs 30, no. 5 (2024): 844–862, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537121.2024.2394286?src=exp-la/.
28 Ronen Bergman, Adam Rasgon, and Patrick Kingsley, “Secret Documents Show That Hamas Tried to Persuade Iran to Join Its October 7 Attack,” New York Times, October 12, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/12/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-war.html/.
29 Bergman, Rasgon, and Kingsley, “Secret Documents Show That Hamas Tried to Persuade Iran.”
30 Ortal, “A Sustainable Strategy”; Karsh, “From Oslo to Be’eri”; Mati Azzetti and R. Bergman, “Buying Quiet: Inside the Israel Plan That Propped Up Hamas, New York Times, December 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/10/world/middleeast/israel-qatar-money-prop-up-hamas.html/.
31 Shamir, “The End of Mowing the Grass”; Shimon Bartal, “After the War: Israeli Military Governance Might Be Temporarily Required in Gaza,” Perspectives Paper No. 2,230 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, November 12, 2023), https://besacenter.org/after-the-war-israeli-military-governance-might-be-temporarily-required-in-gaza/.
32 Itamar Levy, “Hamas Is Weakened, But a Prolonged Guerrilla Conflict Looms,” PolicyWatch 3,929 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., September 12, 2024), 1–2, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-weakened-prolonged-guerrilla-conflict-looms/.
33 Elliott Abrams, “How Israel Can Win in Gaza—and the Key to the Goal Is Going After Hamas in Rafah,” Foreign Affairs (April 17, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/how-israel-can-win-gaza-and-deter-iran; and D. R. Barak, “Israel Must Destroy Hamas Tunnels,” Foreign Affairs (November 9, 2023), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/israel-must-destroy-hamas-tunnels/.
34 Meir Finkel, “Battlefield Decision in the Iron Swords Campaign: Renewing the Discussion,” Middle East Security and Policy Studies No. 211 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, July 2025), 1–21, https://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/211ENGweb.pdf/.
35 Dana Stroul, “The Real Trump Factor in the Gaza Deal,” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., October 17, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/real-trump-factor-gaza-deal/.
36 Stroul, “The Dangers of an Ungoverned Gaza”; Cohen, “Is Israel Losing Sight of the Long Game?”; and Byman, “Can Anyone Govern Gaza?”
37 Audrey Kurth-Cronin, “Sinwar Is Dead, but Hamas Will Survive: His Death, However, Could Create an Opening for Peace,” Foreign Affairs (October 19, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/yahya-sinwar-dead-hamas-will-survive-audrey-kurth-cronin; David Makovsky, “How Blinken Can Seize Opportunity to Capitalize After the Deaths of Sinwar and Nasrallah,” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., October 22, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-blinken-can-seize-opportunity-after-deaths-sinwar-and-nasrallah/.
38 Keith Dayton, James F. Jeffrey, Eran Lerman, Robert Silverman, and Thomas S. Warrick, “Plan for Postwar Gaza,” Executive Summary (Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., May 7, 2024), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/plan-postwar-gaza/.
39 James Jeffrey, “How ‘Day After’ Governance of Gaza Can Draw from Existing Plans,” (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D. C., August 12, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-day-after-governance-gaza-can-draw-existing-plans/.
40 David Makovsky, and Shira Efron, “For Progress in Gaza, Empower the Palestinian Authority,” The National Interest (blog), October 30, 2025, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/middle-east-watch/for-progress-in-gaza-empower-the-palestinian-authority/.
41 Neomi Neumann and Ghaith al-Omari, “Reforming the PA: A Road Map for Change,” Policy Notes No. 150, (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., July 24, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/reforming-palestinian-authority-roadmap-change/.
42 Neumann and Shalev, “Reforming the PA.”
43 Jeffrey, “How ‘Day After’ Governance of Gaza Can Draw from Existing Plans.”
44 Schroden, “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan Security Forces”; Michael Knights, “ISIL’s Political-Military Power in Iraq”, CTC Sentinel 7, no. 8 (2014): 1-6, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss81.pdf/.
45 Schroden, “Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan Security Forces”; Adam Scher, “The Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s Will to Fight: A Lack of Motivation, Training, or Force Generation?,” Military Review (February 19, 2016), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Army-Press-Online-Journal/documents/16-8-Scher-19Feb16.pdf/.
46 Louis René Beres, “After the Gaza War: Why Palestine Would Be a Lawless and Militarized State,” Paper No. 2,256 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, January 18, 2023), https://besacenter.org/after-the-gaza-war-why-palestine-would-be-a-lawless-and-militarized-state/.
47 Celso, “Hamas Unholy Jihad,” 850–851; Eitan Azani, E. and Daniel Haberfeld, “Hamas Media Campaign: ‘Al Aqsa Flood,’” Special Report (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Reichman University, Israel, October 2023), https://ict.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Haberfeld-Azai_Hamas-Media-Campaign-Al-Aqsa-Flood_2023_10_11.pdf/.
48 Bruce Hoffman, “Understanding Hamas’s Genocidal Ideology,” The Atlantic, October 10, 2023, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2023/10/hamas-covenant-israel-attack-war-genocide/675602/.
49 Abu Bakr Naji, “The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Must Pass,” trans. William McCants (John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, May 23, 2006), https://dn721902.ca.archive.org/0/items/Tawhed.netBooks/ManagementOfSavageryabuBakrNaji.pdf/.
50 Ehud Yaari, “How Hamas is Trying To Shape the ‘Day After’ in Gaza,” Policy Watch No. 3,884 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., June 11, 2024), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hamas-trying-shape-day-after-gaza; Ehud Yaari, “Hamas May Be Cheering But It Is Withering in Pain,” Policy Analysis (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., January 26, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hamas-may-be-cheering-it-writhing-pain/; Stuart Eizenstadt and Dennis Ross, “How to End the War in Gaza: Lessons from Lebanon,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., December 2, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-end-war-gaza-lessons-lebanon/.
51 “The Islamists: Doctrine of Hamas,” The Islamists: Insight & Analysis (Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., October 20, 2023), http:// https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/doctrine-hamas/.
52 Benedetta Lia, The Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Musab al-Suri (Hurst, 2009).
53 Nagel, “The UNRWA Are Ensuring the ‘Day After’ Includes More Wars”; and May, “Now the UN Admits Employee Involvement in October 7.”
54 Itamar Shalev, “Review of UNRWA–Produced Study Materials in the Palestinian Territories,” (Impact-Se, Ramat Gan, Israel, January 2021), https://www.impact-se.org/wp-content/uploads/UNRWA-Produced-Study-Materials-in-the-Palestinian-Territories%E2%80%94Jan-2021.pdf/.
55 Guy Millière, “End of the War in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran? Not Quite Yet,” (Gatestone Institute, New York, November 3, 2024), https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/21084/end-war-gaza-lebanon-iran/.
56 “Israel Passes Legislation Curtailing UNRWA Operations,” Flash Brief (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 29, 2024), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/29/israel-passes-legislation-curtailing-unrwas-operations/.
57 Assaf Orion and Matthew Levitt, “The Battle for UNIFIL Independence (Pt. 1): Hezbollah at the UN,” Policy Watch No. 3,786 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., September 21, 2023), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-unifils-independence-part-1-hezbollah-un; and Assaf Orion and Matthew Levitt, “The Battle for UNIFIL Independence (Pt. 2): The Facts on the Ground,” Policy Watch No. 3,787 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., September 21, 2023), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/battle-unifils-independence-part-2-facts-ground/.
58 Eado Hecht, “What Has Happened in Lebanon,” (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, Israel, September 22–28, 2023), https://besacenter.org/the-gaza-terror-offensive-october-7-8-2023/.
59 Kelly Campa, Alexander Braverman, Carolyn Mooran, et al. “Iran Update, October 4, 2024,” (Institute for the Study of War, Washington, D.C., October 4, 2024), https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-4-2024/.
60 Brian Carter, “Israel’s Victory in Lebanon,” (Institute for the Study of War, Washington, D.C., December 2, 2024), https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israels-victory-lebanon/.
61 Matthew Levitt, “What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza: The Power to Fight Without the Burdens of Governance,” Foreign Affairs (May 10, 2024), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/what-hamas-wants-postwar-gaza; and Ortal, “A Sustainable Strategy.”
62 Levitt, “What Hamas Wants in Postwar Gaza.”
63 Levitt, “Hamas Is Not Done Fighting”; Ahmad Sharawi, “Hamas Chooses Half of the Technocrats in New Gaza Governing Body,” Policy Brief (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C., October 29, 2025), https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/10/29/hamas-chooses-half-of-technocrats-in-new-gaza-governing-body/.
64 S. Ben-Ur and Aaron Goren, “US-Led Meeting on International Stabilization Force Inconclusive, IDF Reports 12 Gaza Ceasefire Violations Between December 4 to 18,” FDD’s Long War Journal (Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, D.C., December 18, 2025), https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/12/us-led-meeting-on-gaza-international-stabilization-force-inconclusive-idf-reports-12-gaza-ceasefire-violations-from-december-4-to-18.php/.
65 Ben-Ur and Goren, “US-Led Meeting on International Stabilization Force.”
66 Shay Shabtai, “‘Semi-Self Governance’ of Countries or Regions That Lack Proper Governance,” Perspectives Paper No. 2,326 (BESA, Bar-Ilan University, January 26, 2025), https://besacenter.org/semi-self-governance-of-countries-or-regions-that-lack-proper-governance/.
67 Neomi Neumann, “Israel’s Tribal Approach: A Short-Term Response to a Long-Term Challenge,” Policy Analysis (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2025), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/israels-tribal-approach-gaza-short-term-response-long-term-challenge/.
68 Iselin Brady and Daniel Byman, “Burden Sharing with Non-Traditional Counterterrorism Partners,” CTC Sentinel 18, no. 11 (2025): 19–34, https://ctc.westpoint.edu/burden-sharing-with-non-traditional-counterterrorism-partners/.
