SYRIA’S CLANDESTINE
CHEMICAL ARSENAL:
THE COMPLETE DOSSIER

This report represents the culmination of six years of clandestine intelligence gathering by the Middle East Forum’s network of sources within and adjacent to the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons program. From 2018 until the Assad regime’s downfall, our sources methodically assembled intelligence on Syria’s military-chemical manufacturing complex, revealing an intricate system designed to develop, produce, and deploy chemical and biological weapons while evading international scrutiny.

At the heart of this enterprise were two key components: Institute 6000 (formerly Branch 3000), the scientific and research division tasked with developing chemical agents, and Branch 450, the security apparatus responsible for transporting, securing, and deploying these weapons. Both operated under the umbrella of the Center for Scientific Studies and Research (CSSR), a nominally civilian institution that served as the regime’s primary vehicle for weapons development.

This report provides unprecedented detail on personnel, facilities, operational procedures, command structures, and evasion tactics employed by the Syrian regime to maintain its chemical weapons capability despite international prohibitions and inspections. The intelligence contained herein is based on firsthand accounts from regime insiders, intercepted communications, and documentary evidence collected at great personal risk by our sources.

The Middle East Forum’s investigation reveals a program far more sophisticated, resilient, and extensive than previously understood by the international community. The complete picture that emerges is one of systematic deception orchestrated at the highest levels of the Syrian government, with direct oversight from the Presidential Palace.

Between 2018 and 2024, the Middle East Forum established and maintained a network of confidential sources within Syria who systematically documented the regime’s chemical weapons program. These sources included regime officers, scientists, administrators, and peripheral staff who possessed direct knowledge of various aspects of the program. Many operated at great personal risk, providing information that could have resulted in severe consequences had their activities been discovered.

The investigation began with fragmented intelligence about certain facilities and personnel but gradually expanded as more sources came forward. Information was meticulously cross-referenced and verified, establishing a comprehensive understanding of how the Assad regime structured its chemical weapons enterprise to evade international detection and sanctions.

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The collapse of the Assad regime finally allowed numerous sources to speak openly about their experiences, confirming details that had previously been difficult to verify and filling critical gaps in our knowledge. The resulting intelligence picture represents the most complete accounting to date of Syria’s chemical weapons program.

This report integrates all strands of information gathered during our investigation, revealing the intricate relationships between scientific research, security operations, and executive control from the Presidential Palace. It details the program’s evolution from a relatively straightforward scientific endeavor to a deliberately complex and compartmentalized operation designed to confound international scrutiny.

Syria’s pursuit of chemical weapons began in earnest during the 1970s, driven by strategic calculations about regional power dynamics. Unable to match the conventional military capabilities of neighboring states, particularly Israel, the Syrian leadership under Hafez al-Assad sought asymmetric deterrents that could offset this disadvantage.

The earliest phase of the program centered on identifying and recruiting talented Syrian scientists who could be sent abroad for specialized training. These pioneers would form the intellectual foundation for what would become one of the most secretive chemical weapons programs in the Middle East.

Among the first generation of scientists recruited for this purpose were Abdulhalim Mansour and Omar Al-Bizri, both born in Tartus in 1932. Mansour completed his doctorate in chemistry in Belgium, while Al-Bizri earned his Ph.D. in the United Kingdom. Upon returning to Syria, they joined colleagues such as Mujahid Mamluk and Khalid Al-Azm to establish the scientific bedrock of Syria’s nascent chemical weapons capability.

During these formative years, the program operated primarily through the Syrian Army’s Chemical Corps, with scientific research conducted under military auspices. However, as international attention to chemical weapons proliferation increased, the regime recognized the need for greater discretion. This led to the establishment of the Center for Scientific Studies and Research (CSSR) in 1971 as a nominally civilian scientific institution that could pursue chemical weapons research under the guise of legitimate scientific inquiry.

The CSSR’s founding allowed Syria to present a more acceptable public face for activities that increasingly violated international norms. As the program matured through the 1980s and 1990s, it developed more sophisticated chemical agents and delivery systems while simultaneously building the organizational infrastructure needed to manage a clandestine weapons program of significant scale and complexity.

By the early 2000s, Syria had accumulated one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons in the region, primarily consisting of sarin, VX, and mustard agents. The scientific expertise, production facilities, and security apparatus established during these decades would later prove remarkably resilient in the face of international pressure for disarmament.

The Syrian chemical weapons program was deliberately structured to create layers of administrative complexity that could obscure its true nature and purpose. At its core were three primary organizational components: the Center for Scientific Studies and Research (CSSR) as the overarching institution, Institute 6000 as the scientific and development hub, and Branch 450 as the security and deployment arm.

The Center for Scientific Studies and Research (CSSR)
The CSSR presented itself to the world as a civilian scientific research institution focused on advancing Syria’s technological capabilities. It comprised multiple “institutes,” each nominally dedicated to different fields of research. These included Institute 1000 for ballistic missiles, Institute 2000 and Institute 4000 for electronics and advanced engineering, and others. This structure allowed the CSSR to claim it was engaged primarily in legitimate scientific endeavors.

In reality, the CSSR served as the primary organizational vehicle for Syria’s weapons development programs, with chemical weapons research concentrated within Institute 6000. The CSSR maintained its own administrative hierarchy, budget, and staff, creating the appearance of a normal research institution while facilitating highly classified weapons development.

Institute 6000
Formerly known as Branch 3000, Institute 6000 was the scientific heart of Syria’s chemical weapons program. Within its laboratories, scientists and technicians worked to develop, test, and refine chemical agents for potential weaponization. The Institute maintained facilities in multiple locations, primarily in the Damascus area, including centers in Barzeh and Jamraya.

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Institute 6000 employed a three-generational structure of scientific personnel. The first generation consisted of founding scientists like Mansour and Al-Bizri, who established the program’s foundations. The second generation, exemplified by figures like Zuhair Fadloun, expanded the program’s capabilities and managed its growth. The third generation comprised younger specialists, often recruited directly from the Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology (HIST), who brought fresh expertise and ensured continuity.

Personnel at Institute 6000 were carefully compartmentalized, with scientists typically specializing in narrow aspects of chemical weapons development to prevent any individual from comprehending the entire program. Staff were frequently rotated between projects and facilities, creating a constantly shifting organizational landscape that was difficult for outside observers to map accurately.

Branch 450
If Institute 6000 represented the scientific brain of Syria’s chemical weapons program, Branch 450 served as its secretive muscle. This security-focused entity was responsible for the physical security, transportation, storage, and potential deployment of chemical weapons. Branch 450 operated with extraordinary levels of secrecy, with most of its officers seconded from various intelligence services without formal documentation.

Branch 450 maintained its own chain of command, facilities, and operational procedures, often functioning independently from Institute 6000 even as the two organizations worked toward the same objectives. This separation created additional layers of security and deniability, as scientific personnel could claim ignorance of how their research was ultimately applied.

Post-2011 Reorganization
Following the outbreak of civil war in 2011 and increased international scrutiny of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities, the regime undertook a significant reorganization of its program. This restructuring was designed to disperse the military-chemical manufacturing complex across multiple nominally separate entities, complicating international efforts to monitor and dismantle the program.

Key entities in this dispersed structure included:

• The CSSR and Institute 6000, maintaining their role in research and development
• Branch 450, continuing its security and deployment functions
• The Technical Industries Corporation, established in 2010 under the Ministry of Defense
• The Dimas Laboratory for Pharmaceutical Industries, a front company for procuring dual-use materials

Despite their apparent separation on organizational charts, these entities functioned as parts of a unified system under centralized control from the Presidential Palace. Scientific personnel could be assigned across multiple organizations simultaneously, and resources flowed between entities as needed, all coordinated by Palace liaison officers.

This deliberate administrative complexity served to confuse international observers and sanctions regimes, allowing Syria to maintain its chemical weapons capability even as it ostensibly dismantled portions of its program under international supervision.

The Founding Generation
The first generation of scientists who established Syria’s chemical weapons program laid the intellectual foundation upon which successive generations would build. These individuals combined advanced scientific training, often acquired abroad, with unwavering loyalty to the regime’s strategic objectives.

Abdulhalim Mansour (b. 1932, Tartus) emerged as one of the program’s earliest and most influential figures. After earning his doctorate in chemistry in Belgium, he returned to Syria to help establish the scientific basis for chemical weapons development. Though officially retired by 2012, he maintained a consultative relationship with the CSSR well into the 2010s. His personal connections to the Presidential Palace endured through changing liaison officers, reflecting his continued importance to the program. Mansour retained privileged housing in the research residences in Jamraya despite his retirement, highlighting his special status. His daughter Maya, a medical doctor, was also associated with the program.

Omar Al-Bizri (b. 1932, Tartus) paralleled Mansour’s path, earning his doctorate in the U.K. before returning to help launch Syria’s chemical weapons program. Though he officially resigned from the CSSR more than two decades ago to work with the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) in Beirut, he maintained informal advisory connections to the program. Scientists within the CSSR continued to consult him through personal contacts rather than official channels.

These founding scientists established not only the technical basis for Syria’s chemical weapons capability, but also the organizational culture that would characterize the program for decades to come. Their emphasis on secrecy, compartmentalization, and loyalty to the regime’s strategic objectives would be inherited by subsequent generations of scientists.

The Bridge Generation
Between the founding scientists and the modern era stood a cadre of experts who expanded and modernized Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities. These individuals, who rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s, were responsible for transforming theoretical knowledge into practical weapons systems.

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Zuhair Mahmoud Fadloun (1947-2021, Damascus) exemplified this second generation of leadership. Serving simultaneously as scientific director of Institute 6000, secretary general of the Scientific Council for Pharmaceutical Industries, and deputy director-general of the CSSR, he wielded enormous influence across both military and civilian research domains. Fadloun maintained direct relationships with liaison officers from the Presidential Palace and with senior Branch 450 officers, particularly Brigadier General Ghassan Abbas.

Our sources revealed that Fadloun conducted classified research—unknown even to other CSSR scientists—in a private laboratory within his home, working alongside his wife, Fawza Menem, an expert in bacteriology with a U.K. doctorate. Only the Presidential Palace and director-general Amr Armanazi were aware of this research.

The Fadloun family extended its influence through business ventures in electronics and pharmaceuticals. Fadloun’s nephews, engineer Abdulnaser Fadloun (alias “Nasser Seijari”) and Ammar Fadloun (based in Austria), managed companies that secured contracts for electronics from both the CSSR and Ministry of Defense. After 2016, the regime began publicly promoting Fadloun’s role at the Dimas Laboratory for Pharmaceutical Industries to divert attention from his work at Institute 6000, with state media deliberately showcasing him and Armanazi at the Dimas facility.

Other key figures of this generation included Abdulwahab Alaf (b. 1961, Aleppo), who served as director of scientific research at the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission while advising Institute 6000 on materials science. Though not officially on the CSSR’s administrative staff, he supervised studies by new graduates and managed quality control for manufacturing processes.

Hasan Aita (b. 1954, Dummar, Damascus) represented another significant scientific contributor from this era. After completing a CSSR-sponsored doctorate in chemistry in France, he returned to work at Institute 6000, specializing in materials science. Despite his scientific prominence, the regime restricted his responsibilities due to perceived anti-regime sentiments among his extended family. He focused on supervising research by newer specialists and maintained relationships with scientists who had connections to Branch 450 and the Presidential Palace. Even after reaching retirement age, his contract was repeatedly extended due to his expertise.

The bridge generation’s key innovation was integrating scientific research more closely with security and intelligence functions, creating the hybrid scientific-security apparatus that would characterize Syria’s chemical weapons program in its mature form.

As Syria’s chemical weapons program matured, it developed a unique cadre of personnel who blended scientific expertise with security functions or administrative roles. These hybrid specialists traversed traditional organizational boundaries, linking different components of the program and ensuring coordination across its dispersed elements.

Major General (Physician) Hikmat Abdo (b. 1961, Dreikish, Tartus) exemplified this fusion of medical expertise with military intelligence. Initially affiliated with Air Force Intelligence, he joined the CSSR and Institute 6000, where he combined his medical role with security and research oversight functions. His close relationship with Brigadier General Mohammed Suleiman (until Suleiman’s assassination in 2008) gave him unique status and influence. Abdo conducted frequent foreign missions to Iran, China, and Belarus while managing medical centers within the CSSR. The regime emphasized his physician identity after he was placed under international sanctions, obscuring his more significant security role. He maintained connections with retired scientists and current CSSR employees, functioning more as a security operative than a scientist.

Osama Yassin Al-Sabbagh (b. 1962, Al-Midan, Damascus) represented another hybrid specialist who operated across institutional boundaries. A chemistry graduate from Damascus University, he worked simultaneously with Institute 6000, the Technical Industries Corporation, and Branch 450. He maintained relationships with scientists and security officers throughout the chemical weapons program, frequently visiting manufacturing centers outside Damascus in rural areas of Homs and Tartus. His foreign missions included trips to Iran, Russia, and clandestine visits to European Union countries using documentation bearing false identities. In 2013, he participated in the Syrian delegation to the Netherlands alongside Branch 450 officers. Al-Sabbagh’s two sons resided in Kassel, Germany: Mohammed Yaman (a dentist), and his younger son Kinan.

Eng. Mumtaz Naal fulfilled a critical administrative function bridging Institute 6000 and Branch 450. Working in the CSSR’s “Normative Evidence Section,” he accompanied scientific experiments, prepared trial reports for Branch 450 and CSSR leadership, and coordinated with foreign delegations. He played a decisive role in selecting personnel for foreign missions and chaired the Coordination Committee that interfaced with the United Nations inspection team in 2013, personally instructing accompanying staff to coordinate with Colonel Samer Rabou and the Central Security Office.

These hybrid specialists ensured that the scientific, security, and administrative aspects of Syria’s chemical weapons program remained aligned despite the deliberate compartmentalization of information and responsibility. Their ability to move between different domains allowed the program to function as a coherent whole while maintaining the appearance of separation between its component parts.

(Alex Knott via Wikimedia Commons)

The continued vitality of Syria’s chemical weapons program depended on a steady influx of younger scientists and technicians who could apply fresh expertise to established objectives. This third generation, mostly educated in the 2000s and 2010s, ensured the program’s technical relevance and operational continuity even as international pressure mounted.

Radwan Al-Khatib (b. 1975, Dreikish, Tartus) exemplified this newer cohort. A chemistry graduate from Damascus University, he earned his doctorate from the French University of Nantes in 2014 while on scholarship from the Higher Institute for Applied Sciences and Technology (HIST). He divided his time between Institute 6000 and the HIST chemistry laboratory, where he supervised postgraduate theses. Much of his work involved external missions to Banyas and Tartous to inspect manufacturing centers under Branch 450 supervision. Coming from the Alawite sect and demonstrating strong loyalty to the regime, he was being groomed for sensitive positions within the CSSR. When conducting missions outside Damascus, he followed Central Security Office protocols by switching off his mobile phone and avoiding all electronic communications platforms.

Tamam Darwish (b. 1969, Al-Zara, Hama) represented another key figure in this generation. Hailing from the Alawite sect in Masyaf area, he completed his chemistry doctorate in France before dividing his responsibilities between Institute 6000 in Jamraya and the “Environment Laboratory” at HIST. This dual role allowed him to supervise the research of students specifically selected for future work at Institute 6000. He conducted several foreign missions to Iran, China, and France before 2013, after which he remained in Damascus.

Malath Khansa (b. 1987, Latakia) represented a more recent addition to the program. From the Alawite village of Besheili near Latakia, he held a pharmacy degree and was pursuing a doctorate in Malaysia on a CSSR scholarship. He previously worked at the 5200 Center for Scientific Research within the Environmental Laboratory, which was linked to Institute 6000. His brother, Wael Khansa (b. 1965), had previously directed the 5200 Center, establishing a family connection to the CSSR. Due to this connection and his family’s trusted status within the Alawite community, Malath was transferred to Institute 6000 and placed on Zuhair Fadlun’s team.

Zulfiqar Zod (b. 1990, Banias, Tartus) illustrated the program’s continued recruitment from loyal Alawite communities. After earning his degree in mechatronics engineering from HIST in 2017, he received training in Russia before joining the Dimas Laboratory for Pharmaceutical Industries. However, he also worked with Institute 6000 and Branch 450, serving on a committee overseeing joint projects with North Korean experts.

This latest generation ensured that Syria’s chemical weapons program remained technically sophisticated despite international isolation. Their education at respectable foreign institutions, combined with specialized training from the program’s veterans, allowed them to maintain and potentially advance Syria’s chemical capabilities even as the program faced unprecedented scrutiny.

While Institute 6000 provided the scientific foundation for Syria’s chemical weapons, Branch 450 constituted the secretive security apparatus that protected, transported, and would potentially deploy these weapons. Branch 450 operated with extraordinary levels of secrecy that exceeded even the stringent security surrounding Institute 6000.
Our sources consistently reported that most CSSR staff remained unaware of Branch 450’s full composition and operations for several reasons:

1. Branch 450 officers were typically seconded from various security services without formal documentation of their transfer.
2. Officers rotated frequently between positions to minimize security risks.
3. Working hours for Branch 450 personnel rarely aligned with those of scientific staff.
4. The extreme sensitivity surrounding Branch 450 discouraged any inquiries about its activities.

Despite these obstacles, our investigation identified several key figures within this secretive organization:

Major General Ghassan Abbas emerged as the primary authority responsible for Branch 450 operations. Hailing from Al-Sawari village in rural Homs, he resided in Jamraya and directed all Branch operations. After 2016, his name disappeared from official mentions as branch head, prompting speculation that he had transferred to a direct role within the Presidential Palace. However, our sources believed he maintained effective control over Branch 450 throughout this period. His nephew, Osama Abbas, was a trainee officer at the CSSR.

Brigadier General Samir Daaboul, from Tal Kalakh in western Homs countryside, oversaw Branch 450 operations in central and northern Syria. His close relationships with Presidential Palace liaison officers extended to international connections, particularly with Lebanese Hezbollah leaders during his 2005 posting in Lebanon. His subsequent career included assignments with the Syrian Army’s 44th Regiment (15th Division) in Salkhad, Air Force Intelligence, and finally Branch 450.

Brigadier General Ali Wannous, from Safita in Tartus, assumed unofficial leadership of Branch 450 around 2017, though no formal announcement accompanied this change. Previously, he commanded Unit 417, overseeing storage operations and coordination for potential chemical weapons deployment within military units. His background in logistics made him particularly suited to managing the complex transportation and security requirements of chemical munitions.

Colonel Zuhair Ibrahim Haidar, from Khouriba village in Baniyas, Tartus, leveraged his family’s religious standing—his father was a prominent Alawite sheikh—to facilitate sensitive operations. He resided in Qutaifa until 2014, when his family relocated to Tartus. Seconded to Branch 450 before 2011, he emerged as one of its most knowledgeable officers due to his constant movement between facilities outside Damascus. He played a crucial role during the 2013 U.N. inspection mission, overseeing the transfer of undeclared chemical stockpiles to locations beyond international scrutiny.

Colonel Youssef Hatoum, from Qabu al-Awamiya near al-Qardaha in Latakia, represented another key Branch 450 operative. His responsibilities encompassed movement between various locations, including secret research centers in western Qalamoun. In October 2013, he joined the Syrian delegation to the Netherlands for negotiations with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), even as he maintained direct knowledge of undisclosed chemical storage sites in Syria. He accompanied visiting delegations to the CSSR, particularly Iranian and North Korean experts, and maintained close relationships with other Branch 450 leaders and Presidential Palace liaison officers.

Colonel Eng. Amjad Zirai (b. 1969, Nabek, Rural Damascus) illustrated the program’s compartmentalization practices. An engineer officer with Branch 450, he worked primarily within Institute 6000, where his affiliation remained unknown until 2017. This dual role allowed him to monitor scientific activities while maintaining the appearance of separation between research and security functions. He participated in foreign delegations both before and after 2013.

Branch 450’s operations extended far beyond mere security. The organization actively participated in Syria’s interactions with international inspection teams, helping orchestrate the deception that allowed the regime to declare compliance with chemical weapons prohibitions while secretly maintaining significant undeclared capabilities. This duality—publicly participating in disarmament while privately preserving chemical weapons—exemplified Branch 450’s central role in Syria’s strategy of deception.

Despite the apparent complexity of Syria’s chemical weapons organizational structure, ultimate authority resided firmly within the Presidential Palace. Our investigation revealed that what appeared on organizational charts as separate entities—the CSSR, Institute 6000, Branch 450, the Technical Industries Corporation, and front companies like the Dimas Laboratory—functioned as components of a unified system under centralized control.

The Palace exercised this control through specially designated liaison officers who maintained direct oversight of the chemical weapons program. These officers, while carrying military ranks and formally belonging to the Syrian Arab Army, answered directly to the President’s inner circle and could override standard chains of command throughout the program.

Brigadier General Eng. Mufid Diab Al-Ghada (from Al-Rabiah, Hama) emerged as one of the most influential of these liaison officers. From a family with strong connections to Bashar al-Assad, he served as a scientific supervisor alongside Major General Bassam Hassan. Before the death of Eng. Aziz Esber, Al-Ghada collaborated with him on plans to establish a “fourth sector” in scientific research that would consolidate all projects in regime-controlled areas. Operating from the Presidential Palace, he maintained oversight of all CSSR branches in Damascus as well as Branch 450’s coordination of military industrial production.

Brigadier General Eng. Tariq Ali Yasmina (from Sednaya, Rural Damascus) represented another key Palace liaison. From a family with deep military connections—his uncles included Major General Ghassan Yasmina (former commander of the Syrian Army’s 15th Division) and Major General Ayman Yasmina (former commander of the Syrian Air Force’s 29th Aviation Brigade)—he served as scientific supervisor for all CSSR laboratories. This role dated back to his time as a Lieutenant Colonel, when he worked alongside Brigadier General Mohammed Suleiman before Suleiman’s assassination. He continued in this capacity after Major General Bassam Hassan assumed Suleiman’s duties.

The Presidential Palace’s control extended beyond personnel management to financial and procurement decisions. While routine purchases at Institute 6000 were handled by a rotating procurement committee, any acquisitions related to chemical weapons development required approval from the “Expanded Supervisory Committee.” This high-level body included Palace liaison officers, the CSSR director general and deputy, the head of the Central Security Office, key institute directors, and an Air Force Intelligence representative.

Members of this Expanded Supervisory Committee included Bassam Al-Hasan, Tarek Yasmina, Mufid Al-Ghada, Amr Armanazi, Salam Tome, Mohamed Bilal, Khaled Nasri, Walid Zogheib, Maher Suleiman, Imad Mansour, Youssef Ajib, and Haider Al-Moallem. Only after this committee’s approval would funds flow for major acquisitions or sensitive projects.

This arrangement extended to financial control as well. While local finance departments handled nominal salaries and office supplies, funding for clandestine research and sensitive acquisitions came from high-level accounts controlled directly by the Palace. This dual financial system ensured that the most critical aspects of the chemical weapons program remained under the direct fiscal control of the regime’s inner circle.

The Presidential Palace’s centralized command structure allowed Syria’s chemical weapons program to function coherently despite its deliberately dispersed organizational structure. Scientific personnel could be reassigned across nominal institutional boundaries at will, resources could flow between apparently separate entities, and strategic decisions could be implemented uniformly across the entire enterprise—all directed from the highest levels of the Syrian government.

Syria’s chemical weapons program distributed its facilities across multiple locations to minimize vulnerability to airstrikes or other attacks, to evade international inspections, and to maintain plausible deniability about the scope of its operations. These facilities ranged from well-established research centers in Damascus suburbs to remote storage depots hidden in the countryside of Homs and Tartus.

Institute 6000 Facilities
The primary scientific facilities associated with Institute 6000 were concentrated in the Damascus area, allowing for closer supervision and coordination:

The Barzeh Center (coordinates: 33.558120, 36.315818) served as a major research facility for Institute 6000. Located in a Damascus suburb, it housed laboratories and offices where scientists conducted research on chemical agents and processes. The Barzeh location maintained a somewhat higher public profile than other facilities, allowing it to present a more innocuous face to international observers while still conducting sensitive research.

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The Jamraya Center (coordinates: 33.576819, 36.240878) represented another key Institute 6000 facility. Situated in a secure area northwest of Damascus, Jamraya combined research laboratories with residential housing for scientific personnel. The co-location of work and living spaces allowed for tighter security and monitoring of scientists while minimizing their exposure to outside influences or observation.

Mobile Laboratories (coordinates: 33.554197, 36.314057) provided Institute 6000 with flexible research capabilities that could be relocated quickly in response to security threats or international scrutiny. These specialized trailers contained essential equipment for chemical analysis and testing, allowing scientists to continue their work even when static facilities came under observation or threat of attack.

Branch 450 Facilities
While Institute 6000’s facilities focused on research and development, Branch 450 maintained a network of sites dedicated to manufacturing, storage, and potential deployment of chemical weapons:

Branch 450 Head Office in Homs (coordinates: 34.748718, 36.715976) served as the administrative center for Branch 450 operations. Located near the Air Force Intelligence building in Homs, this facility coordinated activities across Branch 450’s dispersed network while maintaining close connections with Syria’s intelligence services.

Khan Onaiba Manufacturing Site (multiple coordinates including 34.033350, 37.346532; 34.037156, 37.341344; 34.042007, 37.363845; 34.048640, 37.352176) represented one of the primary production facilities for chemical weapons. Located in a remote area of rural Homs, the site’s isolation provided both security and deniability, allowing large-scale manufacturing to proceed unobserved.

Unit 418 near Furuqlus (multiple coordinates including 34.650893, 37.066077; 34.647678, 37.050091; 34.643351, 37.059007; 34.643364, 37.063728) consisted of storage tunnels dug into hillsides outside the town of Furuqlus in Homs countryside. These underground facilities provided secure storage for chemical weapons components and finished munitions, protecting them from both aerial observation and potential airstrikes.

The Ali Center northeast of Ad-Dumayr (coordinates: 33.648802, 36.781077) represented another secretive facility in rural Damascus whose specific functions remained unclear even to many within the chemical weapons program. Its location east of Damascus positioned it away from areas frequently monitored by international observers.

The Oras Region Facility (coordinates: 34.660535, 36.715711) near the Air Defense College south of Homs constituted one of the most restricted sites in Syria’s chemical weapons infrastructure. Access was limited exclusively to Branch 450 officers, with even Institute 6000 scientists requiring special clearance or Branch 450 escort to enter. The facility’s surroundings included farms, officers’ residences, and the headquarters of the 18th Division, where Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah military commanders and experts maintained a presence.

Residential and Administrative Infrastructure
Beyond research and production facilities, Syria’s chemical weapons program maintained specialized infrastructure for personnel:

Research Residences in Jamraya provided housing for scientific staff working at Institute 6000. These residential blocks, including areas known as the “Firdous suburb,” kept scientific personnel in secure environments where they could be easily monitored and protected. Many of the scientists identified in our investigation, from veterans like Abdulhalim Mansour to newer specialists like Radwan Al-Khatib, maintained homes in these research residences.

Qutaifa Residences housed certain Branch 450 officers, including Colonel Zuhair Ibrahim Haidar until 2014. Located along the Damascus-Homs road, this area also contained warehousing and manufacturing sites supervised by personnel like Eng. Nizar Yassin Al-Sabbagh.

The geographic distribution of facilities created multiple layers of security and deniability. Research centers in Damascus suburbs maintained a veneer of legitimate scientific inquiry, while production and storage facilities in remote areas operated with minimal visibility. This spatial arrangement complemented the organizational compartmentalization, ensuring that few individuals possessed knowledge of the program’s complete physical footprint.

One of the greatest challenges facing Syria’s chemical weapons program was acquiring specialized materials and equipment while under international sanctions and scrutiny. The regime developed sophisticated procurement strategies that used front companies, dual-use justifications, and complex supply chains to circumvent these restrictions.

Dual-Track Procurement System
Our investigation revealed that the CSSR operated a two-track procurement system designed to separate routine acquisitions from sensitive purchases related to chemical weapons:

The Institute 6000 Procurement Committee handled conventional materials not specifically intended for chemical weapons production. This committee’s composition rotated every three months, creating the appearance of normal institutional procurement processes while limiting any individual’s long-term visibility into purchasing patterns.

The Expanded Supervisory Committee managed procurement of specialized equipment and chemicals directly relevant to chemical weapons development. This high-level body included Presidential Palace liaison officers, CSSR leadership, security representatives, and institute directors, ensuring that sensitive acquisitions received appropriate scrutiny and authorization.

This dual-track system allowed the CSSR to maintain seemingly legitimate procurement records for most of its activities while segregating the most sensitive purchases under specialized oversight.

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Front Companies and Intermediaries
The regime employed various front companies to disguise the ultimate destination and purpose of dual-use materials:

The Dimas Laboratory for Pharmaceutical Industries served as a primary procurement vehicle for chemical precursors and equipment. Operating under the guise of civilian pharmaceutical production, it could legitimately order chemicals and machinery that would be diverted to Institute 6000 or Branch 450 after delivery. The regime actively promoted the Dimas Laboratory’s civilian pharmaceutical role after 2016, with state media deliberately showcasing figures like Zuhair Fadloun working at its facilities to reinforce this cover story.

Asia Pharmaceutical Industries, where Fadloun served as a consultant and his nephew Abdulnaser Fadloun (alias “Nasser Seijari”) was a partner, potentially served as another channel for acquiring dual-use materials under pharmaceutical pretexts.

Electronics Companies established by relatives of key scientists, such as those run by engineer Abdulnaser Fadloun and Ammar Fadloun, secured contracts for electronic components from both the CSSR and Ministry of Defense. These companies could bid on seemingly legitimate tenders while ensuring that critical electronic equipment reached the chemical weapons program.

International Procurement Networks
The regime maintained procurement networks spanning multiple countries to diversify supply routes and minimize detection:

Russian Connections facilitated both equipment acquisition and specialized training. Scientists like Marwan Beiruti received training in Russia between 1996-1998, while more recent graduates like Zulfiqar Zod underwent training there after completing their Syrian education. These educational relationships often evolved into procurement channels.

Iranian Partnerships provided both technical expertise and procurement assistance. Personnel like Osama Al-Sabbagh and Anas Qureia made frequent visits to Iran, with Qureia specifically coordinating scientific delegations between the countries. These exchanges helped Syria circumvent Western sanctions by accessing materials through Iranian intermediaries.

European Access remained possible despite sanctions through creative documentation strategies. Osama Al-Sabbagh and others traveled to European Union countries using official papers bearing false identities, allowing them to conduct procurement activities or attend technical conferences without revealing their connections to sanctioned entities.

Transportation and Security Protocols
The movement of acquired materials followed strict security protocols managed by the CSSR’s Central Security Office:

VIP Employee Transportation used private cars with armed escorts from the Central Security Office rather than marked official vehicles that might draw attention.

Equipment Transportation employed vehicles driven by security volunteers rather than regular CSSR drivers, ensuring tighter control over sensitive shipments.

Communications Security during transport operations required personnel to switch off personal phones or leave them behind when departing Damascus. Many staff used frequently changing phone numbers or relied on relatives’ contacts to minimize electronic traceability.

These procurement strategies allowed Syria’s chemical weapons program to maintain access to essential materials and equipment despite international sanctions and monitoring. By distributing acquisitions across multiple front companies, exploiting dual-use justifications, and maintaining diverse international supply networks, the regime created a procurement system resilient to outside interference.

Syria’s chemical weapons program employed exhaustive security measures to protect its activities from both foreign intelligence services and internal leaks. These procedures created multiple layers of protection around sensitive information and operations, ensuring that few individuals possessed comprehensive knowledge of the program.

Personnel Compartmentalization
The program strictly limited information access through careful personnel management:

Generational Stratification divided scientific staff into three generations—founding scientists, mid-career experts, and newer specialists—with limited interaction between cohorts. This arrangement prevented comprehensive knowledge transfer while ensuring operational continuity.

Specialized Knowledge Restrictions ensured that most scientists and technicians understood only their specific aspects of chemical weapons development. By narrowly defining each individual’s role, the program prevented any single person from comprehending the entire production process.

Frequent Personnel Rotation between facilities and projects disrupted potential pattern recognition or comprehensive understanding by both insiders and foreign observers. This constant shuffling made it difficult to track key personnel or identify stable organizational structures.

Limited Branch 450 Visibility kept most scientific staff ignorant of the security organization’s complete roster and operations. Even high-ranking Institute 6000 scientists often knew only those Branch 450 officers directly relevant to their work.

Communications Control
Strict communications protocols minimized electronic footprints and potential intelligence collection:

Phone Security Practices for personnel involved in sensitive operations included switching off mobile phones before departing Damascus, using frequently changing numbers, or relying on relatives’ phones for certain contacts. Radwan Al-Khatib, for example, avoided all messaging applications on his personal device and provided his wife’s number for WhatsApp communications.

Restricted Electronic Communications prevented digital documentation of sensitive activities. Staff like Al-Khatib were prohibited from using WhatsApp, Facebook, Viber, or other platforms on their work devices, limiting mobile phones to voice calls only.

Multiple Contact Protocols ensured continued communications even if primary contacts were compromised. Branch 450 officers like Colonel Zuhair Haidar maintained secondary contact numbers through family members, with the Central Security Office keeping these alternate channels on file.

Physical Security Measures
Elaborate physical security arrangements protected facilities and movements:

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Tiered Access Restrictions at facilities like the Oras Region plant near Homs limited entry to specific Branch 450 officers, with Institute 6000 scientists requiring special clearance or escort to enter.

Security Service Drivers rather than regular CSSR employees transported specialized equipment, ensuring that sensitive material movements remained under direct security supervision.

Mobile Laboratories allowed critical research to continue in relocatable facilities that could be moved quickly in response to security threats or international scrutiny.

Administrative Obfuscation
Deliberately complex administrative structures concealed the program’s true nature:

Nominal Institutional Separation between entities like the CSSR, Institute 6000, Branch 450, and front companies created the appearance of unrelated organizations while actually functioning as components of a unified system.

Dual Employment Arrangements allowed scientific personnel to work simultaneously across multiple organizations without formal documentation, creating confusion about institutional affiliations and responsibilities.

Parallel Financial Systems separated routine expenses (handled by local finance departments) from sensitive project funding (controlled directly by accounts under Presidential Palace oversight).

Cover Stories and Public Personas for key personnel shifted attention from their actual roles. After 2016, the regime actively promoted Zuhair Fadloun’s association with the civilian Dimas Laboratory for Pharmaceutical Industries, with state media deliberately showcasing him in this role to distract from his central position at Institute 6000.

International Deception Operations
The program developed sophisticated strategies to mislead international inspectors and monitoring organizations:

Coordination Committees like the one chaired by Eng. Mumtaz Naal during the 2013 United Nations inspection managed interactions with international teams, ensuring consistent narratives and limited access to sensitive areas.

Strategic Facility Declarations selectively disclosed certain sites to international inspectors while maintaining undeclared facilities beyond scrutiny. This allowed Syria to claim compliance with chemical weapons prohibitions while preserving significant undeclared capabilities.

Dual-Identity Documentation for foreign travel enabled scientific personnel like Osama Al-Sabbagh to attend international conferences or conduct procurement activities without revealing their connections to sanctioned entities.

These overlapping security measures created an extraordinary level of operational secrecy that protected Syria’s chemical weapons program even during periods of intense international scrutiny. By combining rigorous personnel controls, communications discipline, physical security, administrative complexity, and international deception, the regime maintained its chemical capabilities despite nominal disarmament.

Syria’s chemical weapons program faced unprecedented international pressure following confirmed chemical attacks during the Syrian civil war, particularly after the August 2013 sarin attack in Ghouta. This scrutiny culminated in Syria’s accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and a U.N.-supervised disarmament process. However, our investigation revealed how the regime systematically circumvented these efforts through elaborate evasion tactics.

The 2013 Crisis and Response
Following international outrage over the Ghouta chemical weapons attack in August 2013, Syria agreed to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and eliminate its chemical weapons program under international supervision. This process involved:

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-U.N. Joint Mission dispatched international inspectors to verify Syria’s chemical weapons declarations and oversee destruction of declared stockpiles and production facilities.

Syria’s Official Declarations to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) acknowledged possession of certain chemical agents and facilities while carefully omitting others.

Declared Disarmament Activities proceeded under international observation, with Syria demonstrably eliminating specific stockpiles and converting or destroying certain production facilities.

While these actions created the appearance of compliance, our investigation documented how the regime simultaneously conducted a shadow operation to preserve key capabilities beyond international scrutiny.

Evasion Strategies and Tactics
Syria employed multiple strategies to maintain its chemical weapons capabilities while creating the illusion of complete disarmament:

Selective Declarations deliberately omitted certain chemical agents, facilities, and stockpiles from official disclosures to the OPCW. By acknowledging some aspects of its program while concealing others, Syria created a convincing partial disclosure that satisfied some international concerns while preserving its most critical capabilities.

Strategic Relocation moved undeclared chemical stockpiles to remote locations during the inspection period. Our sources confirmed that officers like Colonel Zuhair Ibrahim Haidar and Colonel Youssef Hatoum orchestrated these transfers to areas beyond detection, particularly in rural Homs. Colonel Hatoum’s participation in the Syrian delegation to the Netherlands for OPCW negotiations in October 2013 occurred while he maintained direct knowledge of these undisclosed sites.

Facility Repurposing converted certain chemical weapons production sites to seemingly legitimate civilian purposes, particularly pharmaceutical manufacturing. The Dimas Laboratory for Pharmaceutical Industries exemplified this approach, providing both a plausible alternative purpose for dual-use equipment and a procurement channel for new materials.

Technical Compliance with Narrow Requirements allowed Syria to claim it had met disarmament obligations while maintaining its capabilities. By focusing on specific agents or precursors mentioned in disarmament agreements while developing alternatives not explicitly covered, the regime exploited technical loopholes in the verification regime.

Post-Declaration Adaptation
Following the official disarmament process, Syria’s chemical weapons program evolved to maintain capabilities while minimizing detectability:

(Google Maps)

Organizational Dispersion distributed the military-chemical manufacturing complex across multiple nominally separate entities after 2011. This restructuring divided responsibilities between the CSSR, Branch 450, the Technical Industries Corporation, and front companies like the Dimas Laboratory, creating administrative complexity that confounded international monitoring.

Mobile Capabilities developed through specialized transportable laboratories allowed critical research to continue even as fixed facilities faced greater scrutiny. These mobile units could relocate quickly in response to security threats or inspection concerns.

Alternative Agent Development potentially shifted focus to chemical agents not specifically enumerated in Syria’s OPCW declarations or subject to the most rigorous verification measures.

Deepened International Partnerships with allies like Iran, Russia, and reportedly North Korea provided both technical assistance and procurement channels that circumvented Western sanctions and monitoring.

Our sources indicated that despite international disarmament efforts, Syria maintained significant chemical weapons capabilities through this combination of selective disclosure, strategic concealment, administrative reorganization, and technical adaptation. The program’s extraordinary compartmentalization and security measures enabled it to weather unprecedented international scrutiny while preserving its core functions.

The Middle East Forum’s six-year investigation into Syria’s chemical weapons program, made possible by our network of courageous sources within and adjacent to the regime, has revealed a system far more sophisticated, resilient, and deceptive than previously understood by the international community. As the Assad regime’s grip on power finally loosened, allowing more insiders to speak openly about their experiences, the full scope of this clandestine enterprise has come into sharper focus.

A Deliberate Strategy of Deception
Syria’s chemical weapons program represented not merely a collection of scientific facilities and security units, but a deliberate, strategic system designed to preserve prohibited capabilities while creating the impression of compliance with international norms. The program’s defining characteristics included:

Centralized Control with Dispersed Implementation as the Presidential Palace maintained ultimate authority while distributing operations across multiple nominally separate entities.

Compartmentalized Knowledge that prevented any individual beyond the innermost circle from comprehending the entire enterprise.

Layered Security that created multiple barriers between the program’s activities and potential observation by either internal or external parties.

Administrative Complexity that obscured organizational relationships and responsibilities.

Geographic Distribution that scattered facilities across Syria’s territory, minimizing vulnerability and complicating monitoring efforts.

Technical Adaptation that allowed the program to evolve in response to changing international pressure and scrutiny.

These features allowed Syria to maintain chemical weapons capabilities despite unprecedented international attention and formal disarmament efforts. The program survived precisely because it was designed from the outset to operate in the shadows, with deception as a core operational principle rather than a mere security measure.

Accountability Challenges
The information presented in this report—including names, positions, phone contacts, and facility coordinates—illustrates the scope and complexity of the enterprise that sustained Syria’s chemical weapons program for decades. The individuals identified, from founding scientists like Mansour and Al-Bizri to later figures such as Fadloun and the officers of Branch 450, each played distinct roles in maintaining a program that violated multiple international agreements.

Their activities were often disguised behind innocuous job titles, front companies, or academic pursuits. Yet across every layer of official documentation, a consistent pattern emerges: these individuals ultimately answered to the Presidential Palace and its designated liaison officers, who shaped every aspect of Syria’s chemical weapons capabilities.

As international bodies consider how to address the legacy of Syria’s chemical weapons program, this report provides essential context for understanding both the technical capabilities that may still exist and the human infrastructure that sustained them. Any serious accountability effort must recognize the deliberate complexity designed into the system and the careful distinction between the program’s public face and its actual operations.

The Broader Significance
Beyond its implications for Syria specifically, this investigation offers insights into how determined states can maintain prohibited weapons programs despite international monitoring and sanctions. The strategies employed by Syria—organizational dispersion, administrative complexity, front companies, compartmentalized knowledge, and selective disclosure—could serve as a template for other regimes seeking to preserve illicit capabilities while presenting a facade of compliance.

The international community’s partial success in identifying and dismantling certain aspects of Syria’s chemical program should not obscure its failure to recognize and address the program’s full scope and sophisticated evasion tactics. This case study demonstrates the limitations of verification regimes that focus primarily on declared facilities and materials without addressing the broader organizational infrastructure that sustains covert programs.

Final Reflections
The courageous testimony of numerous former regime officers, scientific staff, and other insiders made this comprehensive accounting possible. Many risked their safety to document a program designed to remain hidden, motivated by a desire to reveal the truth about a system that inflicted terror upon the Syrian population and defied international prohibitions.

As Syria undergoes political transition, the information contained in this report provides an essential roadmap for addressing the legacy of its chemical weapons program. By exposing the individuals, infrastructure, and administrative mechanisms that enabled it to function for so long in the shadows, we aim to ensure that such a clandestine apparatus never again takes root—in Syria or elsewhere.

The Middle East Forum presents this comprehensive dossier as a contribution to transparency, accountability, and ultimately, to preventing the recurrence of chemical weapons development and use. We recognize that fully untangling this complex system will require years of additional investigation and that some aspects may never be fully illuminated. Nevertheless, this report provides the most complete picture yet available of how the Assad regime maintained one of the most sophisticated and secretive chemical weapons programs in modern history.

APPENDIX A: GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF KEY FACILITIES
Institute 6000 Locations

• Barzeh Center:
  
  • 33.558120, 36.315818
• Jamraya Center:
  
  • 33.576819, 36.240878
• Mobile Laboratories:
  
  • 33.554197, 36.314057

Branch 450 Locations

• Head Office in Homs:
  
  • 34.748718, 36.715976
• Khan Onaiba Manufacturing Site:
  
  • 34.033350, 37.346532
  • 34.037156, 37.341344
  • 34.042007, 37.363845
  • 34.048640, 37.352176
• Unit 418 near Furuqlus:
  
  • 34.650893, 37.066077
  • 34.647678, 37.050091
  • 34.643351, 37.059007
  • 34.643364, 37.063728
• Ali Center northeast of Ad-Dumayr:
  
  • 33.648802, 36.781077
• Oras Region Facility:
  
  • 34.660535, 36.715711