Iran’s Shadow Empire: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s Military Infrastructure in Syria

This report reveals the comprehensive scope of Iran’s military colonization of Syria, based on six years of information gathering by the Middle East Forum’s network of sources within and around Iranian military installations across Syria. From 2018 until the Assad regime’s collapse in December 2024, our sources meticulously documented how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its proxy militias constructed a parallel military infrastructure that effectively transformed Syria into an Iranian forward operating base.

The investigation uncovered an extensive network of military installations, weapons storage facilities, command centers, and militia deployments that stretched from the Israeli border to the Iraqi frontier. This infrastructure served not merely as support for Assad’s forces, but as the foundation for Iran’s long-term strategic project to establish a permanent military presence linking Tehran to the Mediterranean.

With Syria months into its post-Assad era, the fate of this vast military apparatus—including its weapons stockpiles, trained militias, and command structures—remains one of the most pressing security challenges facing the region.

While the world’s attention focused on ISIS and Syria’s civil war, Iran quietly constructed what amounts to a state within a state across Syrian territory. The Middle East Forum’s investigation, conducted at extraordinary risk by sources embedded within Syrian military structures and Iranian-controlled areas, has assembled the most comprehensive picture to date of this shadow empire.

Our sources included Syrian military officers coerced into coordinating with Iranian forces, civilians living near IRGC installations, individuals with access to militia recruitment centers, and those who witnessed the systematic transformation of Syrian military facilities into Iranian forward bases. Many operated under the constant threat of detection by the sophisticated surveillance systems that Iran deployed around its installations.

The information gathered reveals an operation far more ambitious than simple military assistance to an allied regime. Iran’s project in Syria represented a methodical attempt to establish permanent military infrastructure that would survive any political transition, creating facts on the ground that would be difficult for any future Syrian government or international force to reverse.

Iran’s military footprint in Syria consisted of a carefully planned network of installations that provided defense in depth while maintaining supply lines to Lebanon and Iraq. The IRGC transformed existing Syrian military facilities and constructed new ones, creating an interlocking system of bases that could operate independently of Syrian government control.

The crown jewel of Iran’s presence in southern Syria was the facility at Mount Al-Mazar, located north of Palmyra. This installation featured extensive underground warehouses connected by tunnels large enough to accommodate heavy trucks. The Al-Fatimiyoon Brigade, composed of Afghan Shia fighters, provided security while Iranian engineers supervised the construction of reinforced storage facilities designed to withstand aerial bombardment. Adjacent facilities in the mountain created a complex that served as the primary weapons depot for Iranian forces operating in central Syria.

In Damascus, the IRGC established multiple command centers that operated with minimal Syrian oversight. Regiment 166, positioned strategically between the towns of Sahnaya, Al-Kiswah, and Al-Sbene at the southern entrance to Damascus, exemplified this approach. Officially a Syrian Arab Army facility, the regiment contained approximately 200 Syrian soldiers who were restricted from entering Iranian-controlled sections. The IRGC maintained exclusive control over weapons warehouses within the complex where Iranian missiles and specialized equipment were stored beyond Syrian military access.

The 10th Division base in western Rural Damascus, situated among the villages of Katana, Yafour, Kafarkok, and Al-Saboura represented another model of Iranian occupation. This sprawling complex housed an estimated 100 fighters from various Iranian proxy forces, including Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Hezbollah, and the Al-Nujaba Movement. The base featured a Krasukha-4 electronic warfare system operated exclusively by IRGC officers, while Syrian forces were prohibited from moving within the division without written authorization.

Aleppo province hosted some of Iran’s most sophisticated facilities. The Azzan Mountain complex in southern rural Aleppo served as the primary IRGC command center for northern Syria, featuring underground weapons storage and missile deployment positions. Iranian consultants Haj Abdul Hadi and Haj Abdullah Dahqan oversaw operations that included testing improved versions of Russian Tochka missiles against opposition positions in Idlib.
The Al-Naser Center in Deir Ezzor, located within the Education Faculty building of Al-Furat University on Port Saeed street at the western edge of the city, functioned as the IRGC’s primary operations center for eastern Syria. Under the command of Haj Kameel, who resided in a heavily fortified villa in the Al-Vilat neighborhood, this facility coordinated weapons shipments from Iraq and managed recruitment of local Syrian fighters into Iranian proxy forces.

Iran’s military presence extended far beyond regular IRGC forces through a sophisticated network of proxy militias that provided both plausible deniability and local recruitment capabilities. This militia archipelago operated under unified Iranian command while maintaining distinct organizational identities.

Lebanese Hezbollah established particularly strong positions in strategic areas. In the Qaryatayn region of Homs, approximately 18 kilometers south of the city, Hezbollah reinforced its deployment at Mahsa Al-Qaryatain and near an area known locally as Al-Wadi. These positions controlled the vital supply route linking the Iraqi border through Palmyra to the Lebanese frontier. Iraqi coordinator Qunbur Al-Ruwaimi Al-Basrawi oversaw joint operations between Lebanese and Iraqi Hezbollah units, managing weapons transfers that ultimately reached Lebanon.

The Afghan Fatimiyoon Brigade maintained significant presence throughout central Syria, with training camps in Ithrya, located approximately 90 kilometers east of Hama in the Syrian desert, where recruits underwent months of preparation before deployment. In July 2022, the brigade reinforced positions near the town of Al-Hader in southern rural Aleppo with 120 fighters, supported by artillery systems including 130mm cannons and locally manufactured “Golan Launchers” developed at the Al-Sfera Defense Factories located 20 kilometers southeast of Aleppo.

Iraqi militias operated with particular freedom in western Syria. The Badr Corps established headquarters in Khan Al-Asal in western rural Aleppo, complete with recruitment offices, martyrs’ affairs departments, and operations rooms linked directly to Iranian command centers at the Military Engineering Academy in Aleppo city. Commander Ahmad Al-Hadidi, known as Abu Murtada Al-Iraqi, coordinated with local Syrian Shia militias including the Al-Baqer Brigade to create integrated forces that blurred the lines between foreign and domestic fighters.

The organizational sophistication of these militias extended to specialized units. Brigade 47 and Division 11 incorporated IRGC advisers directly into their command structures, while maintaining Syrian officers like Yahya Al-Fahil as liaisons to preserve the fiction of Syrian sovereignty. This dual command system allowed Iran to exercise operational control while Syrian officers handled administrative functions.

Iran’s investment in sophisticated military technology transformed parts of Syria into some of the most heavily monitored airspace in the Middle East. The IRGC deployed multiple overlapping air defense and electronic warfare systems that provided both defensive capabilities and intelligence collection against Israeli and coalition aircraft.

The electronic warfare infrastructure centered on Russian-supplied systems operated by Iranian technicians. At Tal Al-Hara, on a strategic height in western Daraa province overlooking the Golan Heights and situated just ten kilometers from Israeli-controlled territory, Iran installed R330 and Krasukha systems capable of jamming communications and disrupting aerial navigation systems. The elevated position provided optimal coverage for signals intelligence collection. The site featured restricted warehouses where Syrian personnel were prohibited from entering, suggesting storage of particularly sensitive Iranian equipment.

Air defense systems created interlocking fields of fire across Syrian territory. The IRGC deployed Pantsir systems at Regiment 166 and the 10th Division, Buk-M systems at multiple locations, and maintained stockpiles of man-portable Igla missiles for point defense. At critical facilities like Mount Al-Mazar, these systems were supplemented by extensive passive defenses including underground storage and camouflaged positions that complicated targeting.

The integration of these systems reflected Iranian learning from Israeli air operations. Rather than attempting to create impenetrable air defense, the IRGC focused on raising the cost and complexity of strikes while preserving critical assets underground. Electronic warfare systems provided early warning while mobile air defense units could be rapidly repositioned based on intelligence indicators of impending strikes.

Beyond military infrastructure, Iran pursued a systematic campaign of demographic engineering designed to create loyal population bases in strategic areas. This project went far beyond temporary military deployment to encompass property acquisition, family settlement, and religious conversion efforts.

In Palmyra, Haj Kamal oversaw an extensive settlement program that concentrated on the Al-Amiriya neighborhood on the city’s outskirts and along Al-Jumhuriya Street in the central district. Iraqi and Lebanese Shia families received Syrian documentation officially registered with civil authorities, while property purchases were facilitated through Syrian
intermediaries like Khaled Al-Mutlak. The Cham Palace Hotel in central Palmyra served as a regular waystation for Shia pilgrims whose visits combined religious tourism with assessment of settlement opportunities.

The program extended to creating economic dependencies. In Deir Ezzor, the Office of Martyrs’ Affairs managed by Haj Kameel provided salaries to families of killed fighters, arranged remarriages of widows to militia members, and established educational programs that sent Syrian children to religious schools in Iran and Iraq. This comprehensive approach created multi-generational ties that would persist regardless of military developments.

Iranian forces requisitioned properties for commander housing while establishing security zones that excluded local populations. In Palmyra’s Al-Jumhuriya Street area, an entire street of houses was converted to accommodation for Iranian militia commanders and their families. Similar patterns appeared in Aleppo’s Khan Al-Asal district in the western countryside, where residential villas in an “Iranian security zone” housed IRGC commanders relocated from exposed positions at Aleppo International Airport.

The religious dimension of demographic change operated through cultural centers and seminaries. The Sayida Zeinab complex in southern Damascus, located approximately 200 meters from the religious shrine, served as more than a pilgrimage site, functioning as a recruitment center where local youth were identified for religious education in Iran. The site’s security force, officially protecting religious pilgrims, maintained surveillance capabilities that monitored the surrounding population and identified potential recruits or threats.

The human architecture of Iran’s presence revealed a carefully structured hierarchy that maintained operational security while enabling coordinated action across Syria’s territory. Iranian commanders operated through multiple identities and communication channels while maintaining strict compartmentalization of sensitive information.

Haj Kameel emerged as the central figure in eastern Syria, combining military command with extensive civil administration functions. Operating from Deir Ezzor, he commanded all IRGC and affiliated forces in the eastern region while managing property acquisitions, recruitment programs, and even oversight of families of fallen fighters. His residence in the fortified Al-Vilat neighborhood was protected by multiple security perimeters and surveillance systems linked to monitoring rooms at both his villa and the Al-Naser Center.

The command structure integrated Iranian, Lebanese, and Iraqi commanders in ways that transcended nominal organizational boundaries. Haj Kamal, heading Iranian forces in Palmyra, coordinated directly with Lebanese Hezbollah’s Haj Adnan at Tal Al-Hara and Iraqi commanders like Qasem Muslih who managed cross-border operations from Karbala. This transnational network enabled rapid resource reallocation and coordinated responses to threats.

Communications security reflected lessons learned from Israeli and coalition targeting. Commanders like Haj Kameel maintained multiple phones changed frequently, while sensitive operations used independent landline networks disconnected from public systems. At facilities like the Sayida Zeinab shrine complex, dedicated communications linked guard headquarters, the Al-Safeer hotel located 100 meters from the shrine, and monitoring rooms without touching Syrian telecommunications infrastructure.

Syrian liaison officers provided the interface with official military structures while having limited visibility into Iranian operations. Colonel Jamal Al-Saeed and Colonel Mohammed Barakat at Azzan Mountain coordinated with Iranian forces but were excluded from warehouses containing Iranian weapons. This parallel command structure allowed Iran to operate independently while maintaining the fiction of Syrian military sovereignty.

The MEF investigation uncovered extensive networks supporting Iranian operations from cells based in Europe and North America. These networks provided financing, procurement, and intelligence collection while operating under commercial cover.

The European network centered on individuals who combined legitimate business activities with support functions for Iranian proxies. Operating from Sweden, Germany, Belgium, France, and the United States, network members raised funds through the khums religious tax on Shia communities, laundered money through food import businesses, and gathered intelligence on Syrian and Iraqi expatriates opposed to Iranian influence.

Key nodes included Muhammad Kareem Muhammad Al-Fahdawi operating from Sweden, Thaer Al-Shibani in Germany, and Ahmad Muhsin Al-Mayahi in the United States. The network demonstrated sophisticated operational security, using commercial transactions with inflated invoices to move funds while maintaining plausible legitimate business activities. Electronic commerce platforms allowed collection of customer data including banking information that could be used for intelligence purposes.

The network’s effectiveness was demonstrated through successful penetration of Iraqi opposition groups like Thwar Ashura, with intelligence gathered in Europe transmitted to Iraqi Hezbollah for operational use. Hasan Taleb Faisal maintained a safe house in Baghdad’s Al-Mashtal district that served as a communication hub between European cells and militia leadership in Iraq and Syria.

Coordination between European cells and field operations was achieved through figures like Haj Abu Mujtaba Al-Lami, whose responsibilities included western Iraq’s Sunni-majority areas while maintaining contact with European-based intelligence assets. His visits to Palmyra to meet with the Iraqi Al-Hadi Brigade demonstrated the integration of intelligence collection, military operations, and international support networks.

The scale and sophistication of weapons stockpiling uncovered by the investigation suggested Iranian preparation for long-term confrontation rather than merely supporting Syrian government operations. The geographic distribution and types of weapons indicated multiple strategic objectives including deterrence against Israel, support for Hezbollah in any future conflict, and maintaining leverage over any post-Assad government.

Surface-to-surface missiles formed the core of Iran’s strategic arsenal in Syria. Iranian Fajr and Zilzal missiles were stored at hardened facilities at Mount Al-Mazar, Azzan Mountain, and other strategic locations. More significantly, Iranian and Syrian technicians at Factory 790 within the Al-Sfera Defense complex worked to improve Russian missiles, extending their range and accuracy. These improved weapons underwent testing against opposition areas in Idlib, providing operational data for further refinements.

The investigation documented extensive conventional weapons stockpiles distributed across dozens of warehouses. At the 10th Division base alone, ten separate storage facilities contained everything from small arms ammunition to tank shells and anti-aircraft missiles. The deliberate separation of storage sites, some exclusively controlled by Iranian forces with others managed by specific militias, created redundancy that would complicate any effort to neutralize these stockpiles.

Weapons movement patterns revealed the strategic importance of the Deir Ezzor-Palmyra highway as the primary artery for arms flows from Iraq. Following increased attacks on eastern storage sites in 2022, the IRGC relocated significant stockpiles westward, using Syrian Army vehicles with replaced crews to maintain operational security. The urgency of these movements, documented by our sources observing convoys of eight Volvo trucks moving weapons from the Ayyash warehouses west of Deir Ezzor to Mount Al-Mazar suggested particular concern about specific weapons systems that Iran was determined to preserve.

Anti-aircraft systems received particular emphasis, with multiple overlapping systems creating layered defenses. Beyond fixed SAM sites, the proliferation of man-portable systems and vehicle-mounted anti-aircraft guns provided Iranian forces with organic air defense capabilities that could persist even if major systems were destroyed. The integration of electronic warfare systems suggested an evolution toward disruption rather than destruction as the primary counter-air strategy.

The Middle East Forum’s six-year investigation has revealed Iran’s construction of a parallel military infrastructure in Syria that amounts to far more than battlefield support for an allied regime. Through systematic documentation at great personal risk, our sources exposed a comprehensive colonization project designed to establish permanent Iranian military capabilities regardless of Syria’s political future.

The sophistication of this infrastructure—from hardened underground storage facilities to integrated air defense networks to demographic engineering projects—reflects decades of Iranian strategic planning and billions of dollars in investment. The human networks identified, spanning from military commanders in Syrian bases to operatives in European capitals, demonstrate the multi-dimensional nature of Iran’s approach to regional power projection.

As Syria undergoes political transition following Assad’s fall, the disposition of this vast military infrastructure presents immediate security challenges. The weapons stockpiles documented in this report, if captured by extremist groups or used to fuel renewed conflict, could destabilize the region for years. The militia networks, with their established command structures and international support systems, possess the capability to operate independently of any government authority.

The demographic changes initiated by Iran, particularly the settlement of foreign Shia families with Syrian documentation, have created facts on the ground that will complicate any peace settlement. The economic dependencies established through militia salaries and social services have bound segments of the Syrian population to Iranian interests in ways that transcend simple military occupation.

Perhaps most concerning is the precedent established by Iran’s success in constructing this shadow empire. The ability to build parallel military infrastructure, operate independently of host government control, and maintain strategic capabilities despite international scrutiny provides a template that could be replicated elsewhere in the region.

The international community’s focus on chemical weapons and counter-ISIS operations, while necessary, allowed Iran’s more systematic military colonization to proceed largely unchallenged. The information presented in this report demonstrates the cost of this oversight—an entrenched Iranian military presence that could have shaped Syria’s trajectory for generations regardless of formal agreements or political settlements.

As policymakers consider approaches to Syria’s reconstruction and regional stability, they must reckon with the reality that Iran had successfully created what amounts to a permanent forward operating base stretching from the Iraqi border to the Mediterranean. Dismantling or even containing this infrastructure will require sustained international attention and resources far exceeding current commitments.

The brave individuals who risked their lives to document this shadow empire have provided an essential service to understanding the true nature of Iran’s regional ambitions. Their testimony stands as a warning that beneath the surface of state sovereignty and international law, a parallel reality of military occupation and strategic patience has fundamentally altered the Middle East’s balance of power.

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The 10th Division Base for the IRGC and Iranian Proxies in Rural Syria

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10th Division Warehouses

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IRGC Guarding Headquarters

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Al-Naser Center (Operations HQ)

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Hamoud al-Abd Center (Intelligence/Detention)

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Deir Ezzor–Palmyra Highway “Panorama” Checkpoint

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Residence of IRGC Commander Haj Kameel

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Al-Mazar Mountain (Primary IRGC Depot) Main Warehouse Area

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Hezbollah “Qaryatain Bridge” - Deployment Base (Mahsa al-Qaryatain)

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Hezbollah “Qaryatain Bridge” - Headquarters (Al-Wadi Area)

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Reinforced Deployment (Mazaree Al-Qaryatain)

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Palmyra City - Cham Palace Hotel (Logistics/Rest Hub)

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Aleppo Command Headquarters

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Aleppo - Missile Deployment Platforms

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Fallback & Dispersal Site: Khan Toman Warehouses

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IRGC Commander Relocation Zone (Khan Al-Asal) (Google Maps)

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Artillery & Missile Battalion (Shghidla Dam)

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Tal Al-Hara (Golan Facing Intelligence Site), Main Hill Location

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Al-Fatimiyoun Brigade Training Camp - Ithrya Camp, Hama

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Mount Al-Mazar Complex - Located north of Palmyra, this mountain facility contains the primary weapons depot for central Syria, featuring extensive underground warehouses connected by vehicle-accessible tunnels and multiple storage sites spread across the mountain’s terrain.

Regiment 166 - Positioned between Sahnaya, Al-Kiswah, and Al-Sbene at Damascus’s southern entrance, controlling access from Daraa and housing exclusive IRGC weapons storage facilities prohibited to Syrian forces.

10th Division Base - Situated in western Rural Damascus among the villages of Katana, Yafour, Kafarkok, and Al-Saboura, spanning a vast area with ten separate weapons storage facilities and electronic warfare systems.

Azzan Mountain Complex - Dominating southern rural Aleppo, this elevated position serves as the IRGC’s northern command center with underground storage and missile testing facilities.

Al-Naser Center - Located within Deir Ezzor’s university district on Port Saeed Street, functioning as the eastern region’s operations hub with adjacent residential security zones in the Al-Vilat neighborhood.

Al-Qaryatain Deployment - Multiple reinforced positions south of Homs city, including facilities at Mahsa Al-Qaryatain (18 kilometers south) and the Al-Wadi area, controlling the critical supply route from Iraq through Palmyra to Lebanon.

Tal Al-Hara Installation - Positioned on strategic heights in western Daraa province, approximately 10 kilometers from the Golan Heights, providing surveillance and electronic warfare coverage over southwestern Syria.

Khan Al-Asal - Western Aleppo countryside hosting Iraqi Badr Corps headquarters and Iranian security zones with requisitioned residential villas.

Ithrya Training Complex - Located 90 kilometers east of Hama in the Syrian desert, serving as the primary training facility for the Afghan Fatimiyoon Brigade.

Palmyra Settlement Zones - Concentrated in the Al-Amiriya neighborhood and along Al-Jumhuriya Street, with the Cham Palace Hotel serving as a transit point for Shia pilgrims and potential settlers.

Sayida Zeinab District - Southern Damascus religious complex functioning as a recruitment center with extensive surveillance systems monitoring the surrounding population.