Not only have Hamas militants designated as terrorists by the United States and the European Union chosen Turkey as a safe haven where they can obtain citizenship and residency while exploiting the country’s financial and logistical infrastructure to support their operations, but Israeli organized crime figures have also turned to Turkey as a base for running their criminal enterprises, securing citizenship or legal residence and expanding their international reach, according to US court documents reviewed by Nordic Monitor.
The case of Eran Hiya, a US-born Israeli organized crime figure wanted by Israel on attempted murder and conspiracy charges, offers a rare glimpse into how Turkey has become a preferred refuge for transnational actors ranging from militants to mafia bosses. According to court records Hiya primarily resided in a secured compound in Turkey with private security. American judges deemed him a serious flight risk, citing his Turkish residence, family ties abroad, financial resources and access to multiple travel documents.
Following his father’s imprisonment, Eran Hiya emerged as one of a new generation of Israeli organized crime leaders who assumed control of the long-established criminal organization after his father was jailed.
Following his father’s imprisonment, Eran Hiya emerged as one of a new generation of Israeli organized crime leaders who assumed control of the long-established criminal organization after his father was jailed.
Hiya was the subject of an INTERPOL Red Notice issued at Israel’s request, meaning Turkish authorities would have been aware that he was wanted on serious criminal charges through international law enforcement channels. Despite that, there is no indication in the available court records that Turkey took action to arrest him. Instead, Hiya was able to establish himself in Turkey, where US court records indicate he acquired Turkish citizenship and resided in a heavily guarded compound under private security. According to an Israeli police intelligence document submitted as evidence in the US extradition proceedings, investigators tracked Hiya’s international travel itinerary, which originated in Turkey and extended across multiple countries, underscoring Turkey’s role as his principal base of operations.
After arriving in Malaysia from Turkey, Hiya was arrested by Malaysian police in Johor on April 4, 2024. He was subsequently transferred to US authorities on May 12 in connection with a separate US arrest warrant alleging passport fraud and conspiracy to unlawfully obtain US citizenship for his family members. When Malaysian authorities handed Hiya over to the FBI, they also transferred several identity documents seized at the time of his arrest, including a Turkish passport and a Turkish national identity card. The documents further reinforced US investigators’ assessment that Turkey had become Hiya’s principal base of operations and that he had established formal legal ties to the country.
After arriving in New York, Hiya appeared before a federal court on May 14, 2024, on passport fraud charges. Three days later, on May 17, the US Department of Justice initiated separate extradition proceedings on behalf of Israel under the US-Israel extradition treaty.
According to an FBI memorandum documenting a voluntary interview conducted during Hiya’s transfer from Kuala Lumpur to New York, he discussed his assets, international travel, business interests, associates and criminal rivals with federal agents.
Of particular relevance to Turkey, the FBI report says Hiya told agents that he owned a Turkish passport and real estate in Turkey. That suggests he acquired Turkish citizenship through a property purchase, a common method made available to foreigners in recent years by the corrupt government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to obtain citizenship and residency. Many internationally wanted notorious figures have settled in Turkey under this scheme with the full knowledge of Turkish authorities. As long as they launder money in Turkey and share illicit proceeds with the Turkish mafia, which in turn passes a cut to senior government officials, including Erdogan himself, in exchange for protection, they remain untouched. Hiya’s case fits the same pattern.
How Hiya managed to acquire Turkish citizenship warrants further scrutiny. Under Turkey’s naturalization process, citizenship applications are vetted by the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) as well as the INTERPOL department of the Turkish National Police, both of which would have been expected to know the notorious background of Hiya, who had long been involved in gang wars in Israel. The fact that his application was nevertheless approved raises questions about how he cleared the security screening. It may indicate that he received assistance from insiders, submitted falsified documents or bribed officials. More importantly, the granting of Turkish citizenship requires the signature of President Erdogan, who would have been presented with the case file before giving final approval. Despite Hiya’s background, the application ultimately received the president’s authorization.The letter reveals that FBI agents were seeking detailed information about Hiya’s movements after receiving intelligence that he had been involved in a violent altercation on the Indonesian island of Bali.
According to a complaint filed in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, Israel requested Hiya’s provisional arrest under the US-Israel extradition treaty after charging him with attempted murder and conspiracy to commit a felony. A warrant for his arrest was issued on May 10, 2024, by Judge Eitan Korenhauser of the Tel Aviv Magistrates Court.
Israeli authorities allege that from December 2023 to January 2024, Hiya directed, planned and provided material support for the attempted assassination of rival gang leader Eli Musli. The warrant also lists multiple suspected offenses under Israeli law, including attempting to cause the death of a person, illegally acquiring, carrying or transporting a weapon, illegal possession of a weapon, conspiracy to commit a crime, changing the identity of a vehicle part and destroying evidence.
Despite the Israeli address listed in the warrant, US court records later emphasized that Hiya’s life was centered in Turkey. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Hiya generally resided in a Turkish compound with private security and possessed passports and identification documents from several countries, including Turkey and Poland. The court also cited his lack of strong ties to the United States, his family’s residence abroad and his alleged access to illicit assets as reasons to deny bail.
The court’s April 24, 2026, order affirmed the district court’s finding that Hiya posed a flight risk and should remain detained while challenging extradition. The judges found that even if there were questions about the strength of the Israeli evidence, the combination of his Turkish base, international mobility, financial resources and alleged organized crime role justified continued detention.
The FBI’s international investigation also sheds new light on Hiya’s use of Turkish documentation. In a February 2, 2024, intelligence request, a copy of which was submitted to a court in the US, sent by the FBI’s Legal Attaché Office at the US Embassy in Jakarta to the Indonesian National Police, investigators specifically instructed their Indonesian counterparts to determine whether Turkish-issued documents had been seized from Hiya and to reconstruct his international travel using those documents.
The letter reveals that FBI agents were seeking detailed information about Hiya’s movements after receiving intelligence that he had been involved in a violent altercation on the Indonesian island of Bali. Among the FBI’s questions were whether Indonesian authorities had confiscated a Turkish passport, cell phones, computers, laptops or tablets during his arrest, what passport he had used to enter Indonesia and when he had traveled to Bali.
The case raises broader questions about how foreign fugitives, militants and organized crime figures have been able to embed themselves in the country through residence, citizenship and protection networks while continuing to pose security concerns beyond Turkey’s borders.
These records reinforce later findings by U.S. federal courts that Hiya maintained substantial ties to Turkey. Together with court findings that he primarily resided in a guarded compound in Turkey, the FBI documents indicate that Turkish identity documents were considered sufficiently important by investigators to become a central focus of an international law enforcement inquiry spanning the United States, Indonesia and Israel.
The case adds another layer to Turkey’s growing reputation as a permissive environment for internationally wanted figures. Turkish authorities have long faced criticism for allowing Hamas operatives to acquire residence, citizenship and operational space in the country. The Hiya case shows that Turkey has also attracted figures from the world of Israeli organized crime, who appear to have found in Turkey a secure platform from which to live, travel and maintain influence abroad.
The case raises broader questions about how foreign fugitives, militants and organized crime figures have been able to embed themselves in the country through residence, citizenship and protection networks while continuing to pose security concerns beyond Turkey’s borders.
Published originally on July 2, 2026.
Documents referenced in this article are available in the original Nordic Monitor version.
